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ABSTRACT
This work follows a new and ever-increasing trend in the study 
of administrative systems in their ecological, societal context in less 
developed countries. It proposes to describe, analyze and evaluate the 
practices and techniques employed by, and the rules and regulations 
governing the personnel administrative system of Lebanon.
Many "newly independent countries" have administrative heritages 
with deeply embedded values and patterns of behavior from the past. 
Lebanon inherited significant features of Ottoman administration and 
was directly affected by the administration of the French Mandate.
Upon obtaining independence, Lebanon faced fundamental problems 
in its public personnel system. The personnel system which served the 
needs of the Ottoman and French rulers had to be re-oriented to serve 
the needs of an independent country. Thus, the government made several 
attempts at reforming the administration, notably in 1952, 1955 and 
1958-59. Prior to 1959, Lebanese civil servants had their personnel 
matters administered by individual ministries which were quite inade­
quate for the task. A remedy was sought through the establishment of 
the Civil Service Board, a central agency for personnel administration. 
This Board will be the focus of this study.
Two methods will be combined in this study for the purposes of 
exploring the dimensions of the personnel problems confronting the 
Lebanese government: a sociological approach which focuses on problems 
stemming from the value system rooted in Lebanese society, and an orga­
nizational approach which examines the defects of the personnel system
xi
by looking at the administrative structure.
The essential finding of this study is that the personnel 
system of Lebanon is suffering from the dominance of the cultural 
values of Lebanese society. The absence of effective techniques for 
attracting the best qualified candidates is one of ftany basic problems 
encountering the Lebanese civil service. Furthermore, the study has 
revealed that too many persons are employed; that their services are 
not fully realized and their quality and performance are unsatisfac­
tory; that there exists a high degree, recently diminishing, of favori­
tism, nepotism and sectarianism; that selection is not based on merit 
alone; that a lack of confidence in the competence of the civil servants 
is apparent which in turn, necessitates ways and means to check their 
performance in every detail and at every level; that excessive 
centralization and authority exists which results in undue concentra­
tion of work and decision-making at the senior levels; that there 
is a lack of an adequate, equitable and rational system for rank and pay 
scale. Although a basic Personnel Law is maintained for all Lebanese 
civil servants, many variations can be observed in its application.
The study found that in practice the civil servants, in many instances, 
do not conform with the established rules and regulations. Finally, 
the personnel system has also failed to take a positive approach to 
discipline.
Some final observations derived from the Lebanese experience 
appear to support the folklore of administration. A civil service
xil
necessarily reflects much of the value system of the society of 
which it is a part. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect changes 
in bureaucratic behavior when these changes conflict with the values 
of the society surrounding the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is intricate­
ly a part of a larger political system and will be directly affected 
by the operation and conduct of affairs in the other societal insti­
tutions .
The key to administrative improvement in Lebanon does not lie 
in the structural nature of the various administrative reform move­
ments or on the functions of the Civil Service Board but rather on 




Geographically) Lebanon is a crossroads between Europe,
Asia and Africa. Historically, its coastal plains and ports made it a 
passageway for conquerors. Its mountain ranges, because of their advan­
tages in defense, had provided refuge for numerous persecuted sects since 
the time of Jesus.
The history of Lebanon prior to the French Mandate in 1920 
is the history of Mount Lebanon, a much smaller area than the present 
state of Lebanon.
When the Ottoman Turks conquered the Middle East in 1516-17 
Mount Lebanon technically became part of the Arab region of the Ottoman 
Empire, but throughout the four hundred years of Turkish domination of 
the Middle East, the Ottomans never acquired direct control of the 
Lebanon. Ottoman suzerainty over the mountains was conceded, however, 
for the collection of taxes and for the payment of an annual tribute 
to the Sultan in Constantinople.
Lebanon developed from an autonomous Mutassarifiyah (province) 
within the Ottoman Empire in 1861 to a separate and distinct country 
under French rule after World War I. At the time the province was 
restricted to Mount Lebanon. France, at the inception of its mandate, 
expanded the territory into the much larger area of Greater Lebanon -- 
the Lebanon of today.
In 1920, France proclaimed the existence of the state of 
Greater Lebanon and ruled it directly through governors appointed by the
2
French High Commissioner until 1926 when a Constitution establishing a 
parliamentary republic was promulgated. Modeled after the French 
Basic Laws of 1875, the Constitution called for the Parliament to elect 
the President of the Republic, who in turn would choose the Prime Minister 
and the other ministers. The Mandate period established parliaments and 
governments, but actual power lay in the French High Commissioner.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the High Commissioner 
declared a state of siege in Lebanon, suspended the Constitution and dis­
solved Parliament. However, France allowed free elections in which the 
anti-French nationalists won a majority and in November 1943, the newly- 
elected Parliament ended the Mandate over the country and proclaimed the 
independence of Lebanon.
The country's political development as it emerged after the 
War strongly reflected French constitutional know-how. However, with 
independence, and the removal of French troops, Lebanon was to falter in 
its obligations to its parliamentary democracy. The novelty of political 
independence manifested itself in widespread political disarray and 
governmental corruption.
Of all the historical forces that have played a significant 
role in Lebanon, the period of the French Mandate stands out as the most 
crucial if not the most determining factor in the growth of the adminis­
trative system. Among its more important legacies was a constitutional 
parliamentary form of government. Another contribution was a modernized 
administrative apparatus. France also brought back to Lebanese politics 
a religious problem when it added to the Mount Lebanon Mutassarlfiyah
3
the surrounding Moslem areas, to form Greater Lebanon.
The most important failure of French rule in Lebanon was
its implementation of a policy of divide and rule.
Conscious that their (French) support lay in the Maronites 
of Lebanon, that the other Christian communities were 
only lukewarm, and that they were cordially disliked by 
the bulk of the Moslems, they decided to ease their task 
by an unashamed policy of 'divide-and-rule', by exploit­
ing and widening the religious division with which 
Lebanon, more than any other Middle Eastern country, 
is vexed.*
This policy accentuated and compounded the religious-political 
intricacies of the country and implemented a policy of confessionalism, 
which even to this day has had a determining influence on Lebanese 
political life.
During the early years of independence, the country was 
faced with innumerable problems requiring immediate attention which 
diverted the efforts of the government from problems of administrative 
reform and improvement. This period was characterized by increasing 
inefficiency and corruption leading to the overthrow of President al- 
Khouri in 1952. Following the election of Camille Chamoun to the Presi­
dency in 1952, the first of many attempts at administrative reform was 
made. Thus, the Cabinet was granted special emergency powers to legis­
late by decrees for a period of six months and it was charged with the
^George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 163-64.
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reorganization of governmental departments; revision of personnel laws 
and administrative reorganization. A second and third reform movements 
brought new and improved personnel to govern the Lebanese civil servants.
The crisis of 1958 reflected the chronic disease which has 
beset Lebanon since its inception, that is, the inability of politicians 
and governmental leaders to subdue their parochial interests for the sake 
of national harmony.
The Lebanese political system has been susceptible to exten­
sive constitutional abuse and vulnerable to chronic political dishonesty 
at both the higher and lower levels of the bureaucracy. An important 
factor militating against the existence of a truly democratic form of 
government, one devoid of widespread corruption and nepotism at the 
higher echelons of the political apparatus, is the spirit of tribalism 
which permeates the socio-political life of Lebanon. Although this 
tribal spirit has had many consequences, the most significant is the 
absence of the concept of state both by governmental authorities and 
by the Lebanese people.
There are two important reasons for this enduring configura­
tion of tribalism. Lebanon was endowed with a kinship society. The 
extended family was the primary social unit, and the ties which bound 
cousins to one another were strong. Respect for and obedience to the 
head of the family was the rule. Even in some areas of modern Lebanon, 
extended families are grouped in tribes and clans. Politics, like the 
social and economic aspects of life, was a family matter. Religion, and
5
more specifically, religious sectarianism, was a factor contributing to 
Lebanese political practices.
Religion is the core of culture in the Middle East and 
nowhere is its influence more apparent than in Lebanon whose main charac­
teristic is the mosaic-like nature of its population. It is a country 
of religious minorities, each conscious of its separate identity, jealous 
of its rights, and somewhat different from the other in outlook and 
orientation. The existence of such a plethora of religious denomina­
tions has resulted in political confessionalism. Although Lebanon is 
formally a democracy with a parliamentary system of government, seats in 
parliament are allocated to the religious communities in proportion to 
their presumed strength in the population and public employment is 
governed primarily by confessional considerations and only secondarily 
by merit.
Sectarianism has had serious repercussions on the government 
and administration. It has undermined national unity and has prevented 
the development of the country into a homogeneous, cohesive political 
entity.
In summing up the dominant socio-political phenomena which
are stifling Lebanese attempts to achieve political maturity in the
modern world, Moshe Zeltzer says:
The chief problem for Lebanon lies in a peculiar sociolo­
gical phenomena, namely, a community the main distinguishing 
feature of which is not ethnic origin but religion, and, 
on the other hand, its separateness as a human entity, by 
way of "community of blood". More precisely, the problem 
is whether, and how, a sense of joint citizenship, of
6
Lebanese nationhood, based on common values, can be 
created, strong enough to counter-balance the centri­
fugal forces in the communities.̂
Statement of the Problem
The concept of a government run for the benefit of all its 
people (if not by them) has become generally accepted. The technology 
of the last hundred years has permitted most people to abandon resigna­
tion to their status in traditional society and to hope for a new and 
better life. The responsibility of restructuring the entire society to 
meet these expectations has placed a heavy burden on government. As 
societies become more specialized and complex and as the traditional 
social, economic, and political localisms are merged into larger national 
units, the role of the government becomes increasingly Important.
Meeting these responsibilities requires a combination of 
factors which are barely understood and which have just become the focus 
of systematic study. Nevertheless, in light of this growing importance 
of government (particularly in newly independent and developing states) 
this study begins with the assumption that administration is an essential 
element in the conduct of the modern state and that to understand the 
nature and process of government, one must include consideration of the 
role played by the civil service. Since bureaucracy is part of this 
governmental system, it follows that administration cannot be fully 
understood except as a part of the interrelated system to which it belongs.
2Moshe Zeltzer, Aspects of Near East Society (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 1962), pp. 80-81.
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Consequently, the study of administration must include the relevant 
aspects of its environment.
The bureaucracy, being a unit of a much larger system -- 
the social system -- is influenced by and affects the physical, ideolo­
gical, economic, political, cultural, and psychological environment of 
the country. An important interplay thus exists between the Lebanese 
social system and the administrative system. The Lebanese civil servants, 
who are also members of the larger social system or several of its sub­
systems, bring with them certain expectations, interpersonal relations, 
values, and attitudes. They cannot lay these wholly aside in their bureau­
cratic behavior. Public administration in Lebanon is thus affected by 
social attitudes and values inherent in the Lebanese culture and society. 
Administrative organizations in Lebanon seem to reflect particularly the 
Lebanese family pattern, with authority and decision-making processes 
heavily concentrated at the top.
Oblective
This study proposes to describe, analyze, and evaluate the 
personnel system of Lebanon. The significance of the study arises parti­
cularly from the central role of the civil service in government. Lebanon 
has recently undertaken wide-ranging measures to bring vast changes in 
the social and economic sectors of the Lebanese society. The creation 
of the Civil Service Board is one of several important manifestations 
of this drive toward modernization.
In order to fulfill the needs for an effective government, 
and to respond to the demands of a changing society, the existence of a
8
capable bureaucracy is essential. The honesty of government employees, 
for example, seems to be more important in less developed countries 
where social relationships are still personal and there is a government 
of men rather than law. In addition, new functions assumed by the 
governments create increasing demand for skilled, trained personnel. A 
publication of the United Nations says: "The quality of public administra­
tion is in large measure determined by the devotion, ability and honesty 
of the public personnel."'* In light of these considerations, this study 
seeks to analyze the present problems of personnel administration and 
to suggest appropriate solutions.
Upon obtaining independence, Lebanon faced fundamental problems 
in its public administration personnel system. The personnel system 
which served the needs of the Ottoman and French systems had to be re­
oriented to serve the needs of the independent country.
Two methods will be combined in this study for the purposes 
of exploring the dimensions of the personnel problems confronting the 
Lebanese government: a sociological approach and an organizational 
approach. The first approach focuses on problems stemming from the 
value system rooted in Lebanese society. The second approach examines 
the defects of the personnel system by looking at the formal administra­
tive structure.
3United Nations, Standards and Techniques of Public Adminis­
tration (New York, 1951), p. 20.
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A Note on Sources
The limitations of this study spring primarily from the state
of the source materials. Siffin stated the problem well:
In parts of the world - particularly non-Western areas - 
the availability of material which may be dignified by 
the term data is pathetically limited. The impediments 
to their procurement are gargantuan, including as they do 
language barriers, limits and lack of appropriate skills, 
and in some cases a downright vexing lack of interest in 
objective dissection and intimate analysis on the part of 
the societies and governments whose cultural, political 
and administrative innards now tentalize us.^
It may be pertinent to mention some of the obstacles that 
hindered the investigator. The first obstacle that faced the author was 
the absence of reliable statistics and data. This problem rendered the 
research extremely difficult and in some cases impossible. It would seem 
that explicitness is not yet a common trait in the Arab Middle East, nor 
is it considered a virtue and the researcher cannot manufacture data 
which do not exist.
In addition to the absence of reliable statistics, there was a 
general unwillingness among civil servants in providing information which 
is available. This is inherent in the bureaucratic nature especially in a 
newly developing country. They feel insecure by revealing what is actually 
taking place in their departments and it was difficult to secure their 
cooperation. It was often a painstaking task to acquire or request an
^William J. Siffin, (ed.), Toward the Comparative Study of 
Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 
pp. 13-14.
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official document. To consult or interview a public employee necessitated 
several visits and the author found that his attempts at securing legi­
timate information for research was looked upon suspiciously.
However, the author was greatly helped in the preparation of 
this study by his own observations and familiarity with the language gained 
through fourteen years of residence in the country.
Government documents were an invaluable source of information 
and at the same time a source of frustration. The Official Gazette, pub­
lished weekly in Arabic, contains all the laws and decrees. Although the 
Gazette has a table of contents, it has no index, and this lack complicated 
its use. A further source of confusion is the ambiguity of expression in 
much of the legal language. These problems made The Official Gazette a 
tortuous and frustrating, but a valuable source of information. Additional 
sources were of value, particularly the publications of the Ministries of 
Justice and Finance.
To supplement this study, the author made three field trips to 
Lebanon in 1965, 1966 and 1967 and conducted interviews with thirty-five 
civil servants scattered throughout the agencies of the Lebanese administration.
Considering this situation, i.e., absence of basic data, the 
poor state of the official documents and limited financial resources -- a 
complete study of the role of the civil service in a complex and politi­
cally turbulent country is a time-consuming task and requires a well- 
financed team of experienced researchers.
PART I
THE LEBANESE CIVIL SERVANTS
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The administrative system of a country is an aspect of the 
total environment and culture of the people. In an effort to understand 
administration more clearly and completely we must examine the historical, 
social and political context in which it operates and the complex cul­
tural patterns of the people. The character of administrative arrange­
ments, organizations and processes does not escape the heritage of the 
past which exerts a dominant influence in the shaping of these institu­
tions.
The Ottoman Period
Lebanon has a long history dating back to the third millenium 
B.C. when the Phoenicians established their cities along the Mediterranean 
coastline.^ Since that day, the strategic location of the country as a 
link between East and West has attracted a variety of invaders, the 
Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Arabs, and Turks. At present, the popula­
tion of the country forms a unique variety of ethnic and religious groups 
who are either descendants of these various invaders or of other minorities 
who have sought refuge in the rugged mountains of Lebanon. The Moslem 
Arabs, who introduced Islam into Lebanon, have left a deep imprint on 
the culture of the society, while the Christians, with their Western




outlook and perspective, have, in their turn, left a distinctive mark 
on the same culture.
In 1516, the Ottoman Turks, a Central Asian people who 
adopted Islam and Arabic writing, conquered Lebanon and ruled it for 
four centuries. It was during this period that Lebanon began to acquire 
some of the administrative and governmental procedures which have con­
tinued with some modifications until the present.
From the standpoint of administration, the four hundred 
years of Turkish rule, from 1517 to 1918, served as an 
era of significant consequences in the Levant. Within 
that time taxation procedures were fixed, land titles 
and rights were recorded, and principles of local govern­
ment and administration took on the respect and permanency 
of several centuries' existence. Heavy Turkish influence 
remains today in the courtesies, customs, and traditions 
of Lebanese government offices, and in the patterns of 
local government which a Turkish law of 1857 recognized 
and established.^
The period of Turkish rule can be divided for the purpose 
of this study into three stages: the feudal era from 1516-1842; the 
Double Qa1immaqamatayn from 1842-1861; and the Mutassariflyah from 1861 
until the first World War.
1516-1842
Although Lebanon was ruled directly by the Sultan in Con­
stantinople, it enjoyed some measure of local autonomy. The Sultan
oGeorge Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese 
Administration (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1955), p. 3
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relied on local feudal lords who were given a free hand in ruling the 
country provided they paid taxes to him. These local rulers, or Amirs, 
as they were called, were appointed by the Sultan; however, some of 
them succeeded in establishing their own dynasties and, in certain 
cases, almost achieved complete independence from Constantinople. The 
most famous of these are Fakhr el-Dine al-Ma'ani whose rule lasted from 
1590 to 1635, and Bashir al-Shihabi who ruled from 1789 to 1840.^
The Amir was the leader and chieftain of all feudal lords 
in the country. He exercised great control acting as the final arbiter 
in local disputes, enjoying the prerogatives of leadership, and main­
taining responsibility for the security of the area. In return for 
prestige and protection from the Sultan, the local Amir promised loyalty 
and performed administrative functions such as the collection of taxes -
4where the highest bidder was awarded the contract -- the maintenance of 
order and the execution of public decrees.
The country at that time, lacked a regular court system and 
a code of laws. Judicial functions were handled by feudal lords and 
religious leaders subject to the final judgment of the Amir. The situa­
tion of the era, parallelling the general decline and decadence of the
3Hitti, op. cit., p. 413.
^Philip Hitti, History of Syria (London: Macmillan Co., 
1951), p. 359.
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Ottoman Empire, was effected by the disorganization and corruption
found in the offices of various governors of the neighboring Vilayets,
whose offices were obtained through sale and bribery and used for quick
personal enrichment. The chaotic state of affairs which characterized
this period of Ottoman rule is aptly described by Haddad:
The corruption in the financial, judicial, and the 
whole administrative system and the indifference of 
the central authorities resulted in economic decline, 
negligence of public works, and in poverty, ignorance 
and demoralization among the subjects of the empire.^
It was under these conditions that the civil servants 
worked, with no code except the will and pleasure of the Amir, who at 
times may have been a good and efficient ruler and at most other times 
hardly so.
1842-1861
This situation continued until the year 1841, when the rule 
of Amir Bashir al-Shihabi helped to perpetuate corruption, inefficiency 
and serious religious conflicts among the various communities. The 
religious clashes between Maronites and Druzes prompted the Ottomans to 
suspend the rule of the Amir and impose a new administrative system on 
the country.
The new system divided the country into two administrative 
regions: the Northern region, which was predominantly Christian, to be
5George M. Haddad, Fifty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon 
(Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, 1950), p. 29.
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ruled by a Christian Qa'immaqam; and the Southern region, predominantly 
Druze, to be ruled by a Druze Qa*immaqam. The two Qa1immaqams were 
responsible to the Walis of Tripoli and Sidon who were their link with 
the central government in Constantinople.
The Qa1immaqam was the supreme governor in his region, and 
his powers were defined in ail official document called the "Instructions 
of Shekib Effendi," dated October 31, 1845.^ This document provided 
for the establishment of a Regional Administrative Council to assist the 
Qa1immaqam in the exercise of his functions. This council was composed 
of twelve members chosen from the inhabitants of the region on the basis 
of their religious affiliation. The council enjoyed advisory powers only 
and had to help the Qa1immaqam in both financial and judicial affairs.
It is during this period that the Ottomans gave Lebanon a local govern­
ment system whose patterns can still be seen in the modern Lebanese 
system. It is worthy of note that the Ottomans themselves had borrowed 
this system from nineteenth century France; and as a result, later French 
rule in Lebanon did not completely do away with the procedures introduced 
by the Ottomans.^
^Tawfiq Awad, "Al-Wazifah fi Lubnan," (Public Office in 
Lebanon) Les Conferences du Cenacle, Vol. Ill, Nos. 5-6 (1949), pp. 120-21.
^Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., p. 3,
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A second document -- derived of the first is the "Decision" 
issued by the Christian Qa1immaqam on May 13, 1853. "This century-old 
code constitutes -- in its naive composition and strong spirit -- the first
g
written personnel law" in Lebanon. Its writing was entrusted to a 
3-man Diwan (secretariat) which came out with a simple, short and concise 
Dustur (constitution) which was composed of two parts: the first defined 
the powers of the ruler over his assistants, and the second the rights 
of the latters.^ The ten articles of this "decision" reveal an interest­
ing and amusing regulation. One cannot help but quote
His Excellency the Qa1immaqam is asked to confer for one 
hour at the beginning or end of the day with his aides 
and be graceful to their argument and accepting the right 
opinion; he is also asked not to give an order through 
an alien except in writing or through his aides;...he is 
asked to read the letters and complaints in person and 
give his appropriate time for this so his conscience may 
not be burdened with negligence; he should read his mail 
and sign it, or have it read to him without the presence 
of an alien, and is asked to be inconvenienced or bored 
when the work load increases, for his conscience is under 
Heavenly Justice.
3
Awad, op. cit.. p. 121.
^Milad Rizqallah, "Min Tarikh Lubnan al-Mu'asir," (From 
Contemporary Lebanese History) Majalat al-Mashriq, Vol. XXXV (1937), pp. 
562-63.
^Ibid. , pp. 563-66.
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Civil servants must be faithful, secretive, must give 
the right opinion and be far from every human wish, and 
they must be careful against inclinations towards their 
flesh and blood...They should not decide any matter 
unless agreed upon by his Excellency, and they should 
be alert and full of vitality and let none be injured 
through their negligence, knowing that God shall ask 
them for this for they do not deserve their salaries 
except if they work for it...They shall not delay in 
answering their mail, especially to commissioned offi­
cials and representatives of Foreign Powers, and the rest 
of the mail accordingly, for its owners are poor and are 
injured by negligence...God controls their work and 
rewards it...They shall not be bribed nor receive gifts 
whether in person or through their households, children, 
servants, nor from alien hands, whether internally or 
externally, secretly or openly under the penalty of 
severe punishment.
God avenges those whose faults are not discovered...
They shall come to work daily starting one and a half
hour after sunrise and ending two hours before sunset
except on Sundays and holidays and on Wednesdays in 
weeks that do not have holidays. Whenever there is 
important work to be done, they shall work at night 
also. There shall always be an official on duty until 
sunset, and officials shall change turns.
This period in the history of Lebanon, although marked by 
bloody and brutal sectarian conflicts which impeded progress, can be
credited with two major achievements. First, it weakened the feudal
system which characterized the social system; and secondly, it laid 
down the foundation of popular participation in government.^
1861-1918
The growing religious tensions and conflicts finally culminated
^Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 31-32.
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in the savage massacres of 1860, in which thousands of people were 
massacred. Anarchy in Lebanon was intolerable to the European powers for 
both strategic and humanitarian reasons. France landed 7,000 troops to 
restore security, and in 1861 the six Great Powers (England, France,
Austria, Russia, Prussia and Turkey) signed the Reglement Organique, 
under which Lebanon became an autonomous province in the Ottoman Empire.
According to this organic law, known as the Protocol,
Lebanon was to be governed by a Christian Mutassarlf appointed by the Sultan 
after consultation with the foreign powers. The Mutassarif was to be 
assisted by an Administrative Council composed of thirteen members repre­
senting the various geographic areas and religious communities.
For purposes of administration, Lebanon was divided into 
seven administrative divisions called Qadas, each to be administered by 
a Qa'immaqam appointed by the Mutassarif and responsible to him. Each 
of these Qadas was in turn subdivided into smaller districts called
1 0Mudiriyyahs each to be administered by a Mudir appointed by the Qa* immaqam. 
This system of local administration is basically French in nature and has 
continued with slight modifications during the Mandate period and up to 
the present time.
12The number of mudiriyyahs totalled 43. Bulus Masad, Lubnan 
wal-Dustur al-Uthmani (Lebanon and the Ottoman Constitution) (Egypt: 
al-Ma'arif Press, 1909), p. 3.
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Another significant contribution of the Protocol was the 
establishment of a new judicial system with a hierarchy of courts for 
handling civil and criminal cases. The new system, however, left pro­
blems of personal status such as marriage and divorce, to the jurisdic­
tion of religious leaders, an arrangement which has contined ever since.
In short, one can say that the Protocol of 1861 succeeded in 
establishing the foundations of a relatively modern system of govern­
ment and administration giving Lebanon a reasonably stable rule from 
1861 until the outbreak of World War I when the Protocol was suspended 
and a new phase in Lebanese historical development started.
A final word on the Ottoman legacy is in order:
...the Ottoman Empire was essentially a system of 
exploitation, injurious to the social and economic 
welfare of the subjects, in that it not only lacked 
any guarantee of life and property against the violence, 
stupidity, or caprice of the soldiers, but in effect 
made agriculture, industry, and commerce their helpless 
victims. Legal redress, it was assumed, could not be 
looked for from courts whose officers were a byword 
for venality and corruption, and whose decrees, moreover, 
were illusory, since they depended for enforcement upon 
the goodwill of the very administration and soldiery 
against whom they were directed.
The French Mandate
With the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, the political
matrix of foreign intrigue, sectarianism, and great notables, which had
13H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 208.
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made politics and administration somewhat erratic, fell to the French.
On September 1, 1920, the French High Commissioner proclaimed the 
independence of Greater Lebanon.
1918-1926
France brought to Lebanon a religious problem when it added 
to the Mount Lebanon Mutassarifiyah the coastal area between the north 
of Palestine and a point north of Tripoli. In the East, further terri­
tory was added in the Biqa' plain. The most important consequence of 
this territorial aggrandisement was that the Maronites, although they 
remained the largest single sect, held a precarious lead over the next 
larger one, the Sunni Moslems, in contrast to their uncontestable majority 
under the autonomous regime.^ This in turn became the dominant feature 
of political life in Lebanon.
Administratively, the new state was divided into four 
sanjags containing twelve Qadas, while the municipalities of Beirut 
and Tripoli has independent status. In each sanjag the Administrator 
was assisted by a French adviser and a number of French personnel in 
various departments.
The Decree of September 1, 1920, establishing the new admin­
istration of Greater Lebanon also provided (article 6) for a Governor,
14Edmond Rabbath, L'Evolution Politigue de la Syrie sous 
le Mandat (Paris: Marcel Riviere, 1928), p. 142.
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appointed by the High Commissioner and vested with executive powers.
The same decree (article 16) established an Administrative Council 
composed of fifteen appointed members whose task was to discuss legisla­
tion relating to internal problems and to the budget. All actions and
decisions of the Council were subject to the approval of the High 
1SCommissioner.
In matters of administration, the French could not rely on 
well-qualified and trained local officials since they were practically 
non-existent. As a result, and by sheer necessity, the French had to 
resort to direct administration by French officials who were appointed 
to the various departments. Final authority in all departments was in 
the hands of French advisers who resorted to the French practice of 
highly centralized administration.^
In the field of personnel administration, the French, as 
early as 1920, had promulgated two arretes which laid the foundation of 
a civil service system. Arrete No. 3021 of March 7, 1925, and No. 3195 
of July 6, 1925, attempted to regulate various aspects of personnel 
administration such as appointments, promotions, discipline and discharge.^
15Ibid., p. 414.
^Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., p. 4.
17Lebanon, Ministry of Justice, Collection of Laws (Beirut: 
al-Jumhuriyah al-Jadida, 1928-1954).
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With some slight modifications, these two arretes continued until 1953, 
when they were replaced by a new personnel law.
The mandate arrangement shaped an administrative hierarchy 
that, from the beginning, allowed the lower echelon administrator little 
opportunity to make decisions on his own. Even such question as office- 
keeping and record management required consultation with and approval by 
higher officials, including the French advisers.
The relationship between the Mandatory and the mandated as 
defined in the text of the Mandate was to be one of cooperation in 
laying down the basis for constitutional life in Lebanon. In September 
1923, the League of Nations charged France with promulgating a consti­
tution within three years. The First Representative Council came into
18existence with a membership of thirty members in 1923.
1926-1943
A Constitution for Lebanon was promulgated on May 23, 1926 
and the Representative Council became the Chamber of Deputies. On the 
25th, the High Commissioner appointed the members of the Senate, and on 
the following day, the two Chambers elected the first President of the 
Lebanese Republic. Within the week, the first Cabinet was formed. Thus 
Lebanon was established as a parliamentary republic.




The creation of this parliamentary facade did not, however, 
transfer authority to the Lebanese. The High Commissioner was still 
the supreme authority in the executive and legislative fields. In two 
instances, the High Commissioner by a simple majority suspended the 
constitution. This occurred in 1932 when the legislature was on the 
verge of electing a Moslem to the Presidency and in 1939 after the out­
break of World War 11.^
The mandate gave the French complete dominance over all aspects 
of Lebanese life -- foreign relations, judiciary system, economy, develop­
ment and supervision of education and welfare. The spirit of the mandate 
obligated the French to train the Lebanese in these fields. They, instead, 
"regarded Lebanon as an area of exploitation, where French capital,
French colonial expansion, and French culture should be developed. The
21interests of the people were a matter of secondary importance." This 
led to corruption in certain branches of the administration which, though 
less widespread than that to which the country had in Turkish times been
22accustomed, was a bad advertisement both for France and western methods."
20Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
^Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 50.
^^Robin Fedden, Syria, An Historical Appreciation (London: 
Robert Hale, Ltd., 1955), p. 215.
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Furthermore, a particular grievance against the French --
which led to the bankruptcy of their rule -- was their failure to provide
a reasonable standard of administration. "The French officials were too
often corrupt, avaricious and arbitrary; while the Lebanese officials
were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of 
23responsibility." The indictment against the French also Involved,
besides inefficiency, irresponsibility and corruption, their adoption
of a "harmful attitude towards those whom they ruled," and that they
"...did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated
24the country as if it were a French colony."
The most important factor limiting the full development 
of a Lebanese civil service was the dual structure of the Mandate. Repre­
senting the Mandatory Power, the High Commissioner's functions were 
limited in principle to advice and supervision, but in fact represented 
the ultimate authority in the administration of Lebanon. The Commissioner 
had his own staff and these officers "in practice exercised an almost
25unlimited influence over the local administration and political life."
This dual structure, the High Commissioner's office, superimposed on 
top of local administration and government, resulted in cumbersome and





Imagine the roundabout ways and circumvolutions that a 
simple project presented by a department head goes through. 
His report, already worked out and drafted after inquiries 
and studies, is transmitted by the Wall to the delegate 
who endorses it after hesitation and examination, then 
is retransmitted to the competent Minister who studies 
it anew and modifies it to make it conform to his views.
For this project to become law (to be put in force), 
for it to acquire legislative form, the signature of the 
High Commissioner is indispensable. The project of the 
Minister, countersigned by his adviser and the Chief of 
State, finally arrives at the competent branch of the 
High Commissioner's Office. New inquiries, new studies, 
new postponements, delays, opportunities missed, out-of- 
date or untimely circumstances, that is when the High 
Commissioner published in decree the project presented 
and promulgated it modified, transfigured, and changed 
around.
Whatever may be history's verdict about the French occupa­
tion, it did bring about a number of innovations in politics and govern­
ment which laid the institutional groundwork for the independent Republic 
of Lebanon.
The Lebanese-born scholar Philip Hitti has suimnarized the
positive side of the French achievement:
France, it should be recalled, found the country at the 
lowest ebb in its history, economically, politically, 
socially, and also spiritually. It set out to recreate 
--literally--administrative and judiciary organs, improve 
ports, repair roads, establish means for public education 
and departments of public health and public works. It 
Introduced modern codes for civil procedures, replaced 
(1922) the Ottoman municipal law of 1877 by a modernized 
one which enabled about a hundred and twenty towns and
26Rabbath, op. cit., p. 110.
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villages to exercise a measure of home rule and tried 
to revive sericulture, which had all but been ruined. 
Local currency was tied up with the French franc, 
already depreciated. Special care was bestowed on 
Beirut harbor, neglected since its construction by a 
French company in 1889-1894. But on the whole its 
energy was spent almost exclusively on devising adminis­
trative machinery and political formulas and on main­
taining its own position rather than husbanding the 
resources of the land and training its leaders for 
self rule.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the French High Commissioner
declared a state of siege in the Levant, suspended the constitution,
dissolved parliament, and installed a Lebanese Secretary of State as the
senior administrative officer of the land and liaison between the High
28Commissioner and the administration.
For a brief period, the Mandatory Government became res­
ponsible to the Vichy regime in France. In 1941, British and Free 
French troops occupied Lebanon. In order to secure the cooperation of 
the people and enlist their support for the Allied cause, Lebanon was 
promised independence. In 1943, the French allowed free elections in 
Lebanon in which the anti-French nationalists won a majority. A new 
President, Bisharat al-Khouri was elected, and a cabinet was formed by 
Riad al-Solh. In November, 1943, the newly-elected parliament amended 
the constitution and ended the Mandate over the country.
27Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., pp. 488-89.
2ftHourani, op. cit., p. 176.
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French Impact on the Administrative System
In trying to assess the impact of historical development 
on the Lebanese administration, one can single out the French mandate 
as the most important single factor which has affected the development 
of the governmental and administrative machinery. The French sought to 
implement patterns of government and administration similar to those 
operative in France itself. They superimposed their system on the exist­
ing Ottoman structure, which itself was greatly affected by French 
continental practices.
It would be impossible to name all the various features of 
Lebanese administrative practices. However, one can point to a few 
basic ones which still characterize the administrative system.
One of the basic features of the Lebanese administration is 
the high degree of centralization which constitutes one of the most 
serious problems of the government. Aside from organizing the country's 
administration on a highly centralized basis as existed in France; the 
French had required that all administrative decisions be referred to a 
French senior consultant for approval. Today, one finds many details 
being referred up to higher echelons for action, thus diverting their 
attention to petty problems Instead of using their time to the considera­
tion of major decisions. For instance, the Accounting Law requires that 
many details which could be handled by lower officials must be approved 
by the Director-General of a ministry, and in certain cases by the Minister 
himself.
This high centralization still persists today and is due, 
perhaps to the smallness of the country and the advantage of focusing
28
authority in one place. This is coupled by the thought that is neither 
very efficient nor administratively very reassuring to delegate authority. 
As such governmental wheels move slowly, heavily and, in many instances 
inefficiently.
The centralization of authority in the hands of the 
upper administrators creates a particular conception of 
affairs among the lower administrators. Those in the 
high grades hesitate to confide responsibilities to their 
subordinates who in turn are inclined to avoid initiative.
The spirit of bureaucracy exists. The formal administra­
tive procedures are very long. The most minor formality 
necessitates a series of signatures and sometimes months 
of waiting. These procedures while instituted to prevent 
malpractices had the effect of applying a brake on 
administrative activities. The administration suffers 
equally from a lack of coordination among the various 
departments. Each one of which acts in a manner that 
is absolutely independent.
Another important characteristic of the Lebanese administra­
tion which is to a great extent the result of a long-established Ottoman 
and French heritage is the existence of a high degree of "legalistic" 
orientation, mainly the application of the law in its narrowest sense 
with relatively little attention to the long-term objectives of the law 
and the social objectives of the ministry or agency. This legal orien­
tation affects the Lebanese administration in two general ways: It
obliges the administrator to apply the law in its narrowest sense because 
of the existence of excessive administrative and financial controls;
29L*Orient (Beirut), July 15, 1955.
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and, it provides for the recruitment to public office of administrators 
whose orientation toward public administration is from a legal perspec­
tive. This is why a law degree, (License) or equivalent is considered 
to be the prerequisite for practically any administrative position in the 
top three grades of the administration. There is little attention given 
to the dynamics of administration and to the actual governmental process 
resulting from the interaction between the legal provisions and the 
human elements.
Another carry-over from the Mandate period which has seriously 
affected the administration is the selection system, which has given the 
civil service a special character. This system was originally introduced 
by the French and is based on certain principles and assumptions which 
are typically French and which have been applied in France for sometime. 
The French approach to the problem of recruiting and selecting personnel 
for the civil service stresses the academic and theoretical background 
and places a high premium on educational qualifications. This is in 
marked contrast to the American approach where the main stress is on 
specialized training in a certain limited field. The French admiration 
for lawyers and for legal training as the best preparation for public 
service is manifested in the civil service where a large number of the 
civil servants are lawyers and where the law degree is a requirement 
for all top positions. The stress on a legal training during the Man­
date period was not only true to French tradition and culture but also 
served a very practical purpose; namely, that of staffing the Lebanese
30
civil service with French educated and oriented persons since the only 
institution in the country providing such training was the French 
St. Joseph's University.30 This definite bias in the composition of 
the civil service continues today, but is the subject of vehement pro­
tests from Moslem groups because of the predominant number of Christians 
among the graduates of St. Joseph.
The Independence Period
Independence removed the firm, guiding hand of the French 
High Commissioner and necessitated local initiative, while the popula­
tion made Increasing demands upon the government. The first two years 
of Lebanon's independence were concerned with extricating the country 
from its ties with Syria, also newly independent, and France. Under 
the Mandate Lebanon and Syria had shared the security services, central 
administration, and the Interets Communs -- a joint customs administra­
tion which handled most of the governments' revenues. On February 3, 
1944, the Lebanese Parliament ratified the Common Interest Agreement 
Protocol and on February 9th it approved the Franco-Syrian-Lebanese 
Monetary Accord. In July, Riad al-Solh could proclaim that Lebanon now 
controlled its Surete Generale and concessionary companies. Diplomatic
This monopoly on the teaching of law continued until 1953 
when the Lebanese Academy established a School of Law which was later 
incorporated in the Lebanese University. Also in 1959, the Arab University 
initiated a course leading to a License of Law Degree.
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relations had been established with all the Arab states in April, 1945. 
1943-1952
The Lebanese Republic began its life during an economic 
boom. Too far from actual fighting to suffer, Lebanon enjoyed the eco-
O 1nomic benefits of some 53,000 well-paid, free-spending Allied Troops. L 
Small manufacturing flourished, unemployment disappeared and the major 
towns grew. Owing to the wartime shortage of goods and the burgeoning 
money supply, prices and the cost of living increased sharply. Black 
market operations were common. Inflation and supply were the new 
government's primary domestic problems; and although it proved quite 
unable to solve it the general prosperity was high enough to dampen any 
mass opposition.
With independence, Lebanon faced some fundamental issues 
concerning its administrative structure. The exodus of the French civil 
servants had harmful effects on the quality and efficiency of the public 
service.
The massive departure of the French administrators 
created a vacuum difficult to fill. The new authorities 
were forced to engage in hasty recruitment; the quality 
and quantity of personnel, especially in higher echelons 
suffered. High positions were given to candidates less 
on their ability than on their relationship with the 
political party in power. The efficiency of the
31Gabriel Menassa, Flan de Reconstruction de l'Economie 
Libanaise et de Reforme de l'Etat (Beirut: Edition de la Societe 
Libanaise d'Economie Politique, 1948), p. 59.
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administration declined and its relationship with 
the public was not very satisfactory. A phenomenon 
of corruption could be cited.
During the early years of independence, the country was
faced with numerous problems needing immediate attention and diverting 
the efforts of the government from problems of administrative reform 
and improvement. It was felt that independence would be a panacea for
all its problems. However, the country realized that this was but the
beginning of a long and hard road.
It was to be expected that a newly independent country like
Lebanon, faced suddenly with a multitude of problems, such as consolida­
tion of the internal security of the country, should for some time neglect 
problems of improving the administration. However, due to the increase
in the functions and responsibilities of the state, this neglect could
not endure for long and the need to correct this situation became evident 
in the years preceeding 1953, in which the first codification of rules 
for the civil service of Lebanon appeared.
During this period of its development, Lebanon's administra­
tion was characterized by increasing inefficiency and corruption. There 
was widespread dissatisfaction among the people concerning the deterio­
ration of affairs in the government and administration of the country.
32M. Georges Fischer, "Quelque Reflections sur La Fonction 
Publique dans les Etats Nouveaux," Revue Action (Juillet, 1959), p. 649.
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This was one of the main causes for the overthrow of the al-Khouri's
regime. The following paragraph gives an idea as to how the country was
being governed or misgoverned by President al-Khouri.
...He also used money, intimidation, the arts of diver­
sion and compromise..all the tools of the resourceful 
boss...while his vast prestige made the techniques 
effective. The final result was something understand­
able to Americans by one simple vernacular phrase - 
Tammany Rule...^
1953 - Until the Present
Following the ouster of al-Khouri, Camille Chamoun was 
elected President of the Republic in 1952. His coming to office marks 
the inauguration of a new phase in the administrative history and 
development of Lebanon.
President Chamoun made a serious attempt to improve the 
administrative machinery which he inherited from his predecessor and 
whose corruption and ineffectiveness had aroused so much popular resent­
ment and criticism. Thus in 1952, the Cabinet was given special powers 
to legislate by decrees for a period of six months. (These decrees will 
be discussed in a later chapter).
A second and third reform movements brought new and improved 
personnel laws to govern the Lebanese civil servants. They are, conse­
cutively, Legislative Decree No. 14, dated January 7, 1955 and Legislative
33George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution," Middle East 
Journal, Vol. VII, Winter, 1953, p. 3.
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Decree No. 112 dated June 12, 1959. The latter is presently in operation.
Professor Heady describes the situation of personnel adminis­
tration in the Middle East, which is perhaps true of Lebanon, thus:
The cost of this pattern of inequities is hard to cal­
culate, but it is tragically high. Governments operating 
under conditions of basic poverty of resources realize 
far less output than could be achieved even under these 
limitations. Potentially promising candidates refrain 
from entering the civil service, able public officials 
often leave and the mediocre and poor ones find it 
possible and profitable to stay; lines of hierarchical 
supervision and responsibility are blurred; morale and 
esprit de corps fall; efficiency of performance is low;
and public regard for the public service drops. However,
ways for coping with this dilemma are not easy to find, 
and no Mid-East state has yet succeeded in devising a 
satisfactory system for dealing with rank and pay 
problems.
The 1959 personnel law came as a result of the third reform 
movement. Its stipulations embodied many basic changes in the field of
public personnel administration of the country. Prior to this date, the
Lebanese civil servants had their personnel matters administered by the 
individual ministries. In general, these ministries were not capable 
and able to carry on such a task. A considerable degree of non-uniformity, 
of duplication of efforts, and consequent high cost were the lesser evils 
of such a departmentalized practice. The greater evils were that any 
ministry was open to be overstaffed with civil servants in response to 
political, and, more importantly, sectarian pressures in payment for
■^Ferrel Heady, "Personnel Administration in the Middle 
East," Public Personnel Review. Vol. XX (1959), p. 53.
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electoral and patronage debts. This was done with no regard to the 
ministry's needs and goals, or the ability and competence of those 
appointed. These pressures were applied similarly to other personnel 
aspects such as promotion, transfer, rewards and penalties.
Chamoun's regime dwindled from the crest of a sensational 
start wherein a sudden, almost natural, national unity had crystallized, 
into toward the end of his regime in 1958, internal strife and almost a 
"sectarian civil war." The crisis of 1958 was caused by a multitude of 
internal and external factors; nevertheless, Chamoun was responsible for 
continuing the legacy of the al-Khouri regime, that of meddling in and 
corrupting the administration and interferring in local power (inter- 
za'ims) politics. Chamoun, like al-Khouri, failed to face the reality 
of epochal change.
The internal causes of the 1958 crisis can be reduced to 
four elements: Moslem dissatisfaction; corruption; personalism and the 
attempt of President Chamoun to succeed himself.
The Moslem dissatisfaction arose from the feeling that they 
are second class citizens in Lebanon. Their grievances ranged over the 
whole spectrum of political, social and economic life. First of all, the 
best and decisive positions in the government were controlled by the 
Christians; the Moslems desired an equitable distribution of governmental 
posts or munassafa (half-and-half) in all positions. Second, the Moslems 
complained about the limited educational opportunities open to their 
children. Both elementary and secondary education were still functions
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of private foreign and native institutions - mainly Christians. For 
example, in 1954, of more than one hundred High Schools in the country, 
only five belonged to the state. The Moslems belonged to the lower eco­
nomic status and could not afford the tuition of the private denomina­
tional schools.
The Chamoun administration in the beginning evinced a 
reputation for integrity and fair dealing, at least in comparison with 
the former. Once the new government had established itself, however, 
rumors and accusations of "corruption" began to spread and increase. In 
nature and scope they were similar to those levelled against the admin­
istration of President al-Khouri. They ranged from personal enrichment 
of the President, his relatives and friends, to creating unnecessary 
lucrative government posts for followers and friends, embezzlement of
public funds, bribery, corruption, and miscarriage of justice, and even
35protection of prostitution.
In his bid for power, Chamoun antagonized most of the leaders 
of the country and attempted to liquidate them from the political scene. 
It was only natural that these leaders would exploit and fan public dis­
content to bring about the fall of an administration, whose chief they 
regarded as their personal enemy.
35See Yusuf Hana Akl, Fada’ih 'Ahd Chamoun (Scandals of 
Chamoun1s Regime) (Dar el-Kamar, 1960),
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Another major cause was the desire of Chamoun to extend his
presidential term for another six years, contrary to the injunctions of
the constitution which limits the President to one term.
When Chamoun had his supporters spread the report that 
he intended to stand for election for a further term of 
six years as President by altering the Constitution to 
this effect with the help of his parliamentary majority, 
demonstrations and strikes took place in the Moslem towns 
of Tyre and Sidon and in the Druze areas. After a 
journalist (Nasib al-Matni) opposed to the President had 
been murdered, a general strike was proclaimed on May 9th, 
and large Moslem areas of the country came out in open 
revolt.
As a result, General Fuad Chehab, Commander of the Lebanese 
Army and a person of integrity and prestige was elected in 1958 as 
President of the Republic. Chehab, a compromise candidate who was 
respected by all warring functions (the so-called "revolutionists" and 
the "counter-revolutionists"), came to power amidst considerable politi­
cal instability and social, economic and administrative disorders. He 
found the country's national unity at the breaking point and the govern­
mental machinery at a standstill. He set out to reestablish security 
and order to revitalize the economy which had experienced a considerable 
recession. The need for socio-economic development of the country could 
never be felt more urgently that at the time and it was clear that the 
country could not survive without certain basic and drastic changes in
36Arnold Hottinger, The Arabs (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1963), p. 278.
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its political and administrative structures.
It was this situation, together with the fact that the end
of any major crisis may provide a favorable atmosphere for implementing
drastic changes of any kind, which prompted the new regime of President
Chehab to launch the reform attempt of 1958-1959. Thus, in December of
1958, the newly formed Cabinet was invested by Parliament with wide
emergency powers to legislate by decrees and to overhaul the entire
37administrative machinery of the state.
After the 1958 crisis two distinctive changes occurred in 
political life. There was a dampening of political activity and an 
increase in the development and service functions of the government.
The Lebanese economy recovered and reached new heights. Chehab's expan­
sion of public works expenditures was intended to stimulate the economy 
during the period of stagnation. The Lebanese government began to use 
its financial resources as an economic instrument, deviating from its 
traditional non-interventionist role.
Summary Statement
The Lebanese administrative system has been constructed, 
organized and based upon two sources: French and Turkish contributions. 
Of the two, French concepts dominate particularly so because the Ottoman
^See Chapter VII,
39
Empire had borrowed from French practices.
Turkish contributions are both structural and cultural.
By structural, we refer to the emphasis on centralized administration, 
with power and control focused on the Amir. The government's responsi­
bility was on collection of taxes, maintenance of law and order and 
execution of public decrees, with no emphasis on social and economic 
welfare or development. Because of this, the function of governmental 
responsibility was at a minimum; collection of taxes was sold to the 
highest bidder while other offices were for sale. An atmosphere of 
venality and corruption were cultural infusions from an inefficient 
administrative structure.
A few improvements were made after religious tensions 
exploded in the 1842-1861 period and the pressure of European interests. 
Notably, a Regional Administrative Council was installed to advise the 
ruler. In 1853, the first code of personnel law or the Dustur was promul- 
gated-specifying areas of power and responsibility for both the ruler 
and his attendants. The feudal system was weakening and the foundations 
of popular participation were being laid.
New religious clashes and sectarian violence brought new 
approaches during the period 1861-1914. A new protocol was formulated 
and for the first time a judicial system establishing courts for civil 
and criminal cases was installed.
In 1920, the French were granted responsibility for seeing 
Lebanon through the formal accesion to independence. The period of the
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mandate was the most important single factor affecting the development 
of governmental and administrative machinery.
Key features of the French approach toward administration 
were added to the Turkish legacy; many features introduced by the French 
remain until the present time. The most salient was the high degree 
of centralization with approval of all plans by senior officials. No 
delegation of authority was added to develop the Lebanese ability for 
governing, little initiative or responsibility for decision-making was 
a result that lingers well into the contemporary period.
The French were legalistically oriented and applied the law 
in its narrowest sense. No attention was given to the long-term objec­
tives of the law or to the social objectives of the ministry. As a 
result of their orientation, the selection system for civil servants 
was based on those with legal training or high educational qualifications. 
Both these considerations are still followed in Lebanese administrative 
policy at the present time.
The early years of independence cannot be noted as a time 
for improvement in the administrative machinery but at least it can be 
recorded, that a recognition of the problems was made and attempts to 
reform the administration originated in formal decrees of 1953, 1955 
and 1959. The exodus of the French left the civil service understaffed - 
as far as qualified and trained personnel and overstaffed with persons 
of mediocre talents. The need to fill these vacated positions led, 
however, to the ineffectiveness of the service. The infusion of new
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personnel, mainly through the process of nepotism, reinforced concepts 
of corruption and venality. The personal policies of al-Khouri and 
Chamoun of interference in the administration left the service more 
disrupted and disorganized than ever.
The crisis in 1958, another incident of religious tension 
sparked a new attempt at reform. This time more emphasis was given to 
socio-economic development and to the proper regulation of civil service 
affairs through the creation in June 1959 of a Civil Service Board to 
oversee and protect the status of the bureaucrat.
As was seen from a presentation of historical events, that 
period of crises seemingly brought about attempts at reforms. Religious 
tensions contributed many a time to the development of a crisis. Parti­
cularly, in the 1958 situation, the Moslem dissatisfaction and unrest 
was a chief cause in the overthrow of Chamoun. One of their main grie­
vances was the lack of inclusion within the administrative hierarchy - 
a share of the spoils. Sectarian tension seems to be an important element 
in a discussion of Lebanese politics and administration and the following 
chapter will seek to explore its role and influence on the administrative 
machinery.
CHAPTER III 
THE SOCIAL SETTING 
Recent studies in the field of comparative administration 
emphasizes the need and desirability of examining administrative systems 
in the light of the total environment and culture of a country. Administra­
tion does not operate in a vacuum, and the nature of administrative 
organizations and processes is to a great extent the product of physical, 
political and social forces which operate in a certain culture. Professor 
Robert A. Dahl drew attention to this problem in 1947 when he noted that
...the study of public administration inevitably must 
become a much more broadly based discipline, resting 
not on a narrowly defined knowledge of techniques and 
processes but, rather extending to the varying histori­
cal, sociological, economic and other conditioning 
factors that give public administration its peculiar 
stamp in each country.^-
This study will attempt to examine the reciprocal and sensi­
tive interplay existing between Lebanese bureaucrats and their social 
setting. Their behavior, informal relations, status, Interaction and 
general characteristics as a body resemble to a great extent those of the 
Lebanese social base. The diffusion of human resources into the Lebanese 
bureaucracy and its social setting conveys a strong impact on the civil 
service. In fact, the major problems and characteristics of the Lebanese 
civil service are those of the Lebanese society itself. It will attempt
^Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration," 
Public Administration Review, Vol. VII (1947), p.11.
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to identify certain important factors in the environment in which the
Lebanese administration operates and which have had a tangible impact
on administrative attitudes and practices. This will involve a brief
analysis of Lebanese culture and society which has direct bearing on
administrative behavior.
Social Structure
Lebanon is part of the general "cultural area" of the Arab
Middle East. Countries thereof--although they cannot be equated or
bracketed socio-politically--could be considered as roughly comparable
on the general basis that they share a common history and tradition.
As such, they possess some common social determinants and characteristics
such as the extended family system; the subordination of the individual
to his family and his participation in larger social groupings on a
family basis; larger social units based on kinship lines and the leader-
2ship being concentrated in the upper middle and upper classes.
Also, we may observe the dominance of primary organizations,
such as the traditional family system, over secondary ones which is
characteristic of agrarian societies. In such societies primary groups
tend to perpetuate themselves by maintaining a strong relationship with
those of their members that join secondary organizations.
...the relatively few secondary organizations tend to 
resemble primary organizations, somehow wrenched out
^Raphael Fatai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," The 
Middle East Journal. Vol. VI, No. 1 (Winter, 1952), pp. 20-21.
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of their natural rural setting. Thus, 'secret societies', 
guilds and, most significantly, the government itself, 
the bureaucracy, resemble a greatly extended joint family 
or clan. Important features of administrative behavior 
become comprehensible if we see that members of a bureau­
cratic organ behave toward each other in ways appropriate
for the relations of fathers and sons, or of brothers, 
to each other.
No corresponding or reciprocal interplay exists, however, 
to the extension of the primary groups power into secondary organizations 
in the form of sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of its members 
towards the public. It seems that "in the Near East, people are not yet 
accustomed to looking upon others impersonally in any situation. Their
tendency to look upon others as individuals, with families, friends, and
communities behind them, is carried over into realms where recent changes 
have established different formal requirements."^
The family is one of the most basic and fundamental institu­
tions in Lebanese society and culture. The primacy of the family manifests 
itself in all phases of Lebanese life -- politics, business, religion, 
and personal relationships. In political life it is taken for granted 
that political leadership will be assumed by representatives of certain 
powerful families. Family ties tend to override all other ties, and an
3Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria - Toward a Typology 
of Comparative Administration," in William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the 
Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1957), p. 41.
Slorroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt- 
A Study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), p. 118.
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individual's first loyalty is to his family; the individual does not 
stand alone but appears and acts as a member of a family group. The 
family manifests its solidarity in many situations. "Blood can never 
turn into water" is proverbially stated in a conflict situation in which 
an individual supports his relatives against his own friend. Such loyalty 
is expected from him even by his friend, who would despise him if he did 
otherwise.
The individual derives support and security from his family.
In return he gives his services and loyalty to it. He also finds in 
it fulfillment; for kinship is a powerful factor in securing for him 
prestige and social status. There is a proverb that is significant in 
this context: "He who has no family backing has no backbone."
The Lebanese family is a patriarchal and very closely knit 
one. Lebanese are born into the family and find it extremely difficult 
to leave it. In fact, they seem to surrender their independence and 
individuality and to submit to the rule of the father. The basic values 
of the individual are transmitted and shared by the family into which he 
is born. His personality traits are to a great extent shaped by the 
family. Thus, Diab and Melikian state that
The family is all pervasive and requires the support 
and loyalty of its members. In return, it provides its 
members with the essential security and support. The family 
ascribes clearly defined roles and status to its various 
members, especially to the eldest male child who comes next 
in importance to the parents. Thus the family constitutes 
a very important social unit in the life of an individual,
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and its standing in society, at large, contributes to the 
prestige of its individual members.-*
In this same article, the authors note that in Middle Eastern societies 
the family still claims first priority in the hierarchy of individual 
loyalties and affiliations. This is even true of university students 
who are naturally the most educated and enlightened group in society.^
The consequences of such a situation for government adminis­
tration are very significant. The docile and dependent life which an 
individual leads in the family is reflected in the administration. 
Employees display little initiative or independent judgment and shy 
off from the exercise of responsibility. They try to evade decision­
making and take comfort in submission to their superiors. According to 
Morroe Berger, this attitude of subservience and of avoidance of respon­
sibility is typical of the civil servant in the Near East.^ Berger's 
study on subservience and initiative in the Egyptian bureaucracy is 
very incisive and revealing and is true of the Lebanese situation.
It is no wonder that administrative organization in the 
Lebanese public service resembles the family hierarchy with authority 
concentrated and decisions made only at the top. This is one of the 
main problems of the Lebanese administration and is largely respon­
sible for the notorious delay in the transaction of official business.
^Levon H. Melikian and Lutfi N. Diab, "Group Affiliations of 
University Students in the Arab Middle East," The Journal of Social 
Psychology, Vol. 49, 1959, p. 146.
6Ibid., p. 156.
^Berger, op. cit., p. 152,
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This attitude of domination on the part of superiors and
the docility and obedience on the part of subordinates is also the result
of the authoritarian nature of the Lebanese society in general. Not
only the family, but other social institutions in Lebanon are highly
authoritarian. The Ottoman and French heritage which has exerted a
dominant influence on the country was also an authoritarian one.
If a society is organized on authoritarian lines-- 
i.e. if in family and community life great stress is 
ordinarily placed on submission to supervisors-- the 
area of acceptance of authority in every organizational 
situation will be wider than the area of acceptance in 
similar organizational situations in other societies 
organized on different lines.8
Family ties and allegiances are so strong in Lebanon as to 
result in nepotism and corruption. A person’s duty and responsibility 
according to social customs and values are to his family first. Public 
interest is subordinate to the family interest and, hence, widespread 
corruption and favoritism result in the bureaucracy. Social customs 
and values in western countries do not tolerate such practices or 
behavior.
Sectarianism in Lebanon is part of the basic political 
structure of the country, as will be illustrated below. The religious 
communities are all "warped by old memories and emotions into habitual
g
American Political Science Association, Sub-committee on 
Comparative Public Administration, Report by Herbert Kaufman, Annex III, 
"A Conceptional Framework for the Study of Comparative Administration," 
Unpublished Report, September, 1953, p. 28.
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non-cooperation. The division is not merely formalized by law. It is 
Lebanon itself*.'9 Accordingly, a strong tendency exists, perhaps, for a 
sect once formed to become a closed community and to maintain a conscious 
attitude of being different in its religious beliefs, customs and tradi­
tions from the surrounding world. This is so because a sect is a social 
force and, in essence, it is a faction, which is defined by James Madison 
as "a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, 
or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the perma­
nent and aggregate interests of the community'.'^
A full discussion of the history of the evolution of sectarian­
ism, sectarian conflicts and strife and its various social and political 
manifestations is very Important. There are innumerable writings concerning 
Lebanon's political history.^ Some very relevant and general landmarks, 
nevertheless, are cited here.
Religious Sectarianism
Sectarianism is the distinguishing feature of Lebanese poli­
tics. No study of government and bureaucracy can be attempted without an
a
George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution, "The Middle East 
Journal. Vol. VII, No. 1 (Winter, 1953), p. 2.
^James Madison, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic 
Factions and Insurrection," in The Federalist (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1937,) p. 54.
^For an informative, yet compact, discussion of sectarianism 
and its political history see, Clyde G. Hess, Jr. and Herbert L. Bodman,
Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," The Middle 
East Journal. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1954), pp. 10-26.
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understanding of the religious factor and its influence on the whole life
and culture of the Lebanese people. Lebanon provides a unique and very
interesting example, especially for the student who is interested in
viewing political and administrative processes in the light of the wider
social environment.
Lebanon has never been inhabited by a religiously homogenous
population. This small region around Mount Lebanon, from which the
considerably larger modern state of Lebanon derives its name, was a
place where persecuted sects formed semi-autonomous social groups. Here
they enjoyed a considerable measure of freedom and safety, which was
possible because of the mountainous nature of the country that made access
12difficult and thus placed its inhabitants in a strong defensive position.
Lebanon has come to be peopled by a mosaic of religious communities, none
of which constitute the majority of a population which is at present half
Christian and half Moslem.
Table III-l, below, provides a breakdown of the population
13of Lebanon by religious communities and represents the most recent 
estimate of the size of each sect. This estimate is necessarily a rough 
one because such a statistic is so politically sensitive that every attempt
12 Pierre Rondot, Les Institutions PlitiqueB du Liban (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), p. 5.
1 ̂ For a discussion of each of the major sects found in modern 
Lebanon, see Albert H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London:
Oxford University Press, 1947),
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TABLE III-l
BREAKDOWN OF LEBANESE POPULATION BY COMMUNITIES
a a  b e































For the statistical data of 1913 and 1932, see Pierre Rondot, 




For the statistical data of 1956, see Jacob Landau, "Elections 
in Lebanon," Western Political Quarterly (March, 1961), Part I, p. 121, 
based on al-Nahar (Beirut), April 26, 1956.
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to take a census since 1932 has failed for fear of revealing a Moslem
majority. Table III-2 shows the regional distribution of the sects. It
will be noticed that each sect is thickly concentrated in a given area:
this is indicative of the important role which the sect plays in all
phases of life. Even in the urban concentration of Beirut in the nineteen-
sixties , the various sects had Mukhtars (mayors) for different quarters
who carried the influence of the hierarchy into every household.
The history of Lebanon has been characterized by tense and
strained relationships between these different sects, each of which is
suspicious of the other. Conflict between these religious communities
often resulted in violent and bloody clashes, which finally culminated
in the savage massacres of 1860 between Maronites and Druzes and resulted
in direct foreign intervention. The following quotation is a fairly
accurate description of the situation at the turn of the twentieth century.
Christians versus Moslems. This is my first notion 
of collective human relationships. To my mind at 
the age of five or six the world consisted entirely 
of Moslems and Christians in antagonism to one 
another. By the time I was eight or nine, I had 
developed, or rather inherited, a definite outlook 
common to all Syrian Christians at that time, a 
feeling of aversion toward the Moslems and Druzes 
whom I learned to consider as our natural enemies.
Under the rule of the Ottomans the Empire itself was "... 
a non-national system of Moslem provinces and dependencies whose non-Moslem
14Edward Atiyah, An Arab Tells his Story: A Study in Loyalties 
(London: Murray, 1946), p. 10.
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TABLE III-2
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON, 1950 
(percentage of population of district)
District Mar GO GC AO S Sh D
Akkar 18 2 1 0 52 0 0
Tripoli 5 10 0 1 78 0 0
Zgharta 90 3 0 0 6 0 0
Batroun 76 18 2 0 1 3 0
Koura 28 63 0 0 8 4 0
Hermel 3 0 30 0 6 62 0
Baalbeck 12 2 4 0 12 68 0
Zahle 19 10 23 8 24 10 1
Kesreouan 85 2 1 2 1 8 0
Metn 51 9 5 19 0 0 30
Baabda 48 8 3 1 3 18 18
Aley 29 16 3 0 1 2 46
Chouf 34 0 9 0 22 2 31
Saida 8 0 8 0 62 18 0
Jezzlne 63 0 16 0 3 5-20 1-5
Rachaya 4 25 2 0 28 0 37
Merjayoun 6 14 5 0 13 45 13
Tyre 6 0 6 2 4 80 0
Beirut 8 11 3 4 24 6 1-5
Source: Etienne de Vaumas, "La repartition confessionnelle au Liban,"
Revue de Geographle Alpine. XLIII, (1955), pp. 511-603.
Mar ■ Maronite; GO - Greek Orthodox; GC - Greek Catholic;
AO - Armenian Orthodox; S * Sunnite; Sh - Shiite; D - Druze.
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subjects were organized in religious, not territorial communities."^
The nature of the Ottoman Empire itself provided the sectarian environ­
ment and basis of Lebanon.
The Lebanon of the time was ruled by a combination of feuda­
lism (the amirs) and sectarianism. The "Millet System" which prevailed 
during the Ottoman rule -- and which continued to prevail, to a lesser 
extent, afterwards -- is an embodiment of sectarian semi-autonomy. The 
word "millet" means a sect, and so the system has a theocratic basis. 
From the political point of view it was a device by the central govern­
ment to ease the relations of the subjects with the Porte . More than 
that, "as human cattle, the conquered were to be milked, fleeced, and 
allowed to live their own lives as long as they gave no trouble.
In all matters that concerned one of the sects, the govern­
ment always referred to the head of that particular sect. The spiritual 
leaders of the sects possessed civil as well as judicial functions.
They administered the property and institutions of their sects and 
they handled matters of personal status (which they still do at present). 
"Since the Moslem law (the Sharia') was not applicable to the non-Moslem 
majority (in the Lebanon), they were left under the juris liction of the
^Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East 
(London: R.I.I.A., 1955), p. 16.
^Philip Hitti, History of Syria (London: Macmillan, 1951),
p. 667.
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civil code which had obtained before the Conquest, such jurisdiction 
being now placed in the hands of their own religious dignitaries.
This was the origin of the system of self-administering religious 
communities or millets ... (which) still survives for the purpose of 
civil law in the majority of Middle Eastern countries who have as yet 
not undergone a thorough secularization’.'^ As such the theocratic state 
gave the religious minorities freedom to conduct their affairs as their 
religion dictated. So, by virtue of the Millet System all sects were 
self-administered so to speak, which situation widened the gap more and 
more between the various religious communities.
The Ottoman millet system set up all the religious non- 
Moslem groups into separate entities having each of them under its own 
religious heads. These heads administered the laws related to divorce, 
marriage, inheritance, adoption and other aspects of personal status, 
and supervised religious education and religious foundations. "This 
amounted to a provision for a minor government within the larger govern­
ment. It was a formalization of the traditional Moslem practice of
18attempting to solve the problem of minorities."
The French Mandate "... emphasized the 'confessional1
nature of the 'State', and thus succeeded in creating a diversity of
19interests which drove people into enclaves."
^George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (London: 
Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1952), p. 18.
18Philip Hitti, Lebanon In History (London: Macmillan and Co. 
Ltd., 1957), p. 362.
l^Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 
1957), p. 50.
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The traditional jurisdiction of the communal courts ^
were maintained in some matters of personal status, 
although a large proportion of such matters were 
transferred to the civil courts. An attempt was made 
in 1936 to define the whole position of the communal 
jurisdictions. The High Commissioner issued a decree 
in which the historic communities were given explicit 
legal recognition. Their statutes were given the 
force of law, and the application of them placed under 
the protection of the law and the control of the public 
authorities. They were to possess corporate personality, 
and to be represented in their relations with the public 
powers by spiritual heads. Members of the communities 
would be obliged to conform to the communal statutes 
in matters of personal status, and to the civil law 
where the statutes of the communities were silent.
Anyone who attained his majority would be at liberty 
to leave his community and enter a new one; and
provision was made for individuals who were not members
of any religious community.^0
It was in the 19th century that the principle of confessional 
allotment of seats within a given administrative or electoral district 
was founded. In 1841, the Ottomans took the first step in institutionalizing
sectarian differences by organizing provincial councils' to hear disputes
and carry on discussions in accordance with the laws. As was mentioned 
earlier, Mount Lebanon was divided into a northern governorate under a 
Maronite Qa1immaqam and a southern governorate under a Druze Qa*immaqam.
Each was assisted by a provincial council composed of twelve persons, 
two from each of the major religious sects (Maronites, Druze, Orthodox,
Greek Catholic, Sunnite Moslem, and Shi'ite Moslem).^ Al®°> in 1861,
20Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., pp. 181-182.
71“ Malcolm Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840- 
1868; A Contemporary Account by Antun Dahir al-Aqiqi, and Other Documents 
(Beirut: Khayat's, 1959), p. 4.
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when Mount Lebanon became a Muttassarrifiyah. headed by a Christian
Mutassarif who was assisted by Administrative Council (Majlis Idara)
in which all the major sects were represented. The seats on the Council
were distributed in the following manner: Maronites 4, Druze 3, Greek
Orthodox 3, Moslem 2. These members were elected by the mayors (Sheikhs)
2 2of the villages, and were to examine revenues and expenditures. The
Mutassarifiyah was divided into seven districts, each of which was
governed by a Qa1immaqam appointed by the Mutassarif from the dominant
sect in the district.
Later legal changes by the French -- as of the spring, 1920,
when they established the state of Greater Lebanon -- deeply affected
Lebanon’s political development along sectarian lines. The new state
was enlarged by the addition of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, Baalbeck
and Hasbaya and its area was three times the size of the former Mutassari-
fiyah of Mount Lebanon. With this aggrandizement, the demographic picture
of the country changed sharply. Whereas under the Mutassarifiyah Lebanon
was predominantly Christian (constituting 75 percent of the population),
23the enlarging of the state brought with it a large Moslem population.
Bulus Masad, Lubnan wal-Dustur al-Uthmani (Lebanon and 
the Ottoman Constitution) (Egypt: al-Ma'arif Press, 1909), p. 12.
23See Table 1, page 50 for the breakdown of the Lebanese 
population by communities in 1913 and 1932.
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From an overwhelming majority, the Maronites were reduced to 30 percent
of the population, but still constituted the largest single community;
the next largest community was the Sunnis, followed by the Shi'a, Greek
Orthodox and Druze.
While the 200,000 Maronites, devoted to France had 
previously formed a majority in Lebanon, they were 
now joined by 135,000 Christians of various denomina­
tions, in addition to 30,000 Armenians, and 20,000 
foreigners together with 250,000 Sunnites, 105,000 
Shi'a and 44,000 Druze.^
The creation of the Lebanese state as separate from Syria
was primarily a sectarian issue in background and essence. The French
authorities conceived of the Maronites as their natural friends and allies
and it was only natural that France would favor them:
The French authorities were believed to be not altogether 
impartial in their efforts to hold the balance (between 
Christians and Moslems), and to show excessive favor to 
the Maronites and other uniates (Catholics). Thus the 
other communities became hostile both to France and to 
the Maronites. This hostility in its turn cemented the 
alliance between the two. ^
France laid some regulations which had primary impact on the 
country's political institutions. Arrete No. 1304 of March 1922, established 
a new Representative Council which became the precursor of the Lebanese 
Parliament. Another Arrete No. 1307 established electoral procedures for
2^Carl Brockelman, History of the Islamic People (New York: 
Putnam’s Sons, 1947), p. 494.
25Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 183.
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Lebanon and has exercised its influence on all later Lebanese electoral 
laws. This Arrete provided for the apportionment of seats in each electoral 
district on a confessional basis, and helped to incorporate 'feudalism'
into the electoral system by dividing the country into multi-seat consti-
26tuencies.
The Constitution, promulgated on May 23, 1926, stated in its 
95th Article (as amended on November 9, 1943) that: "As a provisional 
measure and for the sake of justice and concord, the communities shall 
be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of 
the Cabinet, such measure, however, not to cause prejudice to the general 
welfare of the State.1,22 This provision effectively weakened, if not 
contradicted, the 12th Article of the same Constitution which stated that 
"Every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference 
being made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the
conditions established by law. A special statute shall guarantee the
28rights of officials in the departments to which they belong."
At the dawn of independence the question of confessionaliam 
and sectarianism received its modern reaffirmation in the form of the
2^Receuil des Actes Adminlstratifs du Haut Conmissariat de 
la Republique Francaise en Syrie et au Liban, 1922.
27The Lebanese Constitution (Beirut: Khayat's, 1960)
26Ibid.
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so-called Al-Mithaq Al-Watanl (The National Pact) of 1943. This was 
an unwritten agreement concluded between the two "heroes of independ­
ence" President Bisharah Al-Khuri, representing the Christians, and 
Premier Riad Al-Solh, representing the Moslem. The Pact purported 
to serve as a perpetual Entente Cordiale among the various religious 
communities of Lebanon. In essence the Pact consisted of four princi­
ples: (1) Lebanon should be completely independent and sovereign.
This meant that the Christians should stop pressing for Western 
(especially French) protection, and that the Moslems should not try 
to turn Lebanon into an Arabic Islamic state or part of one; (2) Lebanon 
should have an Arab "face" and language while remaining culturally 
distinct; (3) Lebanon should cooperate with all the Arab states providing 
that they recognize her boundaries; (4) Public office should be distri-
n nbuted equitably among the major confessions.
The National Pact was a formula which all elements in the 
country could agree upon, and it laid down the rule for domestic 
cooperation and foreign policy necessary to the country's survival.
The Pact, however, was a remedy rather than a cure, and it depended 
upon the sectarian ratio of the population remaining constant. It also 
legitimized sect as a basis for representation. In the nineteen-fifties, 
as the sectarian ratio shifted in favor of non-Christians, and as Moslems
29Bisharat Al-Khuri, Haqa iq Lubnaniya (Lebanese Realities), 
Beirut: Awraq Lubnaniya, 1961), II, pp. 289-300.
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began to demand a greater share of power, the Pact itself became a 
problem.
Even before the National Pact was given official expression 
certain procedures were being developed on the domestic side to carry 
it out. One of these is the tradition that the President of the Republic
be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem, the Speaker
of the Chamber a Shiite. The National Pact also implicitly prescribed
an equitable distribution of cabinet and bureaucratic positions among the
sects. Every one of Lebanon's forty-one cabinets between 1943 and 1967 
was carefully balanced, 50-50, between Christians and non-Christians and 
also among the various sects and regions. Table III-3, below, gives the 
breakdown of the political representation of the six major religious 
communities. Another was the system of representation of the 1929 Parlia­
ment and all subsequent Parliaments was fixed by law, in advance, in the 
ratio of six Christians to five non-Christians. (See Table III-4). Voters 
in each district had to choose a certain number of deputies from the 
major sects in the district. For instance, a voter in Akkar in the 1964 
election had to choose two Sunni Moslems, one Greek Orthodox, and one 
Maronite. Any candidate would have trouble winning without some support 
from voters of other sects; but these voters would tend to vote first for 
the man in their own sect. There was therefore a pull toward inter­
sectarian cooperation among candidates which resulted in lists. The most 
prestigious men of the dominant sect in the district found themselves in 
a strategic position. They were able to do favor for candidates of other 
sects, since their coattails were so strong; and after the election they
TABLE III-3
SUMMARY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE SIX MAJOR 
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES3
Percentage Mar S Sh GO GC D Total
Population 30.0 20.0 18.0 10.0 6.0 6.0 1.430,908
Parliamentary Seats 
1943-1966
30.7 20.4 18.4 10.8 6.0 6.5 495
Ministerial Portofolios 
1943-1966
21.6 26.2 13.4 14.8 10.9 12.8 439
Cabinet Ministers 
1943-1966
25.8 24.7 13.1 12.0 11.3 13.1 285
a
Figures from 1943-1961 compiled from Ralph Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the 
Lebanese Political System," Journal of Politics. XXIV (August, 1962), p. 519.
Mar ■ Maronite; S = Sunnite; Sh = Shiite; GO = Greek Orthodox; GC * Greek Catholics; 
D ■ Druze.
TABLE III-4
PARLIAMENTARY DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS AMONG SECTS
1929-19643
Sects 1929 1934 1937 1943 1947 1951 1953 1957 1960 1964
Christians:
Maronites 15 7 20 18 18 23 13 20 30 30
Greek Orthodox 6 3 7 6 6 8 5 7 11 11
Greek Catholics 3 2 4 3 3 5 3 4 6 6
Armenian - - 2 2 2 4 2 4 5 5
Minorities 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
Sub-total 25 14 35 30 30 42 24 36 54 54
Moslems:
Sunni 9 5 13 11 11 16 9 14 20 20
Shi'i 8 4 11 10 10 14 8 12 19 19
Druze 3 2 4 4 4 5 3 4 6 6




45 25c 63d 55 55 77 44 66 99 99
a
Nicola Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, I960," The Middle East Journal , Vol. XIV, No. -
(Autumn, 1960), pp. 367-369.
b
Thirty elected and 15 appointed
c d
Eighteen elected and seven appointed Forty-two elected and twenty-one appointed
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had a powerful voice in Parliament, which in turn reinforced their 
prestige.
In the Lebanon of today, with the exception of the family, 
the religious group is still the most important influence in determining 
an entire way of life for many people. The basic value of the individual, 
and very often his role and status in society, are determined by his 
religious affiliation. According to Daniel Lerner, religion in the 
Middle East
...has always claimed priority among the secondary 
symbols of identification. A Middle Easterner related 
himself to his society by way of his sect, and Muslim 
doctrine on the dhimmi as well as the Ottoman Millet 
system accorded cultural and legal authority to recognized 
sects.30
The importance and role of the religious group in society and 
the life of its members is well expressed by Albert Hourani in his often- 
quoted phase:
The sect persisted as a social entity even after the 
impulse which gave it birth had died away. To leave 
one’s sect was to leave one's whole world, and to 
live without relatives, the protection of the com­
munity, the consciousness of solidarity and the 
confort of normality.31
Although some recent studies have revealed that religious
32influence and identification is declining somewhat, the situation
30Haniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: 
Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), 
p. 172.
3^Hourani, op. cit., p. 64.
32e . Terry Prothro and Levon Melikian, "Social Distance and 
Social change in the Near East," Sociology and Social Research, XXXVII, 
(1952), pp. 3-11.
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described above is basically true today. Thus, a recent study conducted 
among a selected group of Middle Eastern students at the American Univer­
sity of Beirut showed that among Moslem students religious affiliation
ranks next to the family only. Among the Christian students, it ranked
33third, after the family and ethnic group.
It would be impossible to present a true and clear picture 
of the role and influence of religion in Lebanese society, especially 
upon government ani administration. One must live in the country for 
some time to obtain a feeling of the mood and atmosphere and to under­
stand all the various repercussions of this problem. An attempt will 
nevertheless be made to describe some instances wherein the sectarian 
problem had serious and adverse effects, especially on governmental insti­
tutions and practices.
By far the most serious repercussion of sectarianism in 
Lebanon is that it has undermined national unity and until now has pre­
vented the development of the country into a homogeneous, cohesive 
political entity. "Sectarianism, authorized by public law and administra­
tive fiat, perpetuates ancient loyalties at the expense of the larger
34national identification."
Thare is a shocking lack of agreement among the two major 
sects on the most basic of all issues; namely, that of the continued
33Diab and Melikian, op. clt., p. 156. 
34L erner, op. clt., p. 172.
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existence of Lebanon as an independent political entity or its incorp­
oration into a larger predominantly Moslem Arab state. This basic 
lack of agreement was brought to a climax in the crisis of 1958, which 
almost degenerated into a religious war between the two main religious 
communities.
In the field of government and administration, sectarianism 
had had most serious and grave effects. To begin with, it has precluded 
the developement of a strong government and has fostered political divisive­
ness and instability. It has complicated the task of forming cabinets, 
which must represent all the various sects. J Cabinets are by definition 
coalitions of the representatives of the various religious groups of 
the country which must not act so as to impair the basic interests of 
any of the major communities if they are to continue in office. All 
groups fear a strong government which, if it fell in the hands of one group, 
might make possible its dominance over others. Hence, the role of govern­
ment has been restricted to a narrow scope of activities and, in comparison 
to other Middle Eastern countries, has played a secondary role.
It is widely held that in Lebanon there can be no strong rule. 
After witnessing the series of coups d'etat in the neighboring Arab 
countries, many people have concluded that Lebanon was not a fertile
35See Malcolm H. Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a 
Confessional Democracy," in Leonard Biner, (ed.), Politics in Lebanon 
(New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 192-200.
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ground for such occurrences. This belief is grounded on sectarianism.
A coup d 1 etat is not likely because sectarian considerations cannot 
be disregarded. A coup d'etat can be attempted only by a group repre­
senting the major sects, which is impractical or else the struggle would 
become a sectarian one.
The major sects not only must have their say but also their 
proportional say in government; thus governing is a joint action of the 
sects. Consequently the governing process is greatly complicated 
because of sectarianism. There is in Lebanon a dual executive-*the 
President who is not only nominally but actually the chief executive and
the Prime Minister. These two executives, being the representatives
of the two largest communities, must work together.
Some claim that sectarianism has been a blessing in the sense 
that it has prevented the rise of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes 
and will continue to do so since no religious sect will tolerate such 
dominance by another sect. This may well be true, but the alternative 
has been a weak and powerless government. The Cabinet in Lebanon is 
becoming more and more a representative institution where different sects 
are represented, and less and less an executive organ which can speedily 
reach and implement decisions. It has become a miniature Parliament 
which debates and discusses issued but rarely reaches agreement on a 
decision.
...The government's function has been to act as a
trustee: to preserve, to stand guard, to see to it
that one's clients receive the due measure of privi­
leges and benefits to which traditions entitle them.
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...Governments are not made to create public policy, 
nor to choose between clear-cut alternatives entailing 
the triumph of one set of demands over another, but to 
reflect faithfully ani adjust the competing interests 
of various groups...In short, it is in the nature of the 
executive to avoid decisions that are political in the 
full sense. The government's functions 
to be judicial: it adjudicates claims...
Politics and sectarianism are inevitably interrelated in 
Lebanon, and very often it is not possible to distinguish between the 
tsro. Sectarianism has had very serious effect on the administration in 
that it has resulted in a prejudiced, and biased civil service and, thus, 
undermined the principle of civil service neutrality. Sectarian attitudes 
and convictions continue after appointment to the public service and, as 
a result, some civil servants' loyalties are to their sect and not to 
the state. They view themselves first as servants to their own sect and 
its members and secondly as servants to the rest of the public.
The Constitutional provision that the sects shall be repre­
sented in the public service has been accepted by the communities as a 
guarantee that each shall have a proportional number of pests in government. 
Since 1959, the Civil Service Board has been attempting to institute the 
principle of munasafa or 50-50 in the distribution if government posts 
between Christians and Moslems.




DISTRIBUTION OF HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS AMONG THE COMMUNITIES
Percentage Year Mar. GC GO S Sh D Moslems Chritians Cases
1946a 38.7 3.2 19.3 29.0 3.2 6.4 38 62 31
1955a 40.0 9.0 11.7 27.0 3.6 7.2 38 60.7 111
Posts b
1962 26.2 9.5 14.3 34.5 2.3 8.2 45 55.0 84
1967C 47 53 87
Population in
1956 a 30.0 6.0 10.0 ' 20.0 18.0 6.0 1,430,908
a
Ralph Crow, "Confessionalism, Public Administration, and Efficiency," in Leonard Binder, 
Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 172.
b
List of government officials, American Embassy, Lebanon.
c
Information from the Civil Service Board.
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tive and diplomatic posts among the religious communities for selected 
years. The three largest Christian communities constituted 467. of the 
total population in 1967 but held 55% of the higher administrative and 
diplomatic posts, while the three Moslem communities together made up 
44% of the population but held only 457. of the same positions. The 
Shi'a community is particularly slighted. Whereas, this sect constitutes 
18% of the population, it occupied 2.3% of the high posts in the govern­
ment .
Another aspect of sectarianism in administration is that it 
results in weak internal control over civil servants. A certain super­
visor cannot control or discipline his subordinates who belong to different 
sects and who have been hired and are still supported by sectarian pressure 
and influence. Many executives hesitate to delegate authority to subor­
dinates who do not share their sectarian view, thus obstructing the smooth 
and speedy functioning of the administration.
The whole problem of sectarianism was recently well expressed 
by a former Prime Minister, who said that for an individual, religion 
constitutes a passport, a check, a privilege and a certificate of compe­
tence.^®
37^0 figures are available for the confessional distribution of 
the civil servants. The author was informed during an interview on January 5, 
1967, that only the President of the Republic has access to these figures.
It is very doubtful that the civil service posts are distributed on the basis 
of munasafa and in all likelihood the Christian elements still predominate.
38Saeb Salam, "Lubnan Wahed La Lubnanan" (One Lebanon and 
Not Two), Conferences du Cenacle, XV, No. 5 (1961), p. 20.
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It is quite obvious that in the realm of government and 
administration, sectarianism contradicts the most elementary principles 
of merit. Its overtones are implicit in practically every act or deci­
sion of the government. The far-reaching implications of the sectarian 
problem will become more evident as this study proceeds to an examina­
tion of various aspects of the Lebanese civil service.
In spite of the gravity of the sectarian problem and of the 
serious obstacles which it creates for the government and administration, 
there does not seem to be an easy and near solution to such difficulties.
The sectarian problem cannot be solved by statutory legislation or govern­
mental action. It is deeply rooted in the society and culture, and 
solution lies in a gradual, slow social evolution in the country. There 
are indications, at present, that the slowly developing secondary insti­
tutions and groups in Lebanese society, especially trade unions and 
political parties, are coming to play a part in the loyalty of the citi­
zens. This is true of transitional societies in general, where primary 
groups and loyalties of a traditional culture gradually give way to 
developing secondary groups and loyalties that normally characterize more 
modern industrial societies and culture. The Lebanese government would 
do well to encourage and support, and, if necessary, regulate these emerging 
secondary groups, with the ultimate goal and hope that they will replace 
sectarian groups and affiliations. It is important, however, that suffi­
cient care be taken so that these growing secondary groups would not 
become instruments of sectarian pressure and interference.
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Economic Factor
In studying the social setting of the administrative system 
in Lebanon, one cannot overlook the economic aspect which is essential 
for understanding some of the basic features of the system. The follow­
ing paragraphs will present brief, general descriptions of the economic 
structure and its bearing on the public administration of the country.
Lebanon is a small country with a population of approximately 
2,405,000 and an area of 4,015 square miles. Although poor in natural 
resources and essentially underdeveloped, it is prosperous in many
respects, and with the exception of Israel and Kuwait, has the highest
39per capita income in the Middle East, The Lebanese economy can be
termed more agricultural than industrial. Thus
...although Lebanon is primarily a country of trade 
and services, when the individual incomes of the 
various sectors of the economy are compared, it is, 
on the other hand still true that about half the 
population derive their income, wholly or partly 
from agriculture, and a little more than half of the 
people are rural in the sense they live in rural 
areas. Rural exodus to urban centers has been 
continuous since the second world war, but is rather
slow.^0
~^New York Times, June 11, 1967, Section 3, p. F 1. The 
per capita income in Lebanon is $450.
^Simon G. Siksek, Bashir J. Daouk and Sami E. Baaklini, 
Preliminary Assessment of Manpower Resources and Requirements in 
Lebanon (Beirut: Economic Research Institute, 1960), p. 18.
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One of the striking features of the Lebanese economy is the 
lack of official economic policy in Lebanon which is central, all- 
pervading, or of long duration. The Lebanese economy "is as close to 
the classical 'laissez faire1 model as one can expect in the modern world."^ 
Table III-6 shows the rat national product by sector. Lebanon 
has been conveniently classified as an agricultural country not unlike 
the other countries of the Arab East. Forty-eight and nine-tenths percent 
of the population derive their income from agriculture. Yet, insofar as 
agriculture produces a relatively small proportion of national income 
(15.8%), Lebanon is much more similar to the more developed, industry- 
based economies of the West. However, industry here contributes only 
12.6% of the total national income and employs 12% of the labor force.
But the most distinctive feature of the Lebanese economy 
remains the large proportion, 31.27., contributed by the trade sector.
Even this high figure somewhat underestimates the actual share of trade 
in the country's income. For to it must be added the greater part of 
income arising from "Transport" (5.37.) and Finance (6.1%). This raises 
the share of the trade sector to over forty percent of the total national 
income. Hence the essentially mercantile nature of the Lebanese economy.
Table 6 exposes the inequality of the distribution of income.
41U.N. - F.A.O., Lebanon - Country Report (Rome: F.A.O.,
1959), p. 1-6.
TABLE III-6
NATIONAL INCOME AND EMPLOYED POPULATION IN LEBANON
BY SECTOR, 1957a
Sector National Income 
(in L.L. Million)b
Percentage Persons Employed 
(in 1,000)
Percentage National Income 
per Employed Person
Agriculture 238 15.8 220 48.9 1,082
Industry 189 12.6 54 12.0 3,500
Construction 41 2.7 33 7.3 1,242
Transport 80 5.3 24 5.1 3,333
Trade 469 31.2 53 11.8 8,849
Finance 91 6.1 2 0.4 45,500
Other Services 148 9.8 48 10.7 3,083
Government 108 7.2 16 3.6 6,750
Real Estate 139 9.3 n.a. n.a.
TOTAL 1,503 100.00 450 100.00
a
IRFED Mission, Etude Preliminaire sur les Besoins et les Possibilites du Developpement au 
Liban. 1959-1960. Vol. I, p. I-I-33.
b
L.L. = Lebanese Pound; $1.00 = 3.1 L.L.
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It may be taken as an evidence that such inequality has been, at least,
in part, caused by the mercantile nature of the economy and the prepon­
derance of services production. The lowest figure recorded for income 
produced per head of active population is in agriculture (1,082 L.L.) 
and the highest figure is for finance (45,500 L.L.).
The pre-eminence of trade in a country like Lebanon is under­
standable. Forming by geographical position a link among three continents, 
and having more Lebanese emigrants than the population of the country, 
and who were forced to leave because of the lack of natural resources, 
Lebanon has developed into a country of middlemen and merchants with 
well established connections in the outside world. Charles Issawi, a 
noted Lebanese economist relates:
...Fabulous, yet perfectly authentic, stories are told 
of the transfer of gold from Mexico to India and China, 
of the shipment of copper from Franco's Spain to Stalin's 
Russia, and of the sale of a huge consignment of tooth 
brushes from an Italian firm to a neighboring one -- 
all these negotiations directed and financed by some mangy 
looking business house in Beirut.^
The country today thrives on a prosperous import and re-export 
trade as well as on such service transactions as gold brokerage; transit 
fees and entreposage (warehouse) trade. Beirut's well-developed sea and 
airports have contributed in no small degree towards making Lebanon the
^Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Political Libera­
lism in Lebanon, in Binder, op. cit., p. 74.,
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center of the Eastern Mediterranean trade; the free zone in Beirut's 
seaport has developed into the most important entrepot center in the 
Middle East; and the free foreign exchange system adopted since 1948 made 
possible various lucrative switch operations.
There is another particular feature of the Lebanese economy 
which has far-reaching implications. Lebanon's balance of visible 
trade has reflected consistently a ratio of 5 to 1 and 6 to 1 to the
advantage of imports over exports. In 1965, the value of total imports
amounted to $482 million, while total exports amounted to $85 million
/ Qonly. Yet this deficit is more than fully covered by "invisible" 
receipts (emigrants' remittances, tourism, banking,-«tc.).
It is related that in 1952, the Lebanese government had 
contracted Paul van Zeeland, to study the economy. After having looked 
carefully at the situation, van Zeeland told the government: "It is a 
miracle -- I can't understand it. But my advice to you, since things
are going so well -- don't ask too many questions or try to do anything
about the situation. Let it go on."
The Educational System
Education in Lebanon owes its rise and development to private 
efforts. Lebanon had developed a powerful tradition which goes back 
to centuries of hard work by foreign and local ecclesiastical establish-
43New York Times, op. clt.
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raente of the various religious communities
Education in Lebanon is characterized by a system in which 
the private local and foreign schools representing different traditions 
and cultures predominate. Tables III-7 and III-8, below, present the 
total number of private and government elementary and secondary schools 
together with the totals of students and teachers between 1955-56 and 
1961-62.
The educational system is a diverse and heterogeneous one 
consisting of public, parochial and private and the medium of instruction 
is either in Arabic, French or English. This multiplicity of systems 
and the lack of a unified educational policy have prevented the emergence 
of a unified intelligentsia.
Education in Lebanon is geared to a traditional system 
where training is of a generalized, historical, legal type (liberal arts 
and law) instead of an emphasis on specialized training for bureaucratic 
organizations (the scientific, technical, and the vocational). Yusif A. 
Sayigh illustrated this situation when he wrote that:
...the emphasis has all along been on liberal arts 
and law, to the detriment of the scientific, the 
technical and the vocational. Largely modeled on 
the French "Baccalaureat" system, the curricula
...early contact with modern Europe which gave Lebanon 
a lead in the adoption of Western education and led thus to a higher 
level of education...than can be found in other parts of the region." 
U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., p. 1-2.
TABLE III-7




Elementary Secondary Total Elementary Secondary Total
1955-56 731 110 841 113,024 20,911 133,935 3,764
1956-57 911 117 1,028 126,589 23,523 150,114 4,142
1957-58 925 120 1,045 128,847 24,340 153,287 4,397
1958-59 1,031 121 1,152 132,214 24,792 157,006 4,845
1959-60 939 145 1,084 126,589 25,625 152,214 5,545
1960-61 1,078 155 1,233 134,208 25,792 160,000 5,600
1961-62 1,225 172 1,397 152,192 28,051 180,243 8,064
a
Al-Jaryda (Beirut), July 18 and July 27, 1962.
TABLE III-8




Elementary Secondary Total Elementary Secondary Total
1955-56 967 60 1,027 80,567 6,494 87,061 3,457
1956-57 975 64 1,039 81,901 6,537 88,438 3,794
1957-58 991 74 1,065 82,530 6,540 89,070 4,045
1958-59 1,033 72 1,105 85,492 8,352 93,844 4,385
1959-60 1,199 91 1,290 92,350 13,572 105,922 5,011
1960-61 1,199 91 1,290 — — 116,923 5,411
1961-62 1,199 91 1,290 116,295 12,859 129,154 6,004
a
Al-Jaryda (Beirut), July 18 and July 27, 1962.
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stuff the student with factual knowledge but equip him 
poorly for individual, independent thinking.^
Tables III-9 and 111-10, below, show an unduly heavy con­
centration on law and arts. In the 1963-64 academic year about 71 percent 
of all university students in Lebanon were either studying law or arts, 
whereas the comparative figure for engineering and medicine are 5.7 
percent and 7.2 percent. This tendency in higher education reflects 
the prevalent pattern throughout all stages of education in the country 
where there seems to be a deficiency in orientation towards technical 
and other practical pursuits.
The tables support Robert Presthus's conclusion about the
traditional philosophy of this cultural area which
...tends to devalue practical training and this 
constitutes a barrier to bureaucratic evolution, 
...university training is legal and historical, 
sprinkled with a generous dash of philosophy... 
field research tends to be concerned with law and 
structure rather than with process. The Western 
idea of higher learning as a preparation for a 
career tends to be pushed aside by viewing the 
degree as conclusive evidence that one has arrived. ^
Based on the above, we may assume that, where such a situa­
tion prevails, education per se will be looked upon as a factor of 
prestige in an administrative situation rather than as a means to enhance
Yusif A. Sayigh, "Lebanon: Special Economic Problems 
Arising From a Special S t r u c t u r e Middle East Economic Papers. 1957, 
p. 65.
^Robert Presthus, "Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," 
Social Forces. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (December, 1959), p. 107.
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TABLE III-9




Law 579 43 128 750
Politics 84 37 94 215
Engineering 325 2 205 532
Medicine 253 30 160 443
Agriculture 43 — 60 103
Pharmacy 34 18 48 100
Dentistry 23 4 25 52
Sciences 204 37 166 407
Administration & Finance 107 11 — 118
Arts 349 353 493 1,195
Theology 67 3 14 84
Nursing & Public Health 23 104 98 225
Fine Arts 125 148 12 285
Others 195 116 444 754
TOTAL 2.410 906 1.947 5,263
a
U.N.-F.A.O., Lebanon - Country Report (Rome: F.A.O., 1959), p. II-9.
TABLE 111-10



















Sciences 398 — - 254 652
Social Sciences 299 — — - - 299
Engineering — 148 531 33 - 712
Medicine — 465 430 - - 895
Commerce — — — 283 - 283
Normal School 385 — — - - 385
Oriental Letters — 173 — - - 173
Others — 50 136 - - 186
TOTAL 6.003 1.869 2,951 1.013 834 12.507
a
Charles Rizk, Le Regime Politique Libanals (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1966), pp. 83-86.
3/4 of the students are Lebanese 1080 students are Lebanese.
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the quality of administrative performance. For instance, where a society 
approximates the agrarian type and where economic opportunities are 
lacking, the educated elite tend to look upon their education as a sure 
means of a government position or at least a place in society which 
recognizes their talents and skills.
Research findings on education in Lebanon^Zndicate that edu­
cation ranks high as a major value based on the question "What qualities, 
traits, and conditions a person should have as the means necessary to 
acquire wealth?" The result suggests a relative low ranking for education 
as a means to acquire wealth. Such matters as luck and pure chance, hard 
work and perseverence were considered more instrumental. We may conclude 
from these limited findings, although not representative of the whole 
society, that we are dealing with a traditionally oriented society where 
ascribed rather than achieved statuses are the criteria for prestige and 
social standing; that education is not highly regarded as a means for 
acquiring wealth, but rather contains a prestige element which overshadows 
consideration of type and quality of education.
The educational system is not presently well adapted to pro­
vide the array of special skills which modernizing goals impose. An 
analytical and problem-solving approach to learning must displace the 
habits of memorization and rote learning which inforce the mentality
47Lincoln Armstrong, "A Socio-Economic Opinion Poll in 
Beirut, Lebanon," Public Opinion Quarterly. (Spring, 1959), pp. 18-27.
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with its inflexible attachment to outmoded precedents and procedures.
The Political System
Lebanon's political system is tremendously influenced by
existing social systems to the extent that it could not operate as an
identifiable total system but as highly intermixed "systems" of politics
in a mixed political culture.
Within the country the preservation of the balance 
has contributed to the survival not only of the 
socio-political role of the religious communities 
(Islam draws no sharp distinction between the political 
and religious spheres, and the Christians of the Middle 
East have been obliged to accept this concept), but 
also of the influence of semi-feudal notables and 
clans. The party system and parliamentary regime have 
taken hold only formally and partially. Public opinion 
has not yet outgrown family and cantonal divisions 
sufficiently for the man at the top to resist the 
temptation, at election times, to pull fatally easy 
strings, for which all sorts of justification can be 
made, often enough in good faith. Indispensable links 
with the West must be preserved because this transit 
country lives on them in the crude material sense, as 
well as deriving intellectual and cultural sustenance 
from them; at the same time the interests of the Arab 
world have to be protected because 'Arab Lebanon' 
must show solidarity or else it impairs a significant 
aspect of its unique nature, not to mention its 
commercial contacts with the hinterland."^®
Sayigh summarizes the country's main political problems, together
with their repercussions, thus
The combined implications of political feudalism and 
political confessionalism have been to divide the
A O Rondot, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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community; to push the unqualified men forward if 
he of the right sect and has the necessary backing; 
to produce inefficiency and superfluity in the civil 
service; and to give the lows of the land less 
authority and effectiveness--in short, to retard far- 
reaching reform in all aspects of society's life.
Although the public at large is aware of the necessity 
of, and is eager for reform, it is generally kept so 
busy with its community rivalries that it has left 
the field free for narrow vested interests.^
The Lebanese bureaucracy is itself a unit or a member of a 
much larger system--the social system. It most definitely influences 
(by its outputs) and is influenced by (through its inputs) the physical, 
ideological, social, economic, political and psychological environment 
of the country. As such, an important interactivity exists between the 
society as a whole and the Lebanese administration which forms an integral 
part of the society. The Lebanese public officials are also members of 
the larger social system and of several of its subsystems -- primary and 
reference groups, families, religious sects, political groups, etc. Thus, 
they bring with them into the Lebanese administration a surfeit of roles, 
expectations, inter-personal relations, norms beliefs, values and pre­
judices. These they cannot lay aside in their bureaucratic behavior.
It has proved impossible to call upon their services, imagination, and 
conceptual abilities without calling into play, simultaneously, the 
products of a lifetime of beliefs and expectations which have the tenacity
49Sayigh, op. cit., p. 64.
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of historic tradition that is still a living force in Lebanon.
Developmental psychologists agree that national 
cultures tend to produce typical personality struc­
tures. It seems equally clear that personality 
structures are not discarded like snake's skins when 
one enters the bureaucratic arena; rather the patterns 
of bureaucratic authority and deference reflect the 
values of institutions through which the bureaucrat 
has grown, primarily the family. For example, cul­
tural parochialism has obscured the fact that the 
nepotism and subjectivity seen in bureaucratic 
systems of many less-developed societies are a 
manifestation of their pattern of family relations 
in which personal loyalties outweigh the demands 
of technical supremacy. Without some theory which 
relates social values and organizational behavior, 
this phenomena is explained only in irrelevant 
moral terms. In the West, a similar conflict -- 
bureaucratic needs vs. family and political 
loyalty -- exists, but the demands of objectivity 
usually persist; in the Middle East, the breakdown 
of the extended family which permits this solution 
has not yet occurred.'0
It looks as if Presthus's opinion that "social change is 
required to provide the basis for objective and rational patterns of 
organization"^ holds much truth for the Lebanese situation.
^°Robert Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cul­
tures," Public Administration Review. Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1959), p. 27.
^Robert Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organi­
zation," op. cit., p. 103.
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Summary Statement
On the assumption that a bureaucracy is part of a larger 
interrelated system, some attention muBt be given to the social and 
political environment within which it operates. As part of a social 
system, bureaucracy is strongly influenced by the society from which its 
members are drawn.
Five aspects of the environment are presented as relevant 
factors in the development of the administrative system: the structure 
of society; the influence of religion; the economic factor; the educa­
tional and political systems.
The basic values of Lebanese society manifested a strong 
authoritarian character, which had long been reinforced in the family 
structure. The primary and traditional groups in society carried much 
of the burden of government down through the Ottoman period.
The Lebanese family is a patriarchal and very closely .knit 
one. It occupies a focal position where the undisputed head is the 
father, where age has a high value standing, and where subordination 
of an individual to group values is an accepted social fact.
Administrative organizations in Lebanon resemble the family 
hierarchy with authority concentrated and decisions made only at the top. 
Family ties and allegiances are very strong in Lebanon and a person's 
duty and responsibilities according to the social customs are to his 
family first. Public interest is subordinated to the family's interest 
and, hence, widespread corruption and favoritism result in the public 
service.
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Sectarianism has been an intrinsic element in the political 
organization of Lebanon and religion has bolstered the place of the 
family.
Sectarian divisions were given official encouragement 
under the Ottomans by the Millet system which extended some sort of semi- 
autonomous status to the different religious sects.
During the Mandate period, the French did not do much to 
ameliorate the situation, but, instead, helped to foster divisiveness 
and sectarianism in pursuit of their own interests.
Sectarianism is not only a social and cultural force but 
finds official recognition in law and practice and directly interferes 
with the governmental and administrative systems. The most important 
manifestations of sectarianism can be found in the constitution, the 
electoral laws and the unwritten National Fact of 1943 which sought the 
coexistence of confessional religious groupings rather than conflict.
The Lebanon of the Pact was an association of all sects whose political 
views were at cross-purposes and who were doomed to live together. In 
essence the National Pact was a formula in pragmatic politics.
Sectarianism has had serious effects in the field of govern­
ment and administration. It has precluded the development of a strong 
government and has fostered political divisiveness and instability. It 
has given added support to political interference in the civil service 
and has prevented the recruitment of the best qualified staff and has 
resulted in weak control over civil servants.
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The Lebanese economy can be called agricultural more so than 
industrial despite the fact that the contribution of agriculture to the 
national output is lower than that of the other sectors of the economy.
Until recently, there was no official economic policy in 
Lebanon and the role of the government was very limited. But this 
picture is changing now. Rapid, continuous industrialization has 
brought with it an increasing need for government interference in various 
spheres of the society.
The system of education in Lebanon is many private and public 
systems, with foreign mission schools of various leanings. It has 
produced a relatively high level of literacy but of doubtful value. 
Education has been geared to a traditional system where the emphasis 
has been on liberal arts and law, to the detriment of the scientific 
and technical. A contributing factor to the lack of scientific training 
appears to be modern Arabic literature which is oriented, primarily, 
toward the humanities, or that instead of emphasizing objective research 
and causal postulates, subjective valuations and ethical preconceptions 
occupy a position of pre-eminence.
The growth of strong sectarian groups with legal safeguards 
for representation have created serious loyalty conflicts in adminis­
tration and have tended to negate what the new civil service regulations 
purport to do, namely, to lay down rules for recruitment, selection and 
promotion based on competence.
This chapter has attempted to show that the Lebanese institu­
tions arise from a social base, and they express Lebanon. The treatment
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THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
The present system of government is embodied in a basic con­
stitutional law, in practices having the force of unwritten law, and 
in certain laws implementing the basic law. The Constitution of Lebanon 
is predominantly western in character and is modeled partly after the 
French Constitution of 1875, strengthening the executive as against the 
Legislature. In accepting from the League of Nations the mandate for 
Lebanon, France accepted the responsibility of tutoring the country for 
self-government and eventual independence. But with the view of main­
taining its control over Lebanon indefinitely, France sought a way of 
keeping absolute control over the government of the country. It was 
easier to control the actions of one man than those of many, and thus 
it was that France invested all the important powers in the President. 
The French High Commissioner alone was more powerful, directing the 
President's actions as he saw fit. When Lebanon achieved its indepen­
dence and abolished all references in the Constitution to its status as 
a mandate, the powers of the President remained unchanged.
The present Constitution was promulgated on May 23, 1926 and 
has been substantially amended. In 1927 the Senate was abolished and 
the legislative power was given to a single Chamber of Deputies. The 
most important amendments were those of November 9, 1943, which deleted 
all mention of the League of Nations and the mandatory power and thereby
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constituted a declaration of Lebanon's independence.*
The Constitution established Lebanon as an independent unitary
republic (Articles 1 and 4), having Arabic as its official language
(Article 11). The executive power is vested in a president assisted by
ministers; legislative power vested in a Chamber of Deputies and the
2judicial powers by independent judges.
The Executive 
The President
The President of the Republic is elected by the Chamber for 
six years and is eligible for reelection but cannot succeed himself 
(Article 49). His powers include the appointment and dismissal of 
ministers and the designation of the Prime Minister (Article 53); the 
issuance of executive orders in accordance with existing laws (Article 51); 
the negotiation and ratification of treaties) subject to approval by the 
Chamber of Deputies of financial and commercial treaties (Article 52); 
the dissolution, adjournment, or calling of special sessions of the 
Chamber (Articles 33, 55 and 59); and initiation of laws and constitu­
tional revisions (Articles 18 and 76). The President can be indicted 
by the Chamber for crimes and high treason (Article 60). An important 
constitutional amendment of 1927 empowered the President to issue a 
decree, with the approval of the Cabinet, to bring into operation any bill
^Subhi Mahmassani, Al-Dastour wa-Dimokratlah (The Constitution 
and Democracy (Beirut: Dar Zlm, 1952,) p. 131.
^The Lebanese Constitution (Beirut: Khayats, 1960).
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which had been submitted to the Chamber as an ’’urgent bill" but on which 
the Chamber did not act within forty days of its receipt. In practice, 
this amendment endows the President with the power to execute the budgets 
and carry out projects still unapproved by the Chamber (Article 58).
Another constitutional provision gives the President a limited 
veto power. He may request reconsideration of a law and to override 
his veto requires an absolute majority of all members of the Chamber.
The burden is here placed upon the Chamber with all the odds in favor 
of a President wishing to kill the bill (Article 57).
The office of the President is a very strong one. The Presi­
dent is not a ceremonial or titular head of state but is the real execu­
tive authority within the state. As such, he presides at Cabinet meetings 
and determines the climate of its debates. But it is the Prime Minister 
who takes responsibility for the actions of the Government.
The President of the Lebanese Republic has extensive powers 
deriving from the Constitution and the operation of the Government, and 
reinforced by a tradition of autocratic tendencies on the part of the 
chief of state. Amir Bechir II played off the Maronite and Druze feudal 
lords against each other in order to concentrate more power in his own 
hands. The Governors-General of the Mutasarrifyya augmented their vast 
executive powers at the expense of the confessionalized and divided 
Central Council. Some of them exercised strong pressure on the voters 
to obtain election to the Council of their own partisans. Some of them 
also arbitrarily pursued their political adversaries before the courts
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and pressured the judges into passing judgment against them.-*
Occupying the most prestigious office in the country, the 
President of the Republic can similarly, but with greater finesse, use 
his vast constitutional and administrative powers to help his friends 
and confound his enemies. In a society where confessional representa­
tion and the tenet of a confessional balance of power have revived 
feudalism in politics and allowed it to masquerade behind democratic 
institutions, the office of the President, endowed with the greatest 
privileges, can and has been used as the top feudal stronghold. During 
the French Mandate, the French High Commissioner controlled the presi­
dency to execute French policy. But with the coming of independence, 
all the mandatory limits on the freedom of the presidency naturally 
disappeared.
During al-Khouri's presidency, (1943-1953), it is reported, 
the President allowed his friends and relatives to use the machinery of 
the state for personal advantage and enrichment. There was a great deal 
of corruption, traffic in influence, political feudalism, interference 
in the courts, and irregular dealings by the administration and friends 
of the administration,^
During the crisis of 1958 similar charges of corruption for 
personal profit, discrimination against Moslem applicants for public
•*M. Jouplain, La Question du Liban (Paris: Rousseau, 1908), 
pp. 475-476, 506-509, 527-528.
^Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn, 1957), 
deals briefly but pointedly with corruption in the al-Khouri regime in 
Chapter 5.
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employment and against Moslem communities and districts needing public 
services were made against the Chamoun regime, and the President was held 
responsible.
The President is the supreme figure in the administrative 
sphere. Ministers are his own appointees and can be dismissed at his dis­
cretion, Government employees in the higher echelons, although subject 
to civil service laws, cannot be appointed without his approval. Pro­
motion and advancement depend on the wishes of the President. Thus, it 
is no surprise to find that in the executive branch of the Lebanese
government, ministers, as well as civil servants, have their loyalty
first and foremost to the President.
The real role and power of the President of the Republic cannot
be fully understood without reference to Article 60 of the Constitution
which states: "While performing his functions the President of the 
Republic shall not be held responsible except when he violates the con­
stitution or in the case of high treason." This article absolves the 
President from the responsibility for any of his acts except in the case 
of violation of the constitution or high treason. In other words, the 
chief executive in Lebanon, who is the titular as well as the actual 
head of the state and who enjoys extensive constitutional powers enabling 
him to play the most important and dominant role in the governmental 
process, cannot be held responsible or accountable for any decisions or 
acts which he makes in performing his assigned duties. This is achieved 
through the simple device of having all presidential decisions and 
decrees -- with the exception of those relating to the appointment and
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dismissals of ministers - countersigned by the Minister or Ministers 
concerned. Through such a device, responsibility is shifted from the 
President to the Minister who might be held responsible for decisions 
which he has not made.
What complicates the situation is the impossibility of pinning 
responsibility for presidential acts and decisions on the Ministers, 
who by being required to countersign these acts and decisions supposedly 
assume responsibility for them. The Constitution, in Article 70, pro­
vides that Ministers can be impeached by the Chamber for high treason 
or for serious neglect of duty by a two-thirds majority of the total 
membership of the Chamber. It further provides that a special law shall 
be issued to determine the conditions for the civil responsibility of 
the ministers. No such law has yet been enacted, thus making it impossi­
ble to determine accountability for executive acts and decisions. This 
lack leaves a serious flaw in the whole system which should be remedied 
as soon as possible.
The Cabinet
Although the President of the Republic is the real executive 
in Lebanon, he is assisted in this role by a cabinet of his choice. 
Constitutionally, the Cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies.
Yet in nearly forty years (1926-1967), only once, has a Lebanese Cabinet 
been dismissed by an adverse vote in the Chamber.-*
^In March, 1930, the Cabinet of Emile Edde fell to an overwhelming 
vote of no-confidence. Edde had introduced austerity measures which deprived 
deputies and their supporters of the reservoir of favors to which they were 
accustomed. See Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 202.
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The President of the Republic appoints the ministers and desig­
nates one as Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers). In 
appointing a cabinet, the President is free to elect his ministers either 
from the Chamber or from outside it, although the former practice has 
been the more prevalent (Article 28). In a parliament where there is 
hardly any real party representation and where there is no one parlia­
mentary group or block which enjoys a clear majority,^ the formation of 
a cabinet and securing confidence for it will have to depend on satis­
fying as many groups and members in the Chamber as possible. Such 
satisfaction is usually achieved by offering ministerial posts to these 
groups or members. The process of forming a cabinet in Lebanon is 
further complicated by Article 95 of the Constitution, which specifies 
that the religious sects should be equitably represented in the formation 
of cabinets and appointments to the public service. This article in the 
constitution has provided an official basis for sectarianism in the 
Lebanese political and administrative systems and it has been the main 
plague of the system. It has greatly complicated the task of governing 
and almost paralyzed the political system. Political sectarianism in 
Lebanon means that the offices of the state should be distributed among 
the various religious sects. Thus, tradition dictates that the President 
of the Republic should belong to the Maronite sect, and the Prime Minister 
to the Moslem Sunni sect. It also means that members of the Cabinet
^There are at least 15 parliamentary blocs or groups in 
Parliament and about 40-50 independent members.
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have to represent equitably the various main religious sects of which 
there are now six: Maronites, Sunnis, Shi'a, Greek Orthodox, Greek 
Catholics, and Druze. Most cabinets in Lebanon have been composed of
6, 8, 10 or 14 members to take care of the religious communities.
This precarious religious balance, which is scrupulously 
observed in the political life, has significantly undermined and weakened 
the governmental system. Any government which has to rule through com­
promise among such sharply differing and dissenting groups is bound to 
be highly ineffective and incapable of asserting its will. The lack
of an absolute minimum of unity and consensus in the society has
rendered the task of governing a most difficult one and has encouraged 
a high degree of political instability. The constant change in cabinets? 
and the resulting lack of political continuity are typical characteristics 
of the political system. This whole situation greatly contributed to the 
crisis of 1958 when the country was plunged into civil strife bordering 
on a religious war between the two main religious communities. The shock 
of the crisis and the chaotic political situation raised serious doubts 
in the minds of the people about the political viability of the Lebanese 
state and revealed a pressing need for basic and drastic reforms in the 
entire political system. There is somewhat of a parallel between the 
situation in Lebanon and that in France where sharp political and social 
differences and a high degree of political instability paralyzed the
^Lebanon has lived under some forty-nine cabinets in twenty- 
nine years of constitutional government from 1926 to 1967, or an average 
of less than seven months per cabinet.
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government and ultimately led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic.
The fact that cabinets are short-lived is mitigated by a
tendency to carry over in membership from one cabinet to the next, and 
the stable character of the circle of eligible ministers within parlia­
ment. From 1926 to 1965 a total of 333 ministerial posts were occupied 
by only 134 individuals. More than half of these men held office more 
than once, and eleven individuals alone accounted for 95 of these posts.
The Cabinet, under the supervision and direction of the Presi­
dent, is responsible for drawing up the general program of the government, 
submitting it to the Chamber and defending it there; Ministers, whether 
they are members in the Chamber or not, are allowed access to it, can 
address it whenever they wish to do so, and have to answer questions and
Qdefend their policies before the Chamber. In Lebanon, most of the 
legislation is initiated by the Cabinet, subject to the approval of the 
President and is referred to the Chamber for approval.
The Ministers are responsible for the direction of the affairs 
of the state, each in his respective ministry or ministries. They are 
responsible for the execution of the laws and regulations in their depart­
ments; and as mentioned earlier, they countersign any presidential act 
or decree relating to the work of their departments. Ministers are the 
main assistants and advisers to the President and work very closely with 
him. They serve at his pleasure and can be dismissed if they lose his 
confidence.
^Lebanese Constitution, op. cit., Art. 67.
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In discussing the Cabinet in Lebanon, one should stress the fact that 
the role played by this body depends to a great extent on the personality 
of the Prime Minister. Political events in Lebanon have shown that a 
stable government is dependent upon a proper balance between the Cabinet 
and the President on one hand and the Cabinet and the Chamber on the 
other hand. The Cabinet is in the very awkward position of being the 
servant of two different masters. It will continue in office as long 
as it can please these two masters, who might not always see eye to
eye. In theory, this seems to be a difficult and embarassing situation
for any cabinet; but in practice, it is not as bad as it seems since the 
President in Lebanon has been able to assert himself as the dominant 
power and to make himself the master of both the Cabinet and the Chamber 
at the same time. While this has greatly eased the way for the Cabinet, 
it has distorted executive-legislative relationships to an extent of 
disrupting proper democratic practices in the country. These executive- 
legislative relationships will be discussed later in this chapter.
The relationships of the Prime Minister and the President is 
a very sensitive issue since it is related to the deeply rooted problem
of sectarianism. These two figures represent the two largest religious
communities in the country, the Maronites and the Sunni Moslems; and a 
proper balance and relationship between them is a proper balance between 
their respective sects.
A distorted balance between them, that is to say a weak Prime 
Minister easily dominated by the Chief Executive, is likely to raise 
cries of foul play from the concerned sect.
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The first two Presidents had enjoyed a relationship of mutual 
trust with their Prime Ministers. Al-Khouri’s fall in 1952 was heralded 
by a breakdown in his relationship with the Prime Minister, Sami al-Solh.
In his resignation, the Prime Minister delivered a blistering attack on 
the President, stating that al-Khouri had relegated the Cabinet to a 
third-rank position of isolation in the affairs of state. Every Presi­
dent under whom he served relied primarily on the advice not of his Prime 
Minister but on an official "sultan":
Every sultan had an entourage and a group of followers, 
relatives, in-laws of in-laws, associates, middlemen, 
and hangers-on from every fraction and class and every 
village and quarter. Whichever of us would come to 
power, to the crematorium of Cabinet office, found 
himself obliged to pay homage to these sultans and their 
followers. It is they who govern and who direct, plan, 
and execute policies, while we are only the instruments 
which they set up before the eyes of the public to bear 
responsibility for their errors and misdeeds.9
The second President, Camille Chamoun, relied on the advice of an unofficial
"sultan" -- the deputy Emile Bustani and the third President, General
Fuad Chehab, or various military officers.
It is believed that some of the causes of the 1958 political
crisis in Lebanon can be traced to the distortion and lack of balance
which characterized the relationships of the President and his Prime
Minister over a long period of time.
^Sami al-Solh, Memoirs (Muthakirat), (Beirut: Maktabat 
al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1960), p. 320.
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The Legislature
The Lebanese Constitution vests legislative authority in a 
single Chamber of Deputies whose members are elected by universal suffrage 
(Article 16). Membership in the Chamber and the manner of elections are 
determined by law. The most recent law of April 26, 1960, provided for 
a Chamber of ninety-nine members elected by simple majority in multi­
member electoral districts. It was mentioned earlier that the distri­
bution of seats in the Chamber and the election of members is based on 
sectarian affiliation. Such a practice excludes from the Chamber some 
eminently qualified and competent persons who are not allowed to become 
candidates in their respective districts because they happen to belong 
to a different religious sect from the one which is alloted a seat in 
that particular district.
The main function of the Chamber is to legislate and determine 
the general policies of the state which are later put into effect by the 
executive organ.
A close examination of the legislative role of the Chamber in 
Lebanon reveals some serious shortcomings. It appears that the Chamber 
has not lived up to the responsibilities expected from it in this regard.
It has allowed the executive branch to usurp some of its legislative 
prerogatives. As was mentioned earlier, the chief executive has made 
frequent use of the constitutional provision which allows him the right 
to issue urgent bills as laws if they have not been decided upon by the 
Chamber within a period of forty days. This fact in itself is an indica­
tion that the Chamber has not been really determined on fully exercising 
its legislative powers or else it would not have allowed so much opportunity
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for legislative activity b y  the executive authorities.
A more serious phenomenon, in this respect, is the willing 
and deliberate delegation of legislative power by the Chamber to the 
Cabinet. On several occasions,^ the Chamber was persuaded to give to 
the Cabinet the right to rule by decrees. This meant that the Cabinet 
could issue decree laws which are as binding as the regular laws passed 
by the Chamber. It is true that normally the power of delegated legis­
lation given to the Cabinet is limited to relatively short periods of 
time and to certain specified fields; but it is at the same time an 
admission by the Chamber that it cannot do the job for which it was 
elected and which can be done better by the executive branch of govern­
ment. Although the right to legislate by decree has been granted to the 
Cabinet rather occasionally, most of the country's basic policies and 
legislation have been issued in this way.^* A legislature which is so 
easily willing to abdicate its rightful duties and prerogatives does 
not inspire much confidence. In France, the Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic in an attempt to avoid such irresponsibility on the part of 
parliament, specifically prohibited the practice of delegated legisla­
tion. ̂
10Notably in 1952, 1953, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1966.
^Examples of such decree laws are: decree laws organizing 
the Judiciary; electoral law; public accounting law; personnel law; law 
organizing the various ministries; press law; law creating the Civil 
Service Board, etc.
12Article 13 of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic pro­
vides that "The National Assembly alone shall adopt the laws. It may not 
delegate this right."
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Besides the important function of legislating which has not 
been properly discharged by the Chamber, it has another important function 
which is normally performed by the legislature in parliamentary democracies; 
namely, that of supervising and checking the executive. The Cabinet is 
jointly and individually responsible to the Chamber and can continue in 
office as long as it enjoys its confidence. Ministers can be questioned, 
investigated, and called to task if the Chamber chooses to do so. The 
Chamber can force an individual Minister or an entire Cabinet out of office 
if it is not satisfied with the way the affairs of state are being handled.
A system such as this presupposes a responsible and vigilant 
parliament which takes its work seriously and which, through careful 
supervision can make sure that the executive branch is not deviating 
from the main policies drawn for it and that the administration is dis­
charging its functions properly. Unfortunately, the Chamber has not 
made use of this right. This is not surprising because a chamber which 
views its main responsibility of legislating casually and lightly is 
likely to display the same attitude with regard to what it considers a 
less important function. It is worthy of note that during the period 
1943-1967, no Cabinet was forced to resign by a parliamentary vote of no 
confidence. All other Cabinets have invariably resigned or been forced 
out of office as a result of differences with the chief executive. It 
appears that in Lebanon, the Cabinet has become more of a representative 
of the chief executive than that of parliament.
Parliament has also failed in exercising any serious and 
important check on the work of various administrative agencies. It is
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true that frequent debates have taken place on the floor of parliament with 
regard to this problem, but they have rarely resulted in any desired 
changes. Parliament has not made any use of its investigative powers in 
its attempts to control and check the administration. In Lebanon,
Cabinet responsibility to parliament, instead of producing some desirable 
results as far as the administration is concerned, has, on the contrary, 
had some adverse effects. The parliamentary system in Lebanon has sub­
jected the Cabinet and the various ministries to serious political pressure 
and interference from the Chamber. The Minister in a parliamentary form 
of government is dependent on the support of his fellow deputies in parlia­
ment and cannot afford to ignore their wishes and demands which are often 
satisfied at the expense of the general interest of the country. The 
Minister has also to attend to the selfish needs of his own constituents 
whose continued support is essential for re-election. The political 
system in Lebanon has helped to promote political interference and 
favoritism and has, to a certain extent, undermined the merit system.
Sami al-Solh relates an anecdote which, unfortunately, is only too common 
in Lebanon:
It is well known how quickly the balance of government-- 
any government--can be lost. Most often it is some childish 
dispute that leads to a cabinet crisis. Thus, in 1952 there 
arose a quarrel between Messrs. Maroun Kanaan and the late 
Rashad Azar, both deputies from Jezine. The former came 
to me repeatedly, insistently demanding the dismissal from 
office of the constable of the town of Kafr Huna, whom he 
accused of pinching a bottle of wine worth L.L. 8. Azar 
meanwhile demanded the head of the town clerk, accusing 
him of pinching L.L. 12 from town funds.
Eight plus twelve makes twenty. More than once I offered 
to pay the L.L. 20 from my own pocket, to put an end to the
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matter, and perhaps to avert a cabinet crisis; for by 
counting the votes of our supporters we saw that two 
votes added to the opposition would be enough to turn the 
balance to our disadvantage.
But Kanaan and Azar took the affair seriously and 
refused my offer to pay the L.L. 20. I considered 
dismissing both the constable and the clerk together, 
but the two Deputies rejected the solution. The fact 
that each of them insisted on the dismissal of his 
enemy alone, as a means of exhibiting his own influence.
In the end, I sent both deputies away without having 
succeeded in settling their disputes, and thus the 
opposition picked up two new members.
Messrs. Kanaan and Azar were not alone in pressing such 
disputes as this; indeed, the majority of the Deputies 
spent their time in creating difficulties for us on 
account of some gendarme or doorkeeper. The atmosphere 
of the Chamber was not a healthy one.^
It is clear that any contemplated changes in the administration cannot
possibly be realized without some necessary changes in the political
system of the country.
Besides its main functions of legislation and of checking and
supervising the administration, parliament has a variety of other functions;
such as electing the President of the Republic, impeaching him and his
14Ministers, and amending the Constitution. These functions are not 
important for this discussion; but suffice it to say that in the exercise 
of these functions parliament has again shown its docility and weakness 
vis-a-vis the executive. Parliament has never impeached any President or 
even a Minister, although there have been cases where such an impeachment
^al-Solh, op. cit., p. 216.
*\,ebanese Constitution, op. cit., Arts. 49, 70, 77.
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was justified. As far as the amending process is concerned, parliament 
has shown a willingness to go along with the wishes of the chief execu­
tive. The amendment of May 22, 1948, was specially passed to allow the 
incumbent President to serve another term. It is interesting to not 
that this amendment applied only to that particular President and was 
not to become a permanent amendment to the Constitution binding on subse­
quent Presidents.
A close examination of executive-legislative relationships in 
Lebanon is a revealing one. To begin with, it is doubtful whether the 
system of government established by the 1926 Constitution can be properly 
called a parliamentary form of government. Parliamentary forms of govern­
ment presuppose executive responsibility towards parliament. In Lebanon, 
the real executive, the President of the Republic, is not formally 
responsible to the Chamber. The system is a combination of the presidential 
and parliamentary forms of government.
More important, the political system in Lebanon has shown a 
lack of balance between the executive and legislative branches of govern­
ment. Instead of a proper balance between these two branches, there is 
a domination by the executive branch. The political history of Lebanon 
since 1926 reveals a consistent trend of executive ascendancy at the 
expense of parliament. Such domination, as was mentioned earlier, is 
manifested in various ways. It Is manifested in the fact that parliament 
upon request has been willing to abdicate its legislative function to the 
executive, that the most important laws have been issued by the executive, 
that the Chamber has never been able to dismiss a single cabinet or even
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a single minister since 1931, and that parliament has rarely resisted 
any presidential wish or request.
On three important occasions, parliament has also discredited 
itself and helped perpetuate the idea that it was far from being repre­
sentative of popular wishes and needs. In the 1952 crisis when a general 
popular strike forced the President to resign, a few hours before this 
resignation, fifty-five members out of sixty-six signed a statement assert­
ing their confidence in him and their loyalty and support for his regime.
In the much more serious and bloody crisis of 1958 when the country was 
involved in an armed civil strife which lasted for several months, parlia­
ment did not even attempt to find a settlement. It remained silent and 
aloof until a settlement was reached through the efforts of various 
political figures outside the parliament. In the summer of 1964, seventy- 
nine deputies out of ninety-nine petitioned the President to stand for 
re-election but to no avail. These are examples of parliamentary weak­
nesses although the Constitution has formally allowed the Chamber more 
powers than it has actually assumed.
This executive domination in Lebanon was, to a certain extent, 
deliberately planned by the mandatory power which naturally preferred to 
deal with a strong President subject to its control rather than with an 
uncooperating Chamber which might be representative of popular feelings. 
Some also think that the French believed that a strong executive is 
specially suited for a sharply divided country because it would provide 
a maximum of needed stability.
Others also believe that a strong executive is more appropriate
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for relatively immature and underdeveloped countries as representative 
forms of government presupposes a certain degree of political maturity, 
economic development, and an advanced social structure which are not 
present in the Lebanon of today. Moreover, the people in Lebanon have 
as a result of Ottoman and French rule become somewhat accustomed to 
strong rule and leadership and did not resent the continuation of such 
a system during independence.
There is much ground for belief that the absence of political 
parties on the political scene has been a determining factor in weakening 
the representative institutions of the government. The member of parlia­
ment in Lebanon does not depend for his election on the organized support 
of political parties but rather on the support of other groups and 
individuals in his constituency whose loyalties and support he cannot 
secure and maintain without some help from the government. There seems 
no doubt that a chamber which Is composed of members belonging to organized 
political parties can assert itself much more easily and can, whenever 
necessary, defy executive authorities. The rising role of parties as 
evidenced in the most recent election of 1964 promises to restore a 
certain balance in executive-legislative relationships.
The Judiciary
Lebanon's Judicial system^ is heavily influenced by Ottoman 
and French practices. During the Ottoman rule, Lebanon followed the 
Ottoman system of Judicial organization with the exception of the Mutassarifiyah
l5For a detailed review of the Lebanese Judicial system and its 
historical development see Subhi Mahmassani, Legal Systems in the Arab States- 
Past and Present (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm LilMalayeen, 1962), pp. 246-258.
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of Mount Lebanon which enjoyed a special internal autonomy wherein 
foreigners enjoyed special privileges and Consular Courts.^
The Lebanese judicial system is composed of the ordinary 
civil courts and of special courts. The former include the three levels 
of First Instance, Appeal and Supreme courts, while the latter comprise 
civil status, military, juvenile, labor arbitration and administrative 
courts.I?
The Lebanese citizens fall under the Jurisdiction of one 
body of laws and one judicial system except in what relates to civil 
status affairs. In these affairs each Christina or Moslem sect follows 
its own particular laws and its courts. The civil status courts include 
the 1Rouhiyat1 courts for the Christian religious sects and the 1Shariya1 
courts for the Moslem religious sects. The application of secular 
principles and practices to civil status affairs and the bringing of such 
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts is a highly desirable 
objective but is, however, a very sensitive and inflammatory issue as 
regards religious sentiments and the sectarian balance of the country's 
political life.
Summary Statement
The 1926 Constitution provides the basic organization of 
government. In basic outline this constitution provided for a parlia­
mentary system similar to that of the French Third Republic. However,
16Ibid., p. 246. 
17Ibid,. pp. 250, 252.
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It departed from the French system in several ways. The President of 
the Republic was endowed with significant authority including the power 
to initiate legislation, meet with the Cabinet, exercise a suspensory 
veto, and issue decrees within the scope of law.
The Cabinet is appointed by the President. In making his 
choice, the President must insure the equitable confessional represen­
tation among its members. They are responsible both to the President and 
to the Chamber. The chief of the Cabinet-the Prime Minister, must be a 
Sunni Moslem. Although the Prime Minister acts as a brake on the tremen­
dous power of the President, his authority by comparison is feeble.
Cabinets are by definition coalitions of the representatives 
of the various religious groups of the country which must not act as to 
impair the basic interests of any of the major communities if they are 
to continue in office.
The Constitution vests legislative authority in a single 
Chamber of Deputies whose members are elected by universal suffrage and 
whose function is to legislate and determine the general policies of the 
government. However, a close look at the record reveals that frequently 
Parliament had granted the Cabinet temporary decree powers to deal with 
legislation which is in effect an abdication of its legislative functions. 
The legislature is ineffective. Throughout the independence period the 
executive was the paramount political institution.
To recapitulate, there appears to be a lack of balance between 
the executive and legislative branches of the government. Instead of a 
proper balance between these two branches, there is a strong domination
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by the executive branch. The administrative structure of the country is 
discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V 
BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION 
The general system of administration in Lebanon today is 
mostly derived from the French who, during their twenty years of rule 
there, helped in shaping the administrative institutions. Before the 
French, Lebanon was subjected to a long period of Ottoman rule which 
left its traces on the administrative machinery. It is during the period 
of the French mandate that the administrative and governmental systems 
began to crystallize and take shape.
Central Administration
Lebanon is a small unitary state with a system of administra­
tion similar to that of France. The basic unit of organization in the 
Lebanese central administration is the Ministry which is the counterpart 
of the French "Ministere" from which it was copied. The Lebanese ministries, 
presently sixteen in number, are divided in the following manner: (1) Foreign 
Affairs and Emigrants, (2) Justice, (3) Interior, (4) National Defense,
(5) Finance, (6) National Economy, (7) Public Health, (8) Agriculture,
(9) Public Works and Transport, (10) National Education, (11) Labor and 
Social Affairs, (12) Post, Telegraph and Telephone, (13) Information,
(14) General Planning, (15) Tourism, and (16) Water and Electric Resources.* 
All these organizations are located in Beirut, with the majority of them 
having field units in the various sections of the country.
^Legislative Decree No. Ill, June 12, 1959, Art. 1 in Adib Y, 
Sader, Collection of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964). Ministries 
are established and cancelled by means of a special law.
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Besides the present sixteen ministries there are around a
score of"independent or autonomous services" and semi-autonomous
"offices" which operate outside the ministerial framework but under the
tutelage (financial and administrative control) of some of these minis- 
2tries. Also, there are three control agencies attached to the Prime 
Minister's Office which involve central financial and administrative 
control and personneL administration. These are the Bureau of Accounts, 
the Central Inspection Service, and the Civil Service Board.
The Minister
The public organizations are all structured along a similar
pattern. Each of these ministries is headed by a Minister.^ The minister
is in charge of the administration of his ministry and is entrusted with
the powers of directing and supervising the services of the state which
4come under his department. He is the center of power in the administra­
tion, and formally speaking, he exercises full and ultimate authority 
over his ministry. As such his judgment and order are final and must 
prevai1
2See Table V-l, below.
In actual practice a Minister may head more than one ministry: 
or he may be a minister of state.
*̂ rhe Lebanese Constitution, Art. 64. This article reads: 
"Ministers shall administer the services of the State and the application 




AGENCIES AND INDEPENDENT SERVICES UNDER 
THE CONTROL OP THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD*
Muhafazah Agency or Independent Service
Beirut: 1. Beirut Power & Transit Service*5
2. National Litani River Service'3
3. Beirut Water Service*5
4. Social Development Service1*
5. Bureau of Silkc
6. Lebanese State Railways*5
7. Bureau of Fruits (Agency)
Mount Lebanon: 8. al-Barouk Water Service*5
9. al-Matn Water Service*5
10. Kisriwan and al-Futuh Power & Water Service'3
11. Ayn al-Dilbi Water Service*5
North Lebanon: 12. Tripoli Water Service*5
13. Permanent International Fair Service0
14. Tripoli Seaport Service*5
South Lebanon: 15. Sidon Water Service*5
16. Jezzine Power Service*5
17. Jabal Amil Water Service
18. Tyre Water & Power Service*5
Biqa: 19. al-Kasmieh and Ras al-Ayn Irrigation Service*3
20. Zahle Water Service*3
21. Agricultural Research Service0
a. Civil Service Board Report, 1961, pp. 533-34.
b. Under the control of the Ministry of Public Water & Transport
c. Under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture
d. Under the control of the Ministry of Labor & Social Development
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The basic administrative unit of the ministry is one or more 
Directorate-General. The Directorate-General Includes all other adminis­
trative subdivisions and is divided into Directorates or Services; 
Directorates and Services into Bureaus; Bureaus into Sections and Sections 
into Branches.
Chart I, below present the typical pattern of structural 
organization found in the Lebanese bureaucracy.
The Director-General
Each Directorate-General is headed by a career civil servant, 
the Director-General, who is the highest administrator and the direct 
head of each and every administrative subdivision in the ministry.^ The 
Director-General is a very important figure in the Lebanese administra­
tion. He is usually a very experienced person--sometimes a career man 
since the days of the French--and with Invaluable knowledge of the ministry 
and its administrative problems. He acts as the chief adviser to the 
minister on all matters pertaining to the ministry and its operation. In 
many instances he actually determines courses of action which an inex­
perienced or, perhaps, a weak minister would follow.
It would be of immediate concern to look at the functions 
given the Director-General by law. He 1b in charge of administering all 
units under him, coordinating their activities, and controlling the proper 
execution of their functions as regards the following
^Legislative Decree No. Ill, op. cit., Art. 7, sect, 1. 
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1. He exercises the authority granted him by law.
2. He takes decisions and signs all transactions and 
correspondence pertaining to his work.
3. He coordinates the activities of the various units 
under his authority.
4. He executes policy in the manner and time ordained.
5. He submits to the Minister matters involving general 
principles or pertaining to the latter*s authority.
6. He prepares instructions regarding work operations, the 
budget, the annual program of work and studies which 
lead to betterment of operations and raising of adminis­
trative standards.
7. He sees to the proper use of materials and furniture in 
the units.
8. He is responsible for the execution of laws and regulations 
through the civil servants under him.
9. He controls and inspects the units and civil servants 
under him; takes necessary measures for punishing wrong­
doers, corrects the wrongs and provides against future 
mismanagement; carries out an inspection once every 
three months in the central units, and once every six 
months in regional units.
10. He establishes contact with the "Directorate-General of 
Central Inspection" regarding the reports of the latter*s 
inspectors and suggestions for better management; he may 
ask the Central Inspection to conduct inspection in his 
units; in addition to his own inspection.
The Director-General signs all project decrees, arretes and 
transactions which must be submitted to the Minister, and he may include 
his written opinion and suggestions. He makes up a report every six 
months outlining the program of his department and specifying what things 
have been completed and where action is still pending. This report should 
state what difficulties confronted the execution of the department's 
programs. It should also include a statement on the conditions of the 
civil servants under him. Finally, the report must include plans or pro­
grams to be executed the following year. This semi-annual report is
submitted to the Minister with copies to the Civil Service Board and the
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Central Inspection Service.^
The Director-General is possessed of definite powers given 
him by law and, hence, cannot be taken away except by law. He may 
delegate some of his powers to the Director or Chief of Service.
g
Council of Directors-General
The Directors-General of all ministries must convene every 
three months upon the invitation of the President of the Civil Service 
Board and in the presence of the members of the Board and of the 
Central Inspection Service. The purpose of this meeting is to exchange 
opinions on the affairs of the Lebanese administration and to suggest 
necessary measures for raising its professional level and the better­
ment of its functioning.
The Advisory Coordinating Committee
A ministry which is composed of more than a single Directorate- 
General has an advisory committee for purposes of coordination attached 
directly to the minister. This committee is composed of all the Directors-
General and heads of smaller units if they are directly attached to the
9minister and is headed by the most senior among them in rank. The
^Ibid., Art. 7, sects. 3 and 4.
8Ibid., Art. 10.
^Decree No. 2894, January 16, 1959, in Collection of Decree 
Laws, op. cit.
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recommendations of this committee are reported directly to the minister; 
and the latter assigns to the committee whatever common problems exist 
between the ministry's main administrative units. These problems may 
involve matters of internal organization in the ministry, the budget pro­
ject and considerations of additional appropriations, purchase^ and 
works' programs and the distribution of funds for these activities, 
personnel matters which demand a choice such as promotion, specializa­
tion and training, and in general, any difficulties that may develop in 
the ministerial machinery.^
Personal Staff Units
Every level of the hierarchy is provided a staff unit respon­
sible for the personal matters of that level.
At the level of the minister, he may, and does designate one 
or two Personal Secretaries from among the civil servants of the ministry 
to organize his interviews, communications, private invitations, etc.
The service of the personal secretary remains in existence so long as the 
minister's term in office also exists. On the termination of the letter's 
office the former reverts to his original position. The secretary is 
attached to the 'Common Administrative Unit* or the 'Diwan' (secretariat) 
of the ministry.^ Actually the minister's secretary is somebody who 
is a supporter of the minister, perhaps his 'protege', or somebody who was
^ Ibtd., Arts. 19 and 20. 
^Ibid. , Arts. 16 and 17.
Filmed as received 
without page(s) / X O  «
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.
121
One can easily discern the influence of French administrative 
traditions in the Lebanese organizational pattern. True to French custom, 
the system in Lebanon has also provided for a high degree of concentration 
of authority. The Lebanese administration is a highly concentrated, highly 
authoritarian one where decisions on minor and routine operations must be 
made at the highest level in the administrative hierarchy. Top adminis­
trators, the Minister and Director-General are overburdened with unnecessary 
details, distracting them from more important matters of policy and manage­
ment .
This over-concentration of authority was instituted by the 
French during the Mandate in an attempt to tighten their hold over the 
public service and was later continued during the independence period by 
successive regimes in pursuit of their own interests. It should be pointed 
out that the lack of properly qualified, trained personnel in the Lebanese 
administration has hindered some efforts for delegating authority.
The problem of over-concentration of authority coupled with 
exceedingly lengthy and complicated procedures have resulted in what is 
probably the most pressing problem of the Lebanese administration--the 
delay in the dispatch of official business, paralyzing government opera­
tions. Completion of the most simple and routine transactions is a lamentably 
slow operation, normally taking weeks or months, and usually requiring 
action by a score or more government officials.
This over-concentration of authority in Lebanon extends into
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the legislative sphere, where Parliament usually includes in its legis­
lative statutes much administrative details, which should normally be
loleft to the discretion of administrative officials. This practice 
limits the freedom of action of administrators and deprives them of 
certain powers essential for the proper discharge of their functions.
In addition to this over-concentration of authority, the 
Lebanese administration suffers from excessive departmentalization in 
its ministries. Each ministry is, to a great extent, a self-contained 
unit acting independently of other ministries. There is practically a 
complete lack of lateral relationships between ministries. That is to 
say, a certain unit in one ministry does not have direct access or 
conmunications with a unit of the same hierarchical level in another 
ministry. Any contact between the two must be channeled through the 
Director-General of each ministry, thus greatly obstructing the normal 
flow of work and seriously undermining coordination between the various 
ministries.
In discussing the central administration, special mention 
should be made of the Ministry of Finance, which plays a key role in 
administrative and financial matters. This ministry is vested with the 
responsibility of preparing the budget in its final form. Its role, in 
this respect, is similar to that of the United States Bureau of the Budget, 
although the Council of Ministers in Lebanon can, at any time, override
1 1Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the 
Government of Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration Improvement," 
unpublished report, Part I, p. 4 (n.d.)
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any decision of the ministry.
Besides budget responsibility, the Ministry of Finance makes 
a comprehensive and total pre-audit of all government expenditures. No 
disbursement of money, no matter how small or trivial, can be effected 
without the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance. This means that 
any request for the expenditure of funds by any department has to be 
submitted to the ministry for approval. This centralization of financial 
control, although it has provided for certain measure of coordination and 
uniformity, has been one of the main causes of delay and obstruction 
in the public service. A simple request for the purchase of a small 
item is normally a very lengthy procedure and cannot be completed with­
out the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
Field Administration
14
Lebanon is divided into five Muhafazahs (departments or 
provinces) which are in turn subdivided into twenty-three Qadas (arron- 
dissements or districts).^  Each Muhafazah is headed by a Muhafez who 
is the highest authority in the province and whose role corresponds to that 
of the Prefect in France. He is appointed by the Council of Ministers and 
is responsible to the Minister of Interior.
^These are Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, South 
Lebanon and the Biqa. See Appendix A.
^Legislative Decree No. 11, December 29, 1954, Annex No. 1.
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The Muhafez
The Muhafez is the chief executive officer in his district 
and is the representative of the central government having the responsi­
bility for overall direction and coordination of all ministries' field 
units.
His major duties are those of maintaining peace and order in 
the Muhafazah; supervising the offices of the central government with 
the exception of the judicial courts, which are independent, and the 
army units, which are subject to direct control by the Ministry of 
Defense in the capital. He controls all civil servants in his province 
and administers the personnel matters of the latter in accordance with 
the Personnel Law. All correspondence between the regional units and 
the central administration must pass through him. Since he is responsi­
ble for the execution of laws and regulations in his district, he is 
entrusted to take all necessary measures for the coordination and proper 
execution of work of all regional offices under his command.^ In addi­
tion to a number of other minor duties, he has a number of powers delegated 
to him by the ministries.*^
An important function of the Muhafez is to observe the poli­
tical and economic conditions of his region and to convey his observations, 
monthly or whenever necessary, to the Minister of Interior. Similarly, he 
is responsible for the maintenance of public security and order, personal 




internal security forces, which are placed under his order for such 
purposes, to take any measures circumstances may dictate.
The relationships between the field and the central adminis­
tration in Lebanon are highly centralized. The Muhafez depends on the 
Minister of Interior for instructions in the performance of his duties.
He does not possess the independence of action and the discretion which 
his position demands. Until 1959, the Muhafez did not possess enough 
power to grant a hunting license for citizens in his Muhafazah. They
had to go to the capital for such a simple and routine transaction.
Decree Law No. 150 of June 12, 1959, has resulted in increased 
authority for the Muhafezs. This was done in order to relieve the central 
authorities in the capital and to place effective power near the people 
themselves. Thus, the Muhafez was granted the authority to decide many 
regional matters without referring them to the capital.
Table 2 below shows the ministries' regional offices in the
Muhafazah.
The Muhafez experiences serious role difficulties. His posi­
tion occupies a unique role in the region. He is, to a considerable
extent, a "political civil servant" in that he is a political appointee
18who is recruited through choice, and not through examinations. He is 
in an unenviable position and has to act very cautiously and diplomatically
if he desires to survive in his position. As the top administrator in his
18Ibid., Art. 5.
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TABLE V - 2
THE MINISTRIES' REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE MUHAFAZAH®
MINISTRY REGIONAL OFFICES
Interior Police, police courts, police records,
census, technical municipal office
Justice Court of Appeals
Finance Finance Administration; Land
Registration Office
Agriculture





Administration for the implementation 
of social programmes
Administration of the implementation 
of health programmes and of the enforce­
ment of sanitary regulations
Regional Directorate, roads, construc­
tion, water, electricity and machinery
Supervision of nationally administered 
schools.
National Economy Protection of the consumer, control of
gold jewelry
Orientation, Information and Tourism; summer and winter resorts
Tourism
Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration of the study, implemen­
tation and maintenance of telephone 
networks, regional administration for 
postal and telegram service.
legislative Decree No. 116, June 12, 1959, Annex No. 2
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Muhafazah he has a double duty to perform. He is under pressure from 
the central government--as its representative and agent--to carry out 
its orders. As the 'prime minister' of his area he is subjected to 
incessant relentless pressures from local Za1ims and the parliamentary 
deputies of the region. He cannot very well ignore their demands and 
wishes; and such wishes arc not always lawful, admissible and in the 
public interest. Many a Muhafez who had troubled relations with local 
politicians found that he could not keep his position too long, and was 
transferred.
Council of the Muhafazh
The Muhafez is assisted in his work by a Muhafazah Council^ 
over which he presides and which is composed of the Director of Finance 
of the Muhafazah, all the Qa*immaqams in the Muhafazah and two represen­
tatives from each Qada1 chosen from the various professions for their
interest in public affairs. They are appointed by a decree of the Council
20of Ministers upon the recommendations of the Muhafez.
This Council is an advisory body and renders advice to the 
Muhafe2 on matters pertaining to the improvement of economic, agri­
cultural, health, and social welfare conditions of the Muhafazah. It 
may be called by the Muhafez to give its opinion concerning any matter 
which he thinks is of public concern and benefit.
^Beirut is an exception and has no such council.
7 0Legislative Decree No. 116, op. cit., Arts. 47-5G.
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The Qada1 is headed by a Qa1immaqam (sub-prefect) who is 
the chief executive officer of the sub-district and assumes the same 
role which the Muhafez assumes in the Muhafazah. He is directly 
responsible to the Muhafez, who is his only link with the central 
administration. Again, the Qa1immaqam is considered somewhat of a 
political appointee. The method of appointment and required qualifica­
tions are the same as those specified in the case of the Muhafez.
Table 3, below, presents the regional offices in the Qada1.
The Muhafez and the Qa1immaqam are considerably overburdened 
with their functions. A look at all the offices which supposedly come 
under their control and with the fact that they are entrusted with the 
running of scores of municipalities would throw enough light on their 
problem. Since their primary concern is with security and order, their 
other administrative tasks suffer to a considerable extent. In order 
to alleviate this situation, Decree No, 15402^* created the position of 
Secretary of the Muhafazah to assist the Muhafez in the performance of 
his duties and to act in lieu of the letter's absence.
Local Administration
In the field of local government, Lebanon displays a highly 
centralized system where local communities are allowed very little inde­
pendence and autonomy in the handling of their own affairs. Local govern­
ment tradition dates back to the days of the Ottomans who introduced a very
^Decree No. 15402, February 13, 1964, in Collection of 
Decree Laws, op. cit.
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Police, census and civil register 
Lower court judge
District doctor and ambulance service
District finance, district land 
registration
Agriculture Agronomic section, veterinary section
legislative Decree No. 116, June 12, 1959, Annex No. 2.
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rudimentary, limited system of local government to the country. This 
was later modified and developed by the French during the Mandate 
period, and local government principles and institutions have been 
patterned mostly after those of France.
The French, however, were not always willing to encourage 
the independent and full-fledged application of local government practices. 
They did not think conditions in Lebanon were yet ripe for the healthy 
and proper functioning of such new and somewhat alien devices. Besides, 
Lebanon, at the time, was suffering from sharp political and religious 
differences, which still persist today, and which threatened the exist­
ence of the country itself. The encouragement of local autonomy might 
further such dissension and lead to highly undesirable results.
The constitution in Lebanon includes no mention of local 
government, thus leaving such a matter to be covered by laws. Decree 
Law No. 5, dated December 10, 1954, governs the operation and functioning 
of local government units in Lebanon.
Each village in Lebanon, with a population of five hundred or
22more, is allowed a municipality. Municipalities are classified into 
two categories, large and small, depending on the number of people in 
each village, town, or city. Municipalities can, in certain cases, be 
created by a special decision of the Minister of Interior upon the 
recommendation of the Muhafez.
22Decree Law No. 5 of December 10, 1954.
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The form of municipal government is simple and uniform
23throughout the whole country. Each municipality is governed by a 
municipal council elected for a period of four years by general 
suffrage. The number of councilors in each council is proportionate 
to the population in the city. This council is vested with decision* 
making or legislative authority and is presided over by a President 
of the Municipal Council, the chief executive officer of the municipality.
Local authorities in Lebanon are subject to strict supervision 
and control by the central government through its agent, the Muhafez 
who exercises the power of tutelle administrative over the municipalities. 
The Muhafez has to approve many of the decisions of municipal councils 
before they become binding. He can also revise the budget by either 
refusing or adding certain items. In certain cases, the Muhafez can 
dissolve the municipal council and can personally assume the responsi­
bility for municipal affairs himself. In many instances, and mainly in 
the case of large municipalities, the central government imposes certain 
conditions which should be observed in recruiting some of the key munici­
pal officials; and, in the case of Beirut and Tripoli, the central govern­
ment directly appoints some of these key officials. Finally, all 
municipalities in Lebanon are subject to administrative and financial 
inspections conducted by the Ministry of Interior and Finance, sometimes 
leading to the dissolution of the municipal council.




The organization of the Lebanese administrative hierarchy 
follows a clear-cut, single and uniform pattern. The basic adminis­
trative unit is the Directorate-General which is systematically divided 
into Directorates and Services; the Directorates and Services are 
further subdivided into Bureaus, and the Bureaus into £ rtions.
The political overhead of the central administration, which 
directs and controls the Lebanese civil service at the level of Director- 
General and below, consists of three echelons: The President of the 
Republic, the Cabinet and the Minister.
The Minister is entrusted with the supreme powers of direct­
ing and supervising the services of the state which come under his 
department and is assisted by the Director-General, who is the highest 
administrative officer and the direct head of all the administrative 
subdivisions in the ministry. The Director-General is responsible for 
the coordination, control and supervision of the units and employees 
that are under his jurisdiction.
In the structure of the Lebanese bureaucracy there are 
twenty-one independent agencies and public utilities. These public 
organizations are under the tutelage authority of the central govern­
ment administration, but they enjoy a certain degree of financial 
autonomy.
The Muhafazahs and Qadas are the territorial subdivisons of 
the Central Government. Each Muhafazah is headed by a Muhafez who is 
the chief executive officer and the representative of all the ministries'
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field units in the district. His major duties are the maintenance of 
peace and order; the supervision of the offices of the central govern­
ment; and acting as liaison between the government and the people of 
the Muhafazah.
The Qa'immagam is in charge of the same responsibilities 
entrusted to the Muhafez but applied only to the jurisdiction of the 
Qada.
It is evident from the above discussion that centralization 
of authority Is a hallmark in Lebanese bureaucracy. This is a by­
product of political and administrative systems imposed on Lebanon as 
well as due to a favorable social climate prevalent in Lebanese society.
The growth of the bureaucracy and the development of the 
size of the state will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VI
GROWTH IN BUREAUCRATIC SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE
Under the Mandate
Prior to World War II the restrained role of the state and 
its elementary interference in the social and economic spheres did not 
make for a big and complex machinery. The administration was character­
istic of a liberal and laissez faire state wherein little importance 
was given to socio-economic services.
In 1926, the first administration consisted of seven minis­
tries and the Office of the Prime Minister. These were: Justice,
Interior, Finance, Public Works, Education and Fine Arts, Agriculture 
and Health.*-
The nature of administrative functions and the relative
importance of each activity (number of personnel and their salaries)
of the time can be deduced from the 1927 budget. This is presented in
Table VI-1, below. This budget shows that the essential and most important
ministries were those of Finance, Interior, Public Works and Justice.
These ministries along with the others "...became the core of Lebanese 
2administration."
■̂ George Grassmack and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese 





REPUBLIC OF LEBANON 
BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1927a




Presidency of the Republic 3 5,601
Parliament - 28,551
Presidency, Council of Ministers 25 6,035
Ministry of Justice 598 59,605
Ministry of Interior 1,802 234,833
Ministry of Finance 765 589,633
Ministry of Public Works 67 126,735
Ministry of Education 385 51,953
Ministry of Agriculture 34 9,594
Ministry of Public Health 70 40,604
Continengy Reserve ---- 66,126
TOTAL 3.749 LS 1.219.270
*Lebano-Syrian Pounds
a
As In Ibid., "The Ministry of Interior maintained a gendarmerie 
of 1,382, over one-third of the entire government’s personnel, and a police 
force of 347 members." p. 7.
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In 1933, a serious depression year, the budget provided for 
3,600 positions, 1,600 of which were for the police. In this year 
"...Personnel was pared to what the mandatory power considered a mini-
3mum and from this base it began to expand."
In 1937, the Lebanese administration had a total of 3,659 
civil servants. This figure is divided into one-third for the economic 
and social service and two-thirds for the administrative departments - 
including the functions of internal security.^
Ministries concerned with economic and social functions were 
very small due to the fact that the government did not have any economic 
or agricultural policies. Private initiative was left to its own 
devices and the policy was to give total liberty to the activities of the 
private sector.
With the outbreak of World War II, the French High Commissioner 
tightened his control over administrative operations. Lebanon, in the 
first few years of the war, experienced "administrative confusion to 
match the political derangement which the country experienced."3
3Ibid.
^Gabriel Menassa, Plan de Reconstruction de L'Economic 
Libanaise et de Reforme de l'Etat (Beyrouth: La Societe Libanaise 
d'Economie Politique, 1948), p. 180.
3Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
137
On January 1, 1944, the control of the administration was
6transferred to the Lebanese authorities.
During Independence
By 1946 the Lebanese bureaucracy had been supplied with a 
complete and large administrative set-up; each ministry found itself in 
possession of nearly all the administrative machinery required for its 
operations^ The number of civil servants manning this set-up burgeoned
from 3,674 in 1937 to 7,810 in 1946 - an increase amounting to 130
. 8 per cent.
The increase in the number and salaries of civil servants 
from 1937 to 1946 is illustrated in Table VI-2, below.
Economic difficulties, corruption, general government mis­
management, and disorganized administration characterized the early 
1950's in Lebanon. Corruption and malfeasance in office, whether in 
the government or administrative circles, developed into unmanageable pro­
portions and added to the economic difficulties already existing.
£
°Eugenie E. Abouchdid, Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria 
(1917-1947) (Beirut: The Sader-Rihani Printing Co., 1948), p. 204.
^Grassmuck and Salibi, op. cit,. p. 14.
®Menassa, op. cit., pp. 380-90.
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TABLE VI-2
TOTALS OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR SALARIES 
1937-19463






1937 3,674 2,446,620 43
1938 3,902 2,843,726 46
1939 4,005 3,062,783 42
1940 4,145 3,071,700 48
1941 4,239 3,932,606 48
1942 4,992 7,149,947 50
1943 5,696 9,125,044 42
1944 6,892 16,137,935 47





Gabriel Menassa, Plan de Reconstruction de l'Economie Libanaise 
et de Reforme de l'Etat (Beyrouth: La Societe d'Economie Politique, 1948), 
p. 389.
b
In 1945, the Lebanese Government assumed control of the military 
after the departure of the French.
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Social needs necessitated the creation of the Ministry of 
Information in 1949; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in 1951.
The need to organize and control developmental activities in the country 
plus the coordination of the works, projects, and socio-economic planning 
and development effort of all the other ministries and agencies necessi­
tated the creation of the Ministry of General Planning in 1954. The
9Civil Service Board was created in 1959 and was entrusted with the 
conduct and control of public personnel administration in the country.
From Scores to Thousands
The Lebanese civil service has experienced considerable growth 
since the inception of its nucleus in the feudal era of the Amirs, prior 
to 1840, in the form of their Diwan (Secretariat), From a score or so 
civil servants in this era, this number doubled in the period of the 
Qa1immaqamiyattan; in the period of the Mutassarifiyah it became 226 
civil servants (and 989 gens d'armes); 3,023 in 1926; 5,996 in 1943; and 
8,808 in 1949, including the gendarmerie and the police, and excluding 
the common services personnel and the army.^
Table VI-3 presents the totals of the civil servants' posi­
tions every other year from 1950 to 1966 with their breakdown on the 
basis of ministries. The totals presented were taken from the budget
^Decree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959.
l^Tawfiq Awad, "Al-Wazifah fi Lubnan" (Public Office in 
Lebanon) Les Conferences du Cenacle, Vol. Ill, Nos. 5-6 (1949), p. 127.
TABLE VI-3
TOTAL OF PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS, 1950-1966a
Name of Ministry or Unit 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966
Presidency of the Republic 13 14 10 10 10 13 11 20 14
Chamber of Deputies 27 29 39 35 35 38 54 92 107
Prime Minister's Office 30 47 68 84 85 69 302 566 560
Foreign Affairs & Emigrants 178 182 154 155 169? 182 222 248 245
National Defense 13 17 42 42 51 60 54 55 69
Interior 169 177 256 253 258 295 300 442 449
Justice 599 637 677 752 896 924 1,028 1,012 1,046
Post, Telegraph & Telephone 605 700 1,634 2,373 2,399 2,263 2,171 3,005 3,596
Finance 743 844 1,070 1,327 1,353 1,194 1,277 2,265 2,238
Information & Tourism 41 62 60 59 60 56 229 478 362
National Education 2,324 3,759 4,056 4,936 5,379 6,103 8,254 10,129 12,398
Public Health 491 625 574 556 626 607 604 1,093 875
Labor & Social Affairs - 94 97 94 94 85 77 141 97
National Economy 137 93 167 189 196 185 165 193 179
Public Works & Transport 438 932 971 1,004 1,088 886 935 1,765 1,637
Agriculture 330 331 529 551 577 373 524 602 574
General Planning “ w — 58 57 19 93 188 126
TOTAL 6.138 8,519 10.364 12.422 13.728 13.352 16.239 22.084 24.572
a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1950; 1952; 1954; 1956; 1958; 1960; 1962; 1964;
and 1966.
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allotments of the said years. The figures presented account for all 
permanent positions of the "cadres", except those performing military 
and police functions, the temporary, the daily paid and the contractuelles. 
The teachers under the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts were 
included, following the French example, which explains the ministry's 
large total.
The totals of the permanent civil servants presented in 
the 1962 budget and thereafter are based on the 1961 Organizational 
Decree which fixed the administrative cadres of the various ministries. 
These decrees were issued to amend the previous cadres set in 1959, and 
were based on a study of all ministries during 1961. Plans were laid 
to start a process of gradual filling of the empty positions in the 
cadres which were set by the 1961 decrees. The Civil Service Board 
stated in a report issued in 1964 that as of April 16, 1963, there were 
2500 vacant positions. Out of this total 292 were in the Third Category, 
1,556 in the Fourth, 600 in the Fifth.^
Bureaucratic Cost and Expenditures
Lebanon is being increasingly subjected to the impact of 
change and all the side effects that goes with it. The Lebanese state 
has evolved in the last twenty years from the traditional, quiescent 
role which is permissive to a more dynamic role concerned with the active
^ Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, 
1964, (Beirut: Sader Press, 1965), pp. 12-13.
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direction of increased varieties of functions together with enterprises 
all hitherto in private hands; and the satisfaction of social and econo­
mic needs through major projects and schemes. These goalb necessitated 
the expansion, revitalization and reorganization of the Lebanese bureau­
cracy .
The totals of basic salaries of the permanent civil servants 
may reveal the trend, general and individual, of the growth of adminis­
trative size and expenses. These totals are presented in Table VI-4, 
below. The years dealt with have 5-year intervals in between in order 
to allow a realizable difference to emerge. The total salary expendi­
tures for 1950 were LL 7,719,342; for 1954, LL 29,193,475; for 1959,
LL 50,020,226; for 1964, 113,516,806 and for 1967, LL 137,295,900. The 
percentage increase of the 1954 total over that of 1950 is 278.26 
percent; the percentage increase of the 1959 total over that of 1954 
is 71.34 percent; that of 1964 over that of 1959 is 131.13 percent and 
the 1967 total over that of 1959 is 174,45 percent.
Totals of basic salaries or pay, together with allowances 
of the permanent and non-permanent civil and military servants in the 1967 
budget are presented in Table VI-5 below. The total of the salaries of 
civil servants excluding the armed forces is LL 193,894,600; including 
them, LL 263,722,800.
Salaries and pay of public authorities' officials and of 
public servants reached the percentages of 42.58 percent in 1962,
39.42 percent in 1964 and 40.58 percent in 1966. General administrative 
expenses were 11.10 percent in 1960, 11.23 percent in 1962, 11.98 per­
cent in 1964 and 9.63 percent in 1966.
TABLE VI-4
BASIC PAY TOTALS OF PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS, 1950; -54; -59; 64; -66a
Name of Ministry or Unit 1950 1954 1959 1964 1966
Presidency of the Republic 18,540 49,920 62,520 162,700 128,600
Chamber of Deputies 29,700 128,885 187,560 516,020 664,320
Prime Minister's Office 39,690 354,400 551,460 2,858,620 2,979,300
Justice 863,700 2,070,860 4,934,456 7,564,620 7,767,420
Foreign Affairs & Emigrants 477,900 958,380 1,408,860 2,018,580 2,349,020
Interior 232,080 959,380 1,208,140 27,535,620 32,356,780
Finance 688,140 3,859,980 6,246,120 12,249,520 12,713,820
National Education 254,880 8,859,980 18,077,490 34,039,820 50,069,120
Public Health 355,884 1,191,340 1,865,390 4,294,320 4,019,320
Labor & Social Affairs --- 269,580 399,300 702,120 600,000
Orientation, Information & 25,620 177,840 258,480 2,569,720 2,239,420
Tourism
Public Works & Transport 492,624 2,888,880 4,414,260 10,506,520 9,564,480
Agriculture 264,354 1,364,250 1,914,420 3,287,920 3,179,620
National Economy 156,660 621,780 853,860 1,020,020 1,023,120
Post, Telephone & Telegraph 2,797,820 4,427,130 7,677,300 5,407,220 5,600,000
General Planning --- --- 95,520 838,420 669,520
National Defense 21,750 147,240 213,980 378,334 443,820
TOTAL 7.719.342 29.193.475 50.020.226 113.516.806 137.295.900
a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1950; -54; -59; -64; -66.
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TABLE VI-5
TOTALS OF BASIC SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES OF THE PERMANENT 
AND NON-PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS, 1967®
Name of Ministry or Unit In Lebanese Pounds
Presidency of the Republic 308,400
Chamber of Deputies 3,321,700
Prime Minister's Office 6,009,400









Labor & Social Affairs 1,208,900
National Economy 1,247,800




Water &  Electric Resources 1,774,300
TOTAL 263.722.800
a
Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1967.
145
Table VI-6 presents the distribution and percentage of the 
1967 budget appropriations of the various ministries and units according 
to the functions of the state. Of the total budget of LL 613 million, 
9.23 percent is for state function, 29.94 percent for security and order, 
8,53 percent for general services, 21.17 percent for public debt and 
4.03 percent for contingent reserves. Table VI-7 presents the distri­
bution of the budget appropriations according to various functions from 
1951 to 1967.
The Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Andre
Tweini, stated in February, 1960 to a newspaper that the budget has
many inadequacies among which is that most of it is for administrative
expenses. He gave the example of the 1960 budget. Out of about LL 220
million, LL 112 million were allocated for the salaries and indemnities
12of the civil servants.
The growth in the size and scope of the Lebanese bureau­
cracy may also be seen in the growth of the annual budgets' totals.
Table VI-8 presents these totals for the years 1929-1943 and Table VI-9 
shows the government's income and expenditures for the years 1944-67 and 
the co-efficient of increase taking the year 1944 as a base.
New Functions, Trends and Changes
A description of the present bureaucratic size and the
12Al-Jaryda (Beirut), February 26, 1960.
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TABLE VI-6
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Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1967.
TABLE VI-7
PERCENTAGE OF SPENDING ACCORDING TO FUNCTIONS
1951-1967®
Functions 1951 1954 1957 1959 1960 1961 1963 1965 1966 1967
State Functions 1.86 1.53 1.19 1.01 2.14 3.25 6.09 7.24 6.87 9.23
Security & Order 36.85 36.20 34.15 35.68 35.00 32.71 26.65 27.30 28.88 29.94
General Services 7.74 11.20 9.04 10.46 9.90 8.86 8.32 8.15 7.64 8.53
Social Services 15.93 16.98 19.11 21.51 20.24 19.17 18.38 21.42 22.12 21.17
Economic & Develop­
ment Services
23.18 17.09 22.31 20.33 20.46 18.61 34.43 27.75 26.30 22.29
Public Debt & 
Contingent Reserve
14.44 17.18 14.20 12.01 12.26 17.40 6.13 8.14 8.19 8.83
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
a






















Lebanon, Ministry of Finances, Budgets of 1929-1943.
b




























GOVERNMENT'S INCOME AND EXPENDITURES, 




























Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1944-1967.
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present socio-economic situation will throw some light on the problems 
and prospects involved in the present and future role of the Lebanese 
state toward its various basic functions and towards the process of 
socio-economic development.
Regarding socio-economic development in Lebanon it is clear 
that it is the function of the state to create development opportunities 
and facilitate access to them. An effective choice of the open possi­
bilities in these opportunities, or in any appropriate combination of 
them, must be made and developed based on the endownments -- natural, 
human, and others -- Lebanon has. This approach envisages state action 
on a far greater scale than its previous passive or negligible role 
and means an increased burden on the public bureaucracy -- as well as 
the political machinery -- of the country. The Lebanese state has 
important functions to perform like any other state. "The maintenance 
of law and order, national defense, the control and issue of fiduciary 
money, and the provision of minimum education and health services are 
leading examples... In fact, the adequate performance of these minimum
tasks is of vital importance for economic growth and generally a
13necessary condition for such growth.
Factors that influence the state and its role were discussed 
earlier. These include the socio-political factors of political
13P. T. Bauer and B. S. YttMy, The Economics of Underdeveloped 
Countries (Cambridge: James Nisbet & Co., 1960), p. 163.
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sectarianism and feudalism which produce internal strains and conflicts 
affecting the state's institutions and hampering radical reform in laws 
concerning the public bureaucracy or even, paralyzing their execution 
to the point of rendering their effect to naught. In this section, a 
review will be made of the total of the civil servants in the various 
ministries and other central administrative units and linking these 
totals to the new functions as ordained by the requirements of the new 
house-keeping and socio-economic situations.
Looking at the individual totals of the various administra­
tive units we find that, in almost all of them, trends and changes are 
identifiable. The most noticeable of these changes are those which took 
place after 1959. Table VI-3 and VI-4, above, present the detailed 
totals which shall be mentioned hereafter.
Table VI-10 presents the totals of civil servants in 1967 
distributed according to the various functions of the state, together 
with the percentages of such totals out of the grand total. Reference 
to such totals and percentages will be made during the following dis­
cussion.
State Functions. Security and Order, and General Services
Administrative machineries concerned with state functions 
involve three central units and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Emigrants. These have a total of 1,068 civil servants and form 3.68% out 
of the total number of civil servants in the whole administration.
The personnel of the Presidency of the Republic and the Chamber
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TABLE VI-10
CIVIL SERVANTS' TOTALS ACCORDING TO STATE FUNCTIONS
1967a








-Presidency of the Republic 
-Chamber of Deputies 
-Prime Minister's Office 
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-Public Health 







Economic & Development 
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-National Economy
-Public Works & Transport
-Agriculture
-General Planning















Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1967.
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of Deputies were practically constant between 1950 and 1960. In 1967 
the former had 16 and the latter 120 civil servants including 40 policemen. 
The personnel total of the Directorate General of the Prime Minister's 
office was also practically constant between 1950 and 1960; it was 13 
in 1960 and it now has 38 civil servants including 5 non-permanent 
employees.
Also, the Central Inspectorate -- which was known, until 
the reform movement of 1958-1959, as the "State Inspection Board" -- 
have played, until that time, a dormant role. It maintained the total 
of 15 civil servants for 7 consecutive years (1953-59) as if no vital 
and dynamic inspection work had to be done or, at least, no widening of 
this important function, to cope with the growth of the administration, 
effected. The reasons behind this situation can be limited to two 
points: the presence of separate inspection units in each ministry 
before the centralization of this control function in 1959; and the use 
of the central and ministerial inspection units as a dumping ground 
for those who fall out of favor; and the paralyzing of this function during 
the previous corrupt regimes. Today the Central Inspectorate has 213 
civil servants.
The Bureau of Accounts, created in 1951^ to examine both 
proposed and completed expenditures by all branches of Lebanese adminis-
l^Although article 87 of the Constitution of October 17, 1927, 
ordained the establishment of the Bureau of Accounts, the Bureau was 
created more than a score of years later. In the 1951 law the Bureau 
could control the completed expenditures (post-audit). Later laws, 
notably legislative Decree No. 118 of June 12, 1959, gave it a pre-audit 
function.
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tration, started with 24 permanent civil servants in 1952 and had 61 in 
1962; it now has 79 civil servants. The Bureai's work expands annually 
with the budget's increase.
The Civil Service Board, created in 1959 to control all 
aspects of personnel administration in the civil service, had 113 
permanent civil servants in 1962 and 145 in 1967 -- including 40 students 
in the National Institute of Administration and Development considered 
as civil servants.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants performs, in 
addition to the central units and agencies, a very important state 
function. It is in charge of foreign policy affairs, generally speak­
ing, and of the protection of the interests of the Lebanese citizens in 
other countries. It is also entrusted with strengthening the relations 
-- social, economic and other -- of the homeland with about 1.5 million 
Lebanese emigrants all across the continents. The ministry had 169 
permanent civil servants in 1958, 222 in 1962 and 268 in 1967. The 
ministry also maintains local personnel in its diplomatic missions abroad 
whose total is not specified in the budget.
Ministries involved in performing functions related to security 
and order are those of National Defense, Interior, and Justice. These 
ministries have a total of 1685 civil servants with a percentage of 5.83 
percent out of the general total of 1967.
The Ministry of National Defense has 66 civil servants; it 
had 51 in 1958. The military personnel are not revealed in terms of 
numbers although the total amount of pay given them are cited in the
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budget. The military has considerably outgrown their little shell of 
the 'Troupes Speciales' of 5000 or so back in 1945; however, any count 
of them is understandably withheld. The size of the armed forces was 
enhanced by the turbulent state of affairs in the Middle East and the 
Palestine War. The ministry does not implement a policy of general 
military service. It, nevertheless, sponsors training programs on a 
restricted basis for the male students of the top two classes in all 
secondary schools and the first class in universities.
The Ministry of Interior has 518 civil servants. It had 
the total of 258 permanent civil servants in 1958 and 300 in 1962. The 
internal and the general security forces totals are not given; however, 
the budget cites their pay totals. The question of internal status quo, 
peace and order are of primary concern to the Lebanese government.
Internal political stability holds precious advantages in view of the 
political life of the country and its social and economic development.
The Ministry of Justice has 1101 civil servants, with almost 
half this amount representing the judges of the various civil, religious 
and other courts. This ministry had 896 civil servants in 1958 and 
1012 in 1964.
Ministries Involved in performing functions of general adminis­
trative services are those of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Finance, 
Information and Tourism. These ministries have a total of 7,987 civil 
servants constituting 27.66 percent out of the general total of 1967.
The Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone had 2399 civil 
servants in 1958, and 2,171 in 1962. The total number of civil servants
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for 1967 reached 4,343 including 761 non-permanent civil servants.
The ministry was involved throughout the last few years, 
and still is Increasingly so, in the consistent widening of the postal 
service and its branches; spreading the automatic telephone system to 
cover the whole country; the establishment of more telecommunication
lines with other countries; and in general to Install better methods
and means to conduct its operation in view of more efficiency.
The Ministry of Finance is the central agency within the
government responsible for all types of fiscal and monetary operations.
It is concerned with collecting, keeping, and disbursing government funds. 
It also prepares the government's annual budget, and supervises its exe­
cution.
The Ministry of Finance is one of the largest ministries, and 
the one with the most control within the Lebanese government. Its 
significant role is copied from the similar role played by the Finance 
Ministry in France.
This ministry had 1353 permanent civil servants in 1958 and 
1,277 in 1962. It has 2,982 civil servants in 1967 including 748 non­
permanent employees.
The increase in the annual budgets, Table VI-9 above, reveal 
the continuous enlargement of the burden of the ministry as regards the 
above mentioned tasks. The increase in the annual budget is caused, 
from the point of view of expenditures, by the rise in the administra­
tive expenses, including the salaries of the civil servants and the
157
pensions of the retired; and from the point of view of income, by the 
rise in the amount of taxes -- especially import duties which amount 
from 35 to 40 percent of the annual income.^
The Ministry of Information and Tourism held a consistent 
total of around 60 between 1C52 and 1960, and a total of 229 in 1962 and 
444 in 1967. In 1966, a separate Ministry of Tourism was created which 
now has 218 civil servants.
Social, Economic and Development Services
Ministries involved in performing social services are those 
of National Education, Public Health, and Labor and Social Affairs.
These ministries have a total of 15,334 civil servants which constitute 
53.13 percent out of the general total of 1967.
The Ministry of National Education has the overwhelming 
majority of this total, namely 14,034 civil servants most of which are 
teachers. The ministry had 5,379 permanent civil servants in 1958 
and 8,254 in 1962. Considering education, Lebanon has developed a 
tradition which goes back to centuries of hard work by foreign and
Khattar Shibli, Al-Ulum Al-Maliyat - Al-Muazanah (the 
Sciences of Finance - The Budget) (Beirut: Dar al-Funun Press, 1962), 
p. 189. This is due to the increase of trade and transit activities, 
which increases the burden and, consequently the size of the Directorate- 
General of Customs in the Ministry.
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local ecclesiastical establishments of the various religious denomina­
tions.*^ Educational facilities, as well as the number of students 
and teachers, have experienced considerable growth. The number of 
students, for instance, enrolled in primary and pre-school education 
in the period between 1951 and 1956 rose from about 184,000 to about 
223,000.17
Statistics showing the degree of literacy in Lebanon are 
not accurate, however, estimates range from 80 to 50 percent. The 
UNESCO's estimates for 1957 gives the ratio of between 50 and 55 percent 
adult illiterates in the country. Regarding schools, statistics for 
1955-56 show that there are almost an equal number of private as opposed 
to government schools, the respective figures being 1,028 private and 
1,107 public. The excess of public schools as regards private schools 
lies only in the field of primary education. For the same year there 
were 57 more private secondary schools then public schools. Also, there
^"Lebanon's greatest economic advantage lies not in its 
natural but in its human resources. The inhabitants of this coastal 
range of mountains have been traditional sailors from ancient times, 
and through their migrations have kept contact with growing civiliza­
tions. The outgoing disposition made easy, during the last century, 
an early contact with modern Europe which gave Lebanon a lead in the 
adoption of Western education and led thus to a higher level of educa­
tion, greater skill and more versatility among the population than can 
be found in other parts of the region." U.N. - F.A.O., Lebanon - 
Country Report (Rome: F. A. 0., 1959), p. 1-2.
17Ibid., p. II-7.
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were more teachers and more students in the private schools; the figures 
being 5,555 to 3,472 and 150,114 to 102,738 consecutively.^
In 1961-62 there were 1,290 government schools with 6,044 
teachers and 129,154 students. For the same year there were 1,397 pri­
vate schools with 8,064 teachers and 180,243 students. On the whole it 
is well acknowledged that private schools' educational standards are higher 
than those of the public schools. University-level education has been 
present for quite a time with the presence of the private Universite de 
St. Joseph (1875) and the American University of Beirut (1866) and the 
recently established government Lebanese University (1953); and university 
enrollment has been increasing considerably in the last few years, from 
3,558 in 1950-51, to 5,263 in 1956-57,19 and about 13,000 in 1964-64.20
Vocational education is provided for an elementary and 
secondary basis in a government institute in Beirut which has branches 
in the various administrative districts of the country and by private 
schools. However, this type of education is not yet considerable and 
effective in providing high-level and sound mechanical and industrial 
technology, agricultural training and research.
18Al-Jaryda (Beirut), July 27, 1962
^9U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., p. II-8. 
2QA1-Ahrar (Beirut), February 10, 1965.
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Lebanon -- true to its traditional role as a center of cul­
ture and education for Arab and some non-Arab Afro-Asian countries --
has offered in the last few years university scholarships to countries
such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, and some African countries 
21and Cyprus.
The Ministry of Public Health had 626 permanent civil ser­
vants in 1958 and 604 in 1962. The total number of civil servants for
1967 reached 1155 including 298 non-permanent civil servants. Concerning 
public health in Lebanon, the researcher is handicapped by lack of 
accurate statistics conducive to sound inferences on the state of public 
health in the country. However,
...it is generally recognized by testimony and obser­
vation of persons in the field that much progress was 
achieved during the post war period in the field of 
public health in Lebanon. Government expenditures 
on health services more than doubled and in the few 
years following the end of the war, rising from L.L.
2 million in 1945 to L.L. 4.8 million in 1950. It 
continued to increase reaching 6,7 million in 1956 and 
over 7 million in 1957.^ Physicians, hospitals’ beds 
and other medical facilities, already fairly adequate, 
increased considerably in the post war period. There 
were 816 physicians in 1948; by 1955 the number had gone 
up to 1,204. This means there is one physician for every 
1,200 inhabitants, a ratio which is not matched in Asia 
and Africa and which is better than corresponding ratios 
in several European countries...Medical personnel and
21A1-Safa (Beirut), March 10, 1963.
22The budget of the Ministry for 1960 was about L.L. 8.8 
million, for 1964 about L.L. 15.2 million, and for 1967 about 24.5 million.
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facilities...exist in abundance compared to other 
Middle East countries. The striking difference between 
Lebanon and its neighbors from the standpoint of the 
supply of medical personnel and facilities is explained 
by the fact that these facilities service many clients 
from outside, particularly from other Asiatic Arab 
countries. With its two medical faculties, Beirut is 
looked upon by the neighboring region as a medical 
center enjoying high professional standards.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which was created 
in 1951, had 94 permanent civil servants in 1958 and 77 in 1962. The 
total number of civil servants in it for 1967 was 145, including ten non­
permanent civil servants. This ministry has important functions to 
perform concerning the guidance of the social affairs and the utiliza­
tion of the labor force in the country. It is entrusted with preparatory, 
coordinative and executory functions regarding social and labor legisla­
tion. It is also entrusted by law with the tasks of the protection 
against unemployment, the betterment of labor conditions and the estab­
lishment of social security. It also looks after the protection of the 
family, youth rehabilitation, the organization of housing and cooperative 
and rural development. It aims, in general, at the promotion of every 
measure pertaining to social development in the country.
0 /The Social Development Service is entrusted by law to lay 
down long-range programs concerning social development in the country, 
and to control their execution; to execute social projects carried by
- F.A.O., op. cit., p. 11-11.
^Legislative Decree No. 155, June 12, 1959, art. 1.
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the State; to give its opinion and suggestions concerning the conduct
of such projects and appropriations therefor; to supply in full or in
part financial aid and loans destined for establishing new social projects
or the strengthening of existing ones; to guide the Lebanese youth
towards vocational and professional training needed by the country and
the guiding of existing schools in the field. Both the said Ministry
and the Service face an enormous task in view of their role concerning
labor and social affairs in the country. They both must face and
stop, for example, the considerable dislocation in the agricultural
population's move away from their areas and towards the Metropolis,
chiefly Beirut, and abroad. This situation was described by the Director
General of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs as a "...near
hemorrhage from the veins of the countryside in a most strange March
by the people of the Village towards the City or beyond it across the
25land or over the seas" Also, both set-ups -- in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Public Health in the points concerning it -- are involved 
in executing the half-hearted and restricted social security project.
Ministries involved in performing functions relating to the 
economy and development of the country are those of National Economy, 
Public Works and Transport, Agriculture, General Planning, and Water and 
Electric Resources. These ministries have a total of 2,800 civil servants 
constituting 9.70 percent out of the general total of 1967.
^ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), March 21, 1962.
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The Ministry of National Economy had 196 permanent civil
servants in 1958 and 165 in 1962. The total number of civil servants
in it for 1967 was 196 including 23 non-permanent civil servants. This
ministry is not, generally speaking, under heavy strain to undertake the
execution of a highly programmed economic policy because the government
exercises minimum interference with economic activity. There is no
written or declared official economic policy in Lebanon which is central
or long-range. Clear trends, however, can be identified and construed
from the State's policy.
From occasional official declarations, from the 
pattern of government expenditures on development 
projects executed, from fiscal and monetary measures, 
and from a number of legislative and other indicators, 
it could be argued that Lebanese economic policy 
is one which most favored a commercial and services 
economy. It is characterized principally by a 
minimum of government interference in, or control 
of, economic activity. The Lebanese economy is 
as close to the classical "laissez faire" as 
one can expect in the modern world.
The structure of the Lebanese economy and the economic
activity under its framework reveal, thus, a free enterprise system.
Basically the Lebanese economy is predominantly one of trade and services.
The proportion of the total national product which 
arises in the goods producing sectors, namely, 
agriculture, industry and construction, does not, 
as a rule, exceed 35 percent. Almost two thirds
26U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., pp. 1-5 and 1-6.
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of the national product, therefore, arises in the 
form of services, with trade accounting for about 
half the value of all the services or about 30 percent 
of the total national income. Perhaps there is no other 
country in the world where the ratio of services to 
goods is as high as it is in Lebanon.
The Lebanese economy suffers from three main weaknesses.
First, the precariousness of the chief source of national income, i.e.,
trade and services. A high export of services is vitally needed to
offset the large annual deficit in the country's balance of trade.
Second, the narrowness of the domestic market due chiefly to the small
size of population which imposes serious restrictions on industrial
28expansion and absorption of the surplus from agriculture labor; and 
the high degree of rigidity of the export market. Third, the inequit­
able distribution of income and the presence of the two extremes of 
wealth and poverty despite the existence of a very strong and large 
middle class. This situation leads to social instability and it is
^Lebanon's natural endowments -- such as its geographical 
location, its pleasant climate, and its variety of altitudes within 
a compact area -- are extremely conducive to the promotion of services. 
The exploitation of these endowments is apparent in the development 
of the country and its capital Beirut into an intercontinental trade 
and communication center which is equipped with an excellent seaport; 
an international airport; adequate storage facilities; transit roads; 
transport system; banking, insurance and other financial facilities; a 
vigorous tourist industry and estivation activity; and almost a mono­
poly, in the Near East, of cultivating a wide variety of fruits.
Ibid., p. 1-1.
28Which surplus account for the high rate of emigration -- 
lately dropping considerably -- from the country. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), 
November 12, 1962.
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being aggravated, instead of being rectified, by the government's
29fiscal and other policies.
Heavy burdens await the government in encouraging and direct­
ing the process of industrializing the country, and more important, 
to create agricultural industries if Lebanon would like to be freed 
from a precarious, although temporarily booming, dependence on a ser­
vices economy. The country's continuous trade deficit is covered by
earnings from services, remittances from Lebanese emigrants, and some-
30times, official donations.
^U.N. - F.A.O., op. cit., pp. 1-8 and 1-9.
30Lebanon's trade deficit was about $185 million in 1957, the 
index of such deficit having fallen to 96 in 1958 (1957-100) and risen 
to 133 in 1960 and to 264 in 1965. The export index remained almost 
constant in 1958 -- probably as a result of the political disturbances 
in that year -- but rose sharply to 219 (1957-100) in 1960.
According to the available information, net invisible earnings 
(services) covered an annual average of 56 percent of the trade gap 
between 1957 and 1960 and net private donations (emigrants' remittances), 
a further 19 percent. The rest was covered by official donations and 
private inflow (Official donations reached a peak of about $26 million 
in 1958 -- when Lebanon received special United States assistance of
$12.5 million and grain under Public Law 480 -- but dropped sharply to
$6 million in 1959. These donations are likely to have declined further
in 1960 as the United States reduced its aid programme in Lebanon).
Good indications of the strength of Lebanon's balance of payments are the 
accumulation of official gold and foreign exchange reserves -- from 
$99 million in 1957 to $139 million in 1961 -- and the depreciation of 
the Lebanese pound in the free market from L. . 3.6 per dollar in 1957 
to L. . 3.02 in 1961. U.N. Economic Developments in the Middle East. 
1959-61 (Supplement to World Economic Survey, 1961) (New York: U.N.,
1962), p. 79.
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The Ministry of Public Works and Transport had 1,088 permanent
civil servants in 1958 and 1,765 in 1964, The total number of civil
servants in it for 1967 was 1675 Including 169 non-permanent civil
servants. The Ministry has certainly experienced a considerable
transformation from its previous meager size of 1937, mentioned above,
and from its 1944-46 conditions in which it was "...poorly organized,
31inexperienced and incapable of directing large works alone." It may 
not, at present, be a paragon of efficiency or be innocent of con­
siderable disorganization in some of its parts; however, it has turned 
out to be, together with the Board for the Execution of Projects, the 
most important tool for the execution of the country's projects and 
development schemes.
The Ministry of Agriculture had 577 permanent civil servants 
in 1958 and 524 in 1962. The total number of civil servants in it for 
1967 was 620 including 67 non-permanent civil servants.
The 1959 reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture could 
be considered -- like the reorganization in other ministries -- as a very 
important measure in strengthening and providing administrative unity
Arthur Edward Mills, "Economic Change in Lebanon," Middle 
East Economic Papers (Beirut: Economic Research Institute, American 
University of Beirut, 1956), p. 93.
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among the various technical agricultural services. Agriculture is
33not the dominant source of livelihood in the country; national income 
generated in the agricultural sector form about one fifth of the aggre­
gate national income. Agricultural commodities, however, constitute the 
principal export items. Also, employment in agriculture accounts for 
about 40 percent of the total employment, although quite a few of those 
persons engaged in agriculture have supplementary sources of income.
"The interesting feature of Lebanese agriculture is the predominance of
fruit and vegetable cultivation (51 percent of the total value) and
3Arelative unimportance of cereals and industrial crops." The establish 
ment of the Office of Fruits in 1959 as an independent public agency
32Legislative Decree No. 2881 dated December 16, 1959 
established a Directorate General which includes the following units: 
the Diwan; Agricultural Resources Service; Forests and Natural Resources 
Service; Animal Resources Service; Common Technical Affairs Se^^ce, 
which includes the Departments of Rural Engineering and Agr ..Itural 
Industries, Agricultural Education and Orientation, and Cooperatives and 
ricultural Economy.
33"Economically, Lebanon is not primarily an agricultural 
country, but socially it is and will remain so. Its sociological 
tissues, even the urban ones, have deep rural roots and its future 
equilibrium requires that this symbiosis between itself and its terri­
tory be affirmed and consolidated."
34U.N. - F. A. 0., op. cit., p. 11-16.
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entrusted with the task of organizing, controlling and developing the
production, exportation and marketing of fruits in the country was an
important measure in encouraging and vitalizing of the more predominant
35type of agricultural production in the country.
Comprehensive planning was not important in Lebanese govern­
ment until 1959, but it began with the establishment of a planning
36council in 1953 and the Ministry of General Planning in 1954. Planning 
enjoyed ministerial status but it remained a small-scale operation until 
1962. The budget for its first year amounted to only L.L. 236,000.
This rose to L.L. 367,000 in 1958, and to L.L. 2,633,100 in 1966.
The Chehab regime did not rely exclusively upon its feeble 
planning Ministry to lay the groundwork for reform of the state. In 
March 1959 General Chehab had met with Pere Lebret, then director of the 
French Centre National de Recherche Scientifique and head of the Insti­
tute pour Recherche en vue de Developpement (IRFED) and on October 23,
1959 the Ministry of General Planning contracted IRFED to conduct an 
extensive study of the Lebanese socio-economic structure with reference 
to the administrative areas of the country and its needs and possibilities 
for development. The IRFED mission, consisting of ten French experts (
Legislative Decree No. 41, March 25, 1959.
36The Ministry was established by Legislative Decree No. 
6393 of September 16, 1954 and organized by Legislative Decree No. 2 
of November 30, 1954.
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and twenty Lebanese technicians, came to Lebanon prepared with a plan
for its own activities, embodying a philosophy of administration which
37called for rational and comprehensive programs. The first phase of 
IRFED*s operations was a systematic inventory of the needs and resources 
of the country. It was accomplished with the submission of its "Etude 
Preliminaire sur les Besoins et les Possibilites de Developpement Au 
Liban," (1959-1960, 8 vols.). The mission was subsequently contracted 
again on June 26, 1961, to collaborate with the State, in an advisory 
manner, in the preparation of a long-term plan (le plan perspectif) and 
a middle range four-to-six year plan. The directors of IRFED then sub­
divided their subject chronologically and functionally. They argued 
that there are four phases of rational planning: the phase of elabora­
tion, in which the necessary plans and subplans are elaborated and the 
necessary specialists engaged; the phase of decision, in which the 
numerous projects and subplans are reduced and choices are made between 
various alternatives for chosen ends; the phase of execution, in which 
the ministries and regional authorities put into effect the plans selected 
in Phase Two; and finally the phase of successive adjustments, in which 
the execution of plans is adjusted to unforseen changes and unforseable 
situations. Functionally, the IRFED group began to make sub-plans which
The Institute is backed by a very strong Dominican order 
which believes, to a large extent, in social reform.
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would eventually harmonize with one another in conformity with the plan 
perspectif, in the following areas: hydraulic engineering, roads, trans­
port, ports, airports, energy, agriculture, industrial and handicraft 
orientation, education, applied research, and tourism. These plans in 
turn would be sub-optimized regionally in the provinces and municipali­
ties, and generally through integrated financing, zoning, and adminis­
tration at the national level.
The IRFED mission's report emphasized the present lack 
of necessary equilibrium between the administrative and the technical
cadres and proposed the necessity of modifying the structure and per-
38sonnel distribution, "organigramme," of the ministry.
The Ministry of General Planning had 57 permanent civil 
servants in 1958 and 93 in 1962. The total number of civil servants in 
it for 1967 was 171 including 42 non-permanent civil servants.
The Ministry of General Planning is entrusted with the pre­
paration of a general comprehensive plan for the social and economic 
development of the country. It must design a unified and harmonized 
fiscal, social and economic policy in step with this general development 
plan. It prepares, also, individual programs, under the general plan, 
comprising one or more developmental projects and can ask other minis-
38Mission IRFED-Liban, DAR/209, C2-3
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tries to do the same. The Ministry controls the steps and operations 
of executing the long and middle range development projects whether 
economic or technical. It participates in the formation of financial 
establishments concerned with development; supplies private establish­
ments with necessary information for purposes of their participation in 
the development effort; and contacts foreign and international institu­
tions concerning technical and economic aid. The Ministry drafts project 
laws related to the economic, social and fiscal life of the country; 
and finally, it collects, analyzes and publishes statistical information 
related to the state's various social and economic effort and coordinates 
the work of the various statistical administrative units.
The role of the Ministry of General Planning as regards the
elaboration of a general development plan for Lebanon does not merely
involve the problem of economic programming but, to be successful, it
must also relate to the more serious problem of the necessary change in
the total values of the country. Hoselitz's following words illustrate,
perhaps, this very important and basic factor:
in practice, i.e., in a situation requiring the elabora­
tion of a development plan for a given country or region,
this problem requires for its solution that the plan
embrace not only prescriptions for economic adjustments 
but also for the channeling of associated cultural and 
social change.
QQJ7Bert P. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth 
(Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 26.
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Summary Statement:
The concept and actual role of the state in Lebanon has 
been one of laissez-faire. For centuries the Lebanese have been a 
trading people with commercial interests far beyond their borders. 
Limited participation of government has been reinforced by the sectarian 
composition of the society.
Since 1943 there has been a growth in the size and scope 
of the Lebanese government. Some of this growth was the result of their 
taking over functions formerly exercised by the Mandatory Power. The 
number of government employees has increased from 6,892 in 1944 to 
28,869 in 1967. Simultaneously, there has come an increased awareness 
on the part of the public of the responsibilities of government and 
hence increased demands and expectations.
Some perspective on this growth can be gained from an 
examination of the level of expenditures which increased twenty-three 
fold between 1944 and 1967. Another perspective of the growth of 
administration is the expansion of administrative responsibility and 
the creation of new central agencies, such as the Civil Service Board, 
the Central Inspection Service and the Bureau of Accounts.
PART III 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
CHAPTER VII
PERSONNEL MACHINERY 
One of the characteristics of the Lebanese administrative system 
is the gap existing between certain laws and their actual application. In 
Lebanon, this is evident in the field of personnel administration where 
the legislature has attempted to establish a merit system through a rela­
tively adequate personnel law but where poor and improper application of 
this law has resulted in a defeat of its main goals and purposes.
Until 1959, Lebanon had a departmentalized personnel system. The 
personnel law did not provide for a central agency which could administer 
personnel matters on a government-wide basis but, instead, entrusted this 
function to individual ministries which were often not properly equipped 
for such a task. The inevitable results of such a set-up, in addition to 
its high cost, were an intolerable lack of uniformity and a duplication 
of effort. A more serious result of such an arrangement was that it invited 
political interference in personnel matters. The ministries were open to 
overstaffing with civil servants in response to political and sectarian 
pressures without regard to the ministry's needs or the ability and 
competence of those appointed.
Such a system, which subjects administration to political encroach­
ment and Interference, is bad enough in any country; but it is far worse 
in Lebanon because of the significant role which sectarianism plays in 
society and government. Sectarian pressures and influences have had 
equally or possibly more adverse effects on the administration of the
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personnel function than has the political factor. Thus, despite the exis­
tence of a personnel law in the country, the achievement of a merit 
system is practically impossible under such circumstances.
The government began to realize the harmful effects of such a 
departmentalized personnel system and the need for a central personnel 
agency which would overcome the flaws and weaknesses of the existing prac­
tices. The earliest attempt to establish such an agency dates back to 
February 18, 1942, when a Directorate of Personnel was established by the 
French and attached to the Presidency.'*' Unfortunately, this Directorate 
was not taken seriously and did not really come into existence except 
on paper.
At the dawn of independence, the Lebanese administration could
be characterized by:
... lack of administrative machine and lack in human 
elements. Most of the employees are not well trained 
and are not sufficiently paid. That is why most of 
them do not know how to work, or work faithfully. The 
reasons for this are: (1) appointment to the job is 
affected by sectarian and party considerations;
(2) in-service training is non-existent; (3) the 
number of employees is more than what is needed which 
results in delay and complication of transactions; ^
(4) low salaries lead employees to accept bribery...
Need for Administrative Reform
The post-war economic dislocation, public dissatisfaction with 
government administrative procedures, the widespread corruption in
1
Decree No. 240 of February 18, 1942.
2
The Lebanese Council for Planning and Development, A Five Years 
Plan for Economic Development in Lebanon (Beirut, 1958), pp. 339-341.
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office, nepotism and the misuse of public funda —  all led eventually to 
a demand for administrative reform. The reform spirit had dominated poli­
tics since 1943. Riad Solh's first two cabinets had fallen because of 
Internal problems; the cabinet chaos of 1946 was generated by adminis­
trative failures and the corrupt election of 1947 was fought over domestic 
reform. Yet it was not until Bisharat al-Khouri's downfall in 1952 that 
the reformists had an opportunity to try their hand at governing.
In 1949, the Government called on the help of Professor William
A. Robson to study the Social Security System. Mr. Robson dealt in his
report with some of the maladies plaguing the civil service and made a
series of recommendations concerning the recruitment and training of
civil servants. His recommendations were not immediately put into effect
3
and had to wait until 1959.
The year 1951 marked the first real attempt for administrative
reform. A Bureau of Accounts (Diwan al-Muhassabat) was created to deal
with administrative irregularities. This agency sought to scrutinize
every financial transaction and its major function was to carry out
pre-and post auditing.
The Bureau, did not function well at the beginning, not 
knowing what offices and agencies existed, and what their 
functions and duties might be. But later on, with growing 
Improvement in Lebanese administration, the Bureau of 
Accounts began to function properly.^
3
Ralph Crow and Adnan Iskandar, "Administrative Reform in Lebanon, 
1958-59," International Review of Administrative Sciences. No. 3 (1961), p. 295.
4
Interview with an official of the Bureau of Accounts, January 5, 1967.
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Following the ouster of al-Khouri in 1952, Camille Chamoun was 
elected President of the Republic. In his Inaugural address to Parliament, 
he stated:
The people ask for a simple, competent and straight 
internal administration that can serve them sincerely, 
quickly, and without favoritism. So the administration 
is in need of somebody who can clean it and organize it 
well, and who can define the rights and duties and 
Immunities of the employees so that they may perform 
their duties with self-confidence and security.
And I long for the time when Lebanon will have a modern 
administrative system that remains a reliable tool that 
can be used for the actualization of the public welfare only.
On October 15, 1952, the cabinet of Khaled Chehab was granted
emergency legislative decree powers for a period of six months. In its 
grant Parliament specified thirteen major areas in which governmental 
action was expected. There were five areas dealing with administrative
reform:
a. Reorganization of governmental cadres and departments.
b. Revision of personnel laws.
c. Administrative organization on the basis of decentralization.
d. Reorganization of the accounting law and the Bureau of 
Accounts. 6
e. Establishment of a planning and economic development board.
As a result of these legislative powers, the Cabinet issued a 
total of 90 legislative decrees establishing new governmental departments, 
reorganizing existing ones and specifying the cadres for all ministries 
and providing other reforms such as a revision of the judicial system and
5
Chamber of Deputies, 7th. Legislative Session, September 23, 1952, 
Lebanon, p. 2519.
10
Compilation of Legislative Decrees (October 15. 1952-April 15. 1953) 
(Beirut: Sader Press, 1955), p. 1.
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and the accounting and auditing procedures.
The next phase of the administrative reform movement under the 
Chamoun's regime was carried out by the cabinet of Sami el-Solh during 
the period of October 15, 1954 to January 15, 1955. The reforms then
were simply intended to introduce minor changes to the previous provi­
sions introduced by the cabinet of Khaled Chehab in order to insure a 
smooth operation of the administration. In his request to be granted 
similar powers to legislate by decree for a period of three months,
Premier el-Solh stated in Parliament on October 15, 1954:
The cabinet in 1952 was granted legislative decree 
powers in various areas for a period of six months,
During that period the government issued about 100 
legislative decrees that dealth with the organiza­
tion of governmental departments, the adoption of
a new personnel law, and the'issuance of accounting
procedures. These decrees constituted a comprehensive 
law upon which the present Lebanese administrative 
is built. But during the past two years we have 
experienced that some of the legislative decrees in 
force are not applicable and should be amended in 
order to promote efficiency and to assure better 
coordination in governmental functions.8
No special machinery was set up for the program of administrative 
reform. The Dlrectors-General of each Ministry were asked to submit to 
the Cabinet drafted revisions of the legislative decrees that were specified 
by the legislative mandate to the Cabinet. New legislative decrees were
7
Crow and Iskandar, op. clt.. p. 296.
8
Republic of Lebanon, Official Gazette. (1954), p. 1550.
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issued replacing those of 1952-53. These decrees "introduced minor changes
9
and in some cases more extensive alterations were made."
At the same time, the Council of Economic Planning and Development
made a study about the needs of the country and recommended the following:
To call on the help of a public administration expert 
to study the present administrative system and to present 
his suggestions and recommendations for reforming it.
The creation of an independent civil service board to 
be responsible for all recruitment and personnel.
The establishment of a national public administration 
institute to train and prepare employees for the public 
service.^
On the basis of this report, Mr. Sami el-Solh asked Mr. Robert
Culbertson of the Ford Foundation to study the suggestions of the Council.
Among his recommendations^^, Mr. Culbertson suggested the creation of a
permanent civil service council. In May 1955 the Council of Ministers
12issued a decree establishing such a council. It was headed by the 
Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office and had as members all 
other Directors-General. It had advisory power regarding recruitment 
and organization. To assist this permanent Civil Service Council in its 
work, the government contracted the services of two Dutch experts, one 
for six months and the other for two years. Since it had no power to
9




Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the Government 
of Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration Improvement," (unpublished 
report,) Part II, p. 23.
12
Decree No. 9393 of May 30, 1955.
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approve or Implement recommendations without the authority of the Council
of Ministers many of the recommendations presented by these two experts
13
were not carried out.
On October 24, 1958, against a backdrop of business recession 
and civic deterioration, the cabinet requested a grant of full decree 
powers to intiate vast administrative reforms. For a third time in a 
decade the government was attempting a drastic overhaul on short notice 
and on December 12, 1958, Parliament granted that power for a period of 
six months.
These powers authorized the government to overhaul the entire 
administrative system, to establish new cadres and to revise all person­
nel laws and regulations.
Having received this delegated authority, the Cabinet started 
to create the machinery which would carry out the intended reform. Thus,
it issued two legislative decrees, the first creating the Central Committee
14
for Administrative Reform (CCAR) and the second one appointing the persons
15
to man the committee.
The CCAR was attached to the office of the Prime Minister and 
was composed of twenty-four members, ten of whom were senior government 
officials with the remainder drawn from among prominent persons in the 
various professions.
13
Crow and Iskandar, op. cit.. p. 296.
14
Decree No. 193 of December 6, 1958.
15
Decree No. 206 of December 6, 1958.
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The CCAR was to be responsible for "giving suggestions in all fields
under the jurisdiction of the decree powers" and had the power "to reorganize
all the civil service for raising its standards and for making it an efficient
16
tool for accomplishing its duties."
In the realm of administrative reform, this Committee was invested 
with wide powers in all fields. It was supposed to work a position-classifi- 
catlon and salary scale for all employees in the civil service; to remove 
conflicts and overlapping among different units; to introduce work simpli­
fication; to insure that geographical delegation of authority Is realized; 
to free the civil service from political interference and corruption; to 
create an independent body called the "Civil Service Board" for tackling 
problems relating to the civil servants and for seeing that the personnel 
laws are properly and fairly applied. In addition, this decree provided 
the CCAR with the needed authority to establish a system of control and 
inspection. The immunities of the civil servants in the tdp two categories
of the Lebanese administration were temporarily waived to enable the new
17
regime to escape the limitations of the existing rules and regulations.
The CCAR was divided into seven preparatory Committees. Each was 
concerned with a number of organizations and laws and was assisted by task 
forces which were established in each ministry to gather data and conduct 
the necessary research.
16




The studies conducted by some of the reform committees revealed
and pln-polnted many personnel problems which needed Immediate attention.
18
In statements which were labelled "The Talks of Administrative Reform"
19
and released to the press these weaknesses were as follows:
In general, the Lebanese administration has three 
ills— political interference, disorganization, and 
inefficiency of the civil servants; more particularly 
the reform studies revealed specific findings below.
Some of the ministries or idaras (sing. Directorate- 
General) therein were overstaffed while others were 
considerably understaffed. The former did not know 
what to do with the useless surplus, the latter were 
busily trying to fill its ranks.
A strange and ridiculous mixture of types of positions 
existed; permanent, temporary, and daily-paid. An 
illogical and unecessary shortage in one type or 
surplus in another created much uncertainty and 
consequent corruption in all the types and throughout 
the service.
Employing and dismissing civil servants was in many 
instances done arbitrarily, thus placing them under 
the aegis of political and sectarian influence with 
resultant serious depression in their morale and 
consequent effects on the public.
The salary scale was seriously inadequate. Also some 
permanent positions received only their basic salaries 
whereas civil servants in the same or other types of 
positions received additional phenomenal supplements 
and allowances amounting to many times their basic 
salaries. This created grudges, envy and chagrin in 
the hearts of the civil servants and produced most 
serious and regrettable effects on their morale, conduct 
and production. Also, this situation burdened the treasu­
ry with wasteful administrative expenses which the tax­
payers could benefit from in other vital services in a 
country which is underdeveloped.
18
As reported by the Civil Service Board in a statement published 
in al-Jaryda (Beirut), September 16, 1961.
19
As adapted by the author.
182
Examinations for recruitment to the service were 
not competitive and their standards, even for the 
same job differed in the various ministries and 
sometimes in the various units within the same 
ministry. The top names of those who passed were 
not necessarily appointed. Choice was allowed from 
all the list of those who passed in order to 
accomodate sectarian and political distribution 
of positions. The best of these candidates used to 
be appointed to secondary positions, and those of 
limited abilitities used to fill important super­
visory positions. As to appointment in Category II 
positions (chiefs of services) no examinations were 
conducted or required and considering the circumstan­
ces, the able and qualified inside the service were 
disillusioned and those outside it were disheartened 
and barred from entering government service. As such, 
with passing days, the service was stacked with 
worhtless elements far from those needed in a chan­
ging and developing country and an administration 
with added responsibilities and spheres of operation.
Training facilities or programs were non-existent 
for the civil servants. Some of them, taken from 
one ministry or the other, were sent abroad, some­
times to be trained all in''a single field or in 
areas where other employees have already been 
trained. Upon their return they were dumped in 
unimportant positions totally unrelated to their 
training. Some civil servants were adequately 
trained and requested consideration that their 
training be taken into account in the reform move­
ment of 1958. Also, despite the obvious need, no 
in-service training existed to raise the performance 
standard of these civil servants.
Administrative procedures and activities were 
disorganized, and there were no set and standardi­
zed regulationsspecifying or properly distributing 
duties and responsibilities among the various 
positions of any idara. Furthermore, no proper 
routing of administrative operations and transactions 
existed inside the ministry or across ministerial 
lines. This was coupled, in many instances, by a 
lack on the part of the civil servants of authority
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commensurate with their responsibilities, of proper 
knowledge concerning their duties and responsibili­
ties, and of satisfactory management of work and 
routine procedures.
Personnel files and records were either completely 
lost or non-existent. In cases where they were 
available, pertinent information was incomplete 
and inadequate. The personnel history of the 
civil servant as such could not be known, i.e., 
his past deeds or misdeeds, training, abilities, 
etc. Since promotion, transfer, rewards and 
penalties were not based on the past record of 
achievement of the person, keeping of records 
was useless.
Working feverishly, the preparatory committees submitted their 
data and findings to the Central Committee, and by the expiration date 
of the mandate, 162 decrees had been drafted, approved by the Cabinet, 
and promulgated as law. These decrees related to all aspects of govern­
mental policy and organization and which, in some instances, brought 
about some basic changes in the administrative pattern. The most important 
of these changes were the reorganization of all ministries, the establish­
ment of the Civil Service Board and of a new inspection service, a National 
Institute of Public Administration, the strengthening of the Bureau of 
Accounts, and a host of other administrative changes throughout the 
public service.
Functions of the Civil Service Board
The plan concerning the establishment of the Civil Service Board 
was embodied in Decree Law No. 114 of June 12, 1959, provided for the 
creation of such a board and granting it extensive powers over all aspects 
of personnel administration in the Lebanese civil service. The jurisdi­
ction of this Board extends to all governmental departments and public
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agencies with the exception of the Army, the Judiciary, and the Security 
Forces.
20
The functions of the Civil Service Board are as follows:
(1) To determine the number of personnel in the various departments;
(2) To determine conditions of employment; to admlnfa ter exami­
nations and select employees;
(3) To supervise and approve alltransfers and promotions in 
the public service;
(4) To abolish all illegal appointments to the public service;
(5) To supervise the performance of all civil servants and to 
dismiss those whose performance does not meet the established 
standards;
(6) To refer to the Disciplinary Councils any civil servant who 
commits a violation of existing laws and regulations;
(7) To maintain personnel files and records on all government 
employees;
(8) To train all government employees;
(9) To adopt personnel policies in accordance with the needs
of the public service.
It is evident from the list of responsibilities that the Civil 
Service Board was intended to play the dominant role in all matters relating 
to personnel administration. It was conceived as the guardian of the 
Personnel Law and the final arbiter and authority on personnel matters 
throughout the civil service. The Civil Service B6ard was considered 
as one of the main pillars of the 1959 reform movements and high hopes
were attached to its creation. It was thought the Civil Service Board
20
Decree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader, Collection 
of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964), Vol. I, Art. 1.
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would help to eliminate, or at least reduce, political interference and 
meddling In the civil service by removing the personnel function from 
the jurisdiction of individual ministries and entrusting it to an inde­
pendent, expert agency which could be free from all these pressures. 
Personnel administration under the previous system was handled in an 
amateurish, casual way by various ministries which did not have the 
properly qualified staff to deal with such problems. The creation of 
a Civil Service Board with the necessary authority and an expert staff 
would bring reason and order to the personnel operations of the govern­
ment .
It should be mentioned, in this connection, that the Central 
Committee of Administrative Reform, which submitted the plan for the 
creation of the Civil Service Board, had envisaged even a more important 
role for it. The original plan submitted to the Council of Ministers 
included, among other functions of the Civil Service Board, those of 
inspection and research and guidance. However, this plan was not approved 
by the Council of Ministers and a separate agency was established and
21
entrusted with both inspection functions and research and guidance work.
Such an arrangement enabled the government to satisfy the two major reli­
gious communities by appointing a Maronite as President of the Civil Service 
Board and a Sunni Moslem as head of the Central Inspection Service. 
Organization of the Civil Service Board (CSB)
The basic organizational structure of the Lebanese Civil Service 
is defined by Decree Law No. 112 of June 12, 1959, and Decree Law No. 2459
21
Decree No. 2968 of December 26, 1959.
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of November 11, 1959 and reorganized In accordance with Decree No. 8337 
of December 30, 1961 as shown in Charts I and II, below.
The Civil Service Board is composed of the following units:
The Board
The Board of the Civil Service is the highest administrative 
unit within the civil service and consists of three members, the President, 
the Head of the Preaparation and Training Department and the Head of the 
Personnel Department.
The President of the Board is the chief executive officer 
invested, within his own agency, with the same administrative and finan­
cial powers whcih are normally vested in a Minister, with the exception
22
of the constitutional powers.
The President and the two members of the Board are appointed 
by a decree approved by the President of the Republic for an indefinite 
period. However, they can dismissed from the service on the recommenda­
tions of the Prime Minister and the approval of a special committee 
composed of the President of the Court of Appeals, the President of the 
Council of State, the President of the Bureau of Accounts, the President
of the Central Inspection Service and a Director-General with the longest
23
years of service. This is intended to give the Board members adequate 
protection against arbitrary dismissal and political interference.
22
Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader, Collection 
of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964), Art. 6.
23
Ibid., Arts. 6 and 7.
CHART VIII-1 
STRUCTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD, 1959

































Source: Decree No. 2459, November 9, 1959, Official Gazette. No. 61.
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The Board Is the sole body entrusted with the responsibility
of administering the Personnel Law. Thus, all administrative units, public
agencies and municipalities are under the supervision of the CSB and are
required to receive the advice and consent of the Board regarding permanent,
temporary, wage and contractual employees. The Board Is at the same time
the only organ having the responsibility of interpreting the rules and
24
regulations pertaining to the Civil Service.
The President of the Board has the right to attend meetings 
of the Cabinet, of parliamentary committees, of public agencies and 
municipalities when matters pertaining to personnel are discussed. He 
must also present to the Cabinet an annual report about the functions and 
achievements of the CSB.
There are two main departments under the Board, The Personnel 
Department and the Preparation and Training Department.
Personnel Department
The Personnel Department is headed by a Director-General who 
is a member of the CSB assisted by two members, the Head of the Supervision 
and Studies and the Head of the Examinations and Personnel Service. The 
three form a Board for the Personnel Department.
25
The responsibilities of the Personnel Department are:
(a) To define and provide standards to organize and maintain 
the personnel files of all civil servants;
(bj> To give its opinion on legality of appointments;
(c) To observe the conduct of employees on and outside the job;
(d) To study the reports of the Central Inspection Service 
pertaining to the civil servants;
(e) To study and give its opinion on matters of raises and 
promotion, and
(f) To administer the recruitment process
24
Decree No. 241, December 15, 1961.
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This Department is made up of two services: The Supervision
26
and Studies Service and the Examination and File Service.
The Supervision and Studies Service is responsible for studying 
and supervising all matters related to the Personnel Law. It studies 
draft rules pertaining to all civil servants and it estimates the number 
of employees needed by each department and is responsible for determining 
the conditions of employment to the lowest two categories. It also defines 
the conditions under which benefits and pensions are distributed to 
employees.
The Examination Bureau prepares the general examination system 
and specifies the qualifications for each vacancy^ prepares and administers 
the examination and furnished the list of the succesful candidates.
The Personnel Records Bureau prepares an up-to-date file on each 
civil servant. This file contains all pertinent information such as educa­
tion, qualifications, experience, promotion, etc. This Bureau acts as the 
statistical unit of the CSB.
The Preparation and Training Department
Its general aim is the training and development of the human 
element in the Lebanese administration. It is entrusted with the following 
functions:
(a) To train prospective civil servants in areas of adminis- 
tion and development;
(b) To provide in-service training sessions;
(c) To assess the needs for new employees, and




Decree No. 4800, July 25, 1960.
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This Department is also called the Institut National d'Adminis- 
tration et de Developpement (National Institute of Administration and 
Development) and a detailed analysis of the functions of the Insitute 
will be discussed in a later chapter.
Evaluation
It is still too early to evaluate the work of the Lebanese Civil 
Service Board as it has been in operation for a relatively short period 
of time and has not had enough time to develop into a full fledged central 
personnel agency. A careful study of its work up to the present is revea­
ling and will shed some light not only on its achievements but also on 
the many problems which it faced and the obstacles which have hindered 
its smooth and effective functioning.
The first period of operation was a period of trial and error.
The Board had to work in a suspicious atmosphere. The line administrators 
were resentful of the extensive powers granted to the Board; the politi­
cians were afraid that it would endanger their political status and the 
civil servants were worried that they might be dismissed for incompetence. 
The country had just passed through a major crisis and the wounds had not 
yet been healed. In this atmosphere of fear, distrust and instability, the 
CSB had to launch its activities. It had to gain the recognition from those 
it had to control, direct and supervise; it had to dissipate the fear and 
suspicion of those who viewed it as endangering their powers and had to 
win the support of the politicians.
On the positive side, the Board could count on the unqualified
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support of the President of the Republic who viewed its creation as one 
of the most important achievements of his regime; this support offset 
the pressures of the politicians. It also received the endorsement of the 
press which succeeded in creating a favorable public opinion, and finally, 
it had the honesty, sincerity and courage of its members.
During the first years of its existence, the Board acted as a
policing agency whose main task was to see that all personnel rules and
regulations were observed throughout the public service. It was more
concerned with the negative rather than the positive role and functions
28
which were envisaged for it.
Aside from the greater uniformity and adherence to established 
regulations which have been fostered by the Board, one can also point to 
some other achievements which are more positive in nature and which consti­
tute a somewhat more significant contribution to personnel administration 
in the Lebanese Civil Service. The most important achievement in this 
respect is the in-service training program initiated by INAD under the 
supervision and guidance of the Board.
Another aspect of Personnel Administration which received the 
serious attention of the Board is that of examinations. The examinations 
which had hitherto been administered by Various departments of the civil 
service were far from satisfactory. Examination questions were hurriedly 
prepared by amateurs who were not sufficiently versed in the subject matter
28
In 1960, the CSB decided on some 2,328 transactions regarding 
all aspects of personnel; in 1961, the number of decisions was 2,245 and 
in 1963, some 8,000 cases such as promotion, transfer and retirement were 
decided by the Board.
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of the examination. The results were often unreliable and invalid
tests which could not possibly discover and properly measure the
29abilities of the candidates.
The Civil Service Board, with the help of various standing
examination committees set up in different ministries and properly 
staffed by expert personnel, was able to improve significantly such 
examinations through more careful, serious study and planning. One of 
the notable improvements in this respect was the introduction of the 
interview as a supplement to the written and practical tests.
For the first time in its history, Lebanon now has a special 
Department in the Civil Service Board which is undertaking continuous 
research in the field of testing and the principles of testing. This 
is a specialized, technical field where scientific research and study 
are of utmost importance. It is hoped that the seriousness with which 
the Board views this whole matter and the attention it has given it 
will result, over the years, with a definite improvement in the quality 
of public employees.
Another field in which the Board has made commendable head­
way is that of personnel records. Until recently, personnel records 
in the Lebanese Civil Service were practically non-existent. The most
9 QInterview with an official of the Civil Service Board, 
January 6, 1967.
194
basic and essential data for making day-to-day personnel decisions 
and for preparing reports was sadly lacking. Planning for future 
operations was impossible under such a situation.
The Civil Service Board was aware of this distressing fact 
and gave priority to this problem. It has established central personnel 
files for all government employees and has devised new forms which will 
record all essential data and information about every employee. It is 
obvious that such a task cannot be accomplished overnight but requires 
persistence and hard work over a long period of time.
Finally, one significant activity of the Board is worthy of 
mention, although it has been exercised on a very limited scale. The 
Personnel Law in Lebanon, in its Article 71, gave the Civil Service 
Board the authority to check the performance of civil servants in order 
to determine whether or not it is satisfactory. In cases where on the 
job performance was judged as unsatisfactory, the employee could be 
dismissed.
This was an innovation in the Lebanese Personnel Law. For 
until 1959, a civil servant in Lebanon could be dismissed through dis­
ciplinary action for a variety of causes; but there was no provision 
for dismissal of employees whose performance was below a minimum
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satisfactory level. The Civil Service was stuck with them and could 
do nothing about it.
In accordance with this new provision in the Personnel Law,
the Civil Service Board handled a limited number of cases where the
performance of the employees was being questioned. The Board conducted
its own investigations and in two of these cases decided to terminate
1 1the services of the employees. The Civil Service Board has been 
somewhat extremely cautious in exercising this new, and for Lebanon, 
unprecedented function. The cases referred to above were investi­
gated upon the request of the Departments concerned. Many departments 
expressed their apprehensions about this function of the CSB, which 
could easily be abused. This is certainly true; but on the other hand, 
one can hardly imagine an organization which cannot get rid of its 
inefficient personnel. The two cases of dismissal handled by the CSB 
have served a purpose by giving a badly needed warning to public employees 
that, at last, the government can and intends to do something about 
those who are not carrying out their duties in a satisfactory manner.
In evaluating the Civil Service Board and its work one must 
be careful not to give a hasty and premature judgment regarding a newly 
created body. The old civil service structure is not something that
31Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board,
I960, p. 254.
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can be cut away from the society in one day; and a new, modern efficient 
civil service is not something that can be created, established, and 
organized the day after. New policy, methods, and procedures must be 
introduced and intelligently applied. This takes a certain amount of 
time and only the future will tell whether the CSB is a success or a 
failure.
The following questions may be raised: Has the CSB been
able to apply the "merit system"?; Has it succeeded in eliminating the
surplus employees?; Has it succeeded in eliminating appointments due 
to political and sectarian pressures? and how efficient was the Board 
in its attempts to tackle some of the diseases of the civil service and 
what factors limited it in solving these problems?
All of the above questions cannot be satisfactorily answered 
at the present time, although one can have educated guesses based on 
informal discussions with decision-makers. By necessity, their names 
must be withheld.
In attempting to answer the above questions, a brief summary
of the defects of modern civil service in general, and of the Lebanese
civil service in particular, is in order.
The Lebanese administration is plagued by the defects of
other bureaucratic organizations. A bureaucracy is:
...a vast body of officials wielding great power, 
imbued with so definite and particular a view 
of their calling that it separates them from and
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makes their ways and thought and behavior strange 
and alien to the rest of the society.3^
These defects increased in the absence of outside controls. 
The bureaucratic aloofness from the rest of the community took the 
form:
...of apparent superciliousness, the faulty handling 
of the general public proceeds unchecked to the callous 
subordination of its interest, to the needs of the 
bureaucratic routine, delays tend to multiply with 
the growing centralization of powers and with the 
refusal of officials to jeopardize their official 
existence for the sake of obliging the public.33
In Lebanon, the bureaucracy suffered from such defects as 
absence of initiative and imagination, ineffective organization and 
waste of manpower, delay and refusal to take responsibility or to 
make decisions, isolation from the rest of the society, over-devotion 
to tradition and a low standard of honesty and integrity.
The general administrative situation was described by the
President of the Civil Service Board as:
...unnecessary increase in the number of employees, low 
standard of performance, appointment without evaluating 
knowledge or qualifications, patronage, unnecessary 
spending of public funds, routine and the absence of law. 34
•^Herman Finer, "The British Civil Service," cited by Eric 
Strauss, The Ruling Servants (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961),
p. 86.
33Ibld., p. 89.
^Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, 1960,
p. 321
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Concerning the first question as to whether the CSB has
succeeded in developing a merit system, that is a system of:
...civil service recruitment and tenure based upon 
competitive entrance examinations, relative security 
from partisan removal, and political neutrality and 
non-partisanship in public office.
The answer to this question is in the negative. The CSB 
has failed to establish a uniform standard for tests and this lack has 
seriously undermined the achievement of a "merit system." It is 
suspected that competitive examinations were tailored in such a way 
as to give the testing authorities the opportunity to choose the person 
they wanted. The absence of a position-classification plan combined 
with sectarian influence renders any claims, on the part of the Civil 
Service Board that it is working on the dictates of the "merit system," 
completely false. A further limiting factor is the over-emphasis on 
the legal approach which prevented competent persons not possessing a 
legal background from joining the public service.
Instead of reducing red tape and procrastination the CSB has
intensified this trend. In its stress on achieving control it has
spent far more time than it has saved. It has been argued that the
'.'..disease of making no errors at all costs, involved 
the American government during the last war in dispro­
portionate expenses through the detailed checking
~^Paul Vanriper, History of the United States Civil Service 
(New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958), p. 309.
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of comparatively trivial travelling expenses of huge 
numbers of officials, with the result that the total 
money disallowed is much less than the salaries of the 
auditors."36
The same thing can be argued about the detailed rules and regulations 
by the CSB which were intended to achieve control but resulted in 
crippling the Lebanese administration.
Some might argue that these detailed rules and regulations 
are needed in order to pinpoint responsibility on the part of the 
civil servants. However, "the essence of responsibility is psychologi­
cal rather than mechanical." True responsibility "is to be sought in
37an identity of aim and point of view."
For instead of occupying its time in the preparation of rules 
and regulations which were usually cast aside, the CSB should have 
stressed the goals that the government is trying to achieve.
The Civil Service Board in Lebanon must realize that its 
role is not that of an administrative court, rather it is to cope with 
a dynamic and changing administration. Its emphasis should be on 
achievement and not on the legality of transactions. An administration 
that moves, works and errs can be tolerated, whereas, one that is 
crippled with red tape and legality which prevent it from achieving any - 
positive goals cannot.
36Ibid., p. 48.
3 Ĵ. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow 
Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), p. 282.
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Despite all this, the Civil Service Board has some achieve­
ments to its credit. There has been greater uniformity and adherence 
to established regulations; there has also been an improvement in the 
quality of examinations, the interview has been used as a supplement 
to the written and practical tests; the in-service training program 
started in earnest around 1963 and could prove of immeasurable benefit 
in the long-run.
Until recently, personnel records were almost non-existent 
and the Civil Service Board has devoted its energy in devising forms 
which record all essential data and information about each employee.
With the help of the Ford Foundation, the CSB is hard at
work devising a comprehensive classification position plan and on
December 8, 1965, it entered in agreement with the Foundation by which
the latter agreed to support the training of selected Lebanese civil
servants overseas. As a result eight employees from the CSB were
assigned to a six-months training course with the United States Civil
38Service Commission in Washington.
One may conclude that the Civil Service Board has performed 
creditably under existing and often trying circumstances and it has 
developed in the few years of its existence into a respectable agency.
38Interview with Dr. Roy Jumper, Ford Foundation Representa­
tive in Lebanon, January 9, 1967.
201
Its continued development will depend on the support it receives from 
the public and on its ability to provide needed services.
The following proposals are derived from the material pre­
sented in this study. They are directed toward the improvement of the 
Lebanese administration.
A Comprehensive Personnel System
The diversity of work and the complex interrelationships 
among different features of personnel administration, such as salary 
system, recruitment, promotion, reasonable proportion between the number 
of employees and the work load, and the multiplicity of objectives in 
carrying out a personnel reform plan - these require a comprehensive, 
detailed, statistic-supported picture of the structure of the current 
personnel system. \
The statistical d̂ ita on salaries, grades, education, and
the ages of government employees are very important sources of research.
1
To analyze the education, professional and vocational ability, and 
experience of the applicants for government employment helps to formu­
late the recruitment policy more wisely. Obtaining general information 
about the number and qualifications of public employees in all ministries 
provide a basis for analyzing how some political, social and economic 
development increase or lessen outside pressure for government employ­
ment. Distributing a questionnaire containing questions about the 
personal background of the employee--his education, experience, and 
technical ability-- and the characteristics of the position he occupies, 
has multiple usefulness for a personnel survey.
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Unfortunately, government employees, underpaid and afraid of 
their situations, do not always furnish truthful or, at any rate, ade­
quate answers. Many of them merely state that they are busy all the 
time and accomplish a great deal. Their answers concerning their 
experience and other qualifications can always be interpreted in different 
ways. Some actually may have no jobs to write about, but think it is 
to their advantage to write something. The approval of their state­
ments by their supervisors does not mean much; the supervisors pretend 
their subordinates are necessary to their jobs, thinking that the number 
of subordinates employees is a matter of administrative and personal 
prestige.
The demonstration of these problems, in gathering useful 
information through questionnaires, shows the general difficulties 
existing in all fact-finding programs based on statements of individuals. 
It remains that the facts obtained by questionnaires must be rectified 
and supplemented by other means of research. To determine the range 
of salary range and set up regulations concerning salary increases, 
varied information on salary levels in private enterprise, the demand 
and supply for governmental jobs, and changes in the price index during 
recent years, is required. Although the collection of basic social data 
in the form of statistics and censuses has usually become a function 
of governments everywhere, university research institutions, such as 
the American University of Beirut's Economic Research Institute, could 
help the reform organ to take its survey. There is urgent need for 
personnel and manpower planning to forecast requirements over a long
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period of time and provide the resources needed to train skilled
administrators and technicians. Lebanon has no reliable data on the
39number of persons on the public payrolls, no records of turnover, 
output, productivity or unit costs of repetitive operations by depart­
ments, projects, or sections of work and has no long-term projections 
of manpower needs as a basis for recruitment and training.
We may generalize that the administrative reform attempts 
affected mainly the structural aspects and the formal processes of the 
Lebanese bureaucracy. At present the country's administration enjoys 
a high standard of modernization in its formal institutions and tech­
niques. It has modern laws and regulations as well as a sound organi­
zation. Yet these reform attempts did nothing serious regarding the 
informal aspects of the bureaucracy. The main problem at present seems 
to center around the effectuating of the new changes which were wrought 
into the formal structure of Lebanon's bureaucracy; and at conciliating 
adjustments that need to be made between the formal and informal in it; 
in other words, closing the gap which exists between the formal organi­
zation and its actual operation. In any case one point remains essential, 
"...that changes in power and in structure do not mean that the basic 
class governing behavior in a given situation have changed. Generally .
39There is a discrepancy in the total number of civil servants 
in Lebanon. The Civil Service Board, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of General Planning list different totals, with a variation of 
about 3,000 employees.
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speaking, changes in cultural habits and values come very slowly'.*̂ 0 
Summary Statement
Until 1959, the personnel administration system in Lebanon 
was a departmentalized one. Each ministry was a self-contained unit 
handling its own personnel matters. Such an arrangement resulted in 
duplication of effort, lack of uniformity and overstaffing.
Realizing the harmful effects of such a departmentalized 
personnel system and the need for a central agency to correct the 
flaws and weaknesses of the existing practices, the government was 
granted emergency decree powers on three separate occasions to initiate 
vast administrative reforms. The first two attempts were not serious 
ones since no special machinery was set up to handle this program and 
the results were minor changes. The third attempt culminated in the 
establishment of a Central Committee for Administrative Reform which 
was invested with wide powers in all fields. By the expiration date of 
the emergency powers, the CCAR had drafted 162 decrees which were pro­
mulgated as law. These decrees related to all aspects of governmental 
policy and organization and brought about basic changes in the adminis­
trative pattern. The most important of these changes was the creation 
of the central Civil Service Board and the National Institute of Public 
Administration.
^John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative 
Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 252.
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The Civil Service Board was considered as one of the main 
pillars of the 1959 reform and it was thought that by removing the 
personnel function from the jurisdiction of individual ministries and 
entrusting it to an independent agency, political interference in the 
civil service would be eliminated, or at least reduced.
The Board administers all personnel laws and is composed 
of two main departments: (1) The Personnel Department which supervises 
all matters related to personnel laws and prepares and administers the 
examination system; and (2) The Preparation and Training Department 
which trains prospective civil servants and conducts in-service train­
ing sessions.
It is still too early to evaluate the work, of the Board, 
however, one can have educated guesses based on informal discussions 
with members of the Board. Its achievements include the following: 
greater uniformity and adherence to established regulations; an improve­
ment in the quality of examinations; the beginning of in-service training 
sessions and a central personnel file of all essential data and informa­
tion about each employee.
Its drawbacks include its failure to establish a uniform 
standard for tests; it has intensified red tape and procrastination; and 
has emphasized legality of transactions instead of achievement.
To sum up: the CSB has performed creditably under existing 
conditions and its continued development will depend on the support it 
received from the public and on its ability to provide needed services.
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Personnel reform could be aided by a comprehensive, detailed, 
statistic-supported picture of the structure of the current personnel 
system. Such an outline of the system could be gained through the 
collection and analysis of data. Statistical and census information are 
required for manpower planning and forecasts for the future. Surveys 
in this area have been lacking. It was recommended that in fulfilling 
this vital requirement the private research organizations could be enlisted 
to aid in this task.
It is generally recognized that position classification is 
the cornerstone of modern personnel administration and the systematic 
treatment of this topic will be the subject of the following chapter.
CHAPTER VIII 
POSITION CLASSIFICATION AND COMPENSATION 
The Rational System
The objectives of a rational system of position classifica­
tion is to provide the means for effective performance which are necessary 
for the attainment of desired organizational goals. This requires the 
presence of a differential ranking system of classes or layers of 
positions with each layer having roughly a similar rank; the concept of 
the "position" used must imply an aggregate of harmonious and related 
duties and responsibilities; each role content must contain certain aspects 
which may be emphasized more than others; the ranking must be based, con­
sequently, on the relative merit of quality and performance; the total 
scale must be grouped into categories reflecting the levels of difficulty; 
and finally, salaries should be adequate and based on the classification 
used. Thus, a sound classification plan is essential to the establish­
ment and operation of a comprehensive personnel program.
A position classification plan is useful for the following 
reasons: (1) It permits the development of a standard title and a common 
language in personnel action and budgeting, (2) it helps recruitment 
through furnishing the personnel officer with advanced knowledge of the 
duties and responsibilities of the positions classified and of the 
educational and experience requirements demanded by various classes of 
positions, (3) it provides a firm basis for pay policy, (4) it encourages 
the keeping of meaningful records, (5) it helps the training officer in
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providing training and educational programs, (6) it aids in raising
employee morale, (7) it provides a basis for the solution of organizational
problems through finding gaps or conflicts in authority and duplication
of work, (8) it presents a picture of the various jobs as they exist
within the organization, and (9) it enables management to estimate
1budget needs accurately on the basis of a common denominator.
The ultimate concern of public personnel administration is 
to contribute towards the most efficient performance of the work required 
to accomplish the purposes of government. This is the direct or indirect 
purpose of all activities encompassed by public personnel administration.
In personnel administration, therefore, individuals are always being 
considered in relation to the work assigned, or to be assigned to them. 
Since the raison d'etre of personnel in any organization is that there 
is work to be performed, the information relating to the work to be 
performed by individuals is of primary significance. This information 
is gathered and considered in public personnel administration in terms 
of "positions". Those attributes of work which are considered signifi­
cant for the purposes of personnel administration form the basis of the 
classification of positions.
Fritz Morstein Marx, Elements of Public Administration 
(New York; Prentice Hall, 1946), p. 552; Felix A. Nigro, Public Personnel 
Administration (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959), p. 83; Leonard D. 
White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1939), p. 326; W. Brooke Grave, Public Administration 
in a Democratic Society (Boston; Heath & Co., 1950), p. 126.
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The Lebanese System
The prevailing system in Lebanon is a rank system which
differs from position classification in that in the former the "rank
or title of an individual gives him a right to the pay, prestige and
prerequisites of the rank or title; and he carries with him the title
and its rights whatever role in the organization he may play at a
particular time," while in the latter the stress is laid upon the
"particular job performed at the time rather than the rank or title of
the performer. Actually the position is thought of as a structure of
duties and responsibilities that exists regardless of the existence of 
2the performer."
The classification system operating in Lebanon is basically 
regulated by the "Law of May 7, 1957" - which is the third amendment of
3Legislative Decree No. 13 of December 7, 1953. Later decrees issued in 
1959 and 1961 added some positions to the present categories and amended 
the pay scale.
The general cadre classification and salary schedule involve 
what is termed the "administrative positions," i.e., the non-technical 
and special positions. Every ministry or government agency has its 
own "technical or special cadre" which involve technical and special
2Dwight Waldo, Ideas and Issues in Public Administration 
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1953), pp. 254-255.
^The system of 1953 was established by Legislative Decree 
No. 13 of December 7, 1953, that of 1955, by Legislative Decree No. 14 
of January 7, 1955.
210
positions in line with its functional specialty and nature. Nevertheless, 
the administrative cadre comprise the majority of the civil service 
leaving the technical and special cadres a comparatively small number of 
positions.
Table 1 presents the general administrative classification 
and salary schedule as set by the 1957 law plus later additions and 
amendments.
The present classification system is a simple and almost 
rigid plan comprising five categories with the first as the highest one 
and the fifth as the lowest. Each category (Fia1) contains few specified 
job titles, some categories have two or three ranks (Retba) and all 
follow pay steps numbering from 5 steps (Daraja) in Category I to 8 
steps in the lowest category. Each category has a salary range and the 
law sets down rigid educational requirements for entrance to each cate­
gory and for promotion from one category to another.
It can be seen that a position classification plan is non­
existent in Lebanon. The present broad groupings of positions into 
categories and classes is an arbitrary one and has not been applied on 
the basis of any systematic study of the duties and responsibilities 
of each position. As a result, the existing classification plan in 
Lebanon suffers from certain basic deficiencies which are detrimental 
to the personnel program and the proper functioning of the administration 
as a whole.
The first and most important weakness of the present plan 
is that it provides a poor and inadequate basis for determining salaries.
TABLE VIII-1
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM AND SALARY SCHEDULE a
Category Rank Positions Monthly Salary (Leb. Pounds) No. of Steps
I 1 -President, Civil Service Board
-President, Central Inspection 1555; 1655; 1755; 1855; 1955 5
2 -Director-General 
-Muhafez
-Inspector General 1080; 1180; 1280; 1380; 1480; 1580 6
II -Director
-Chief of Service
-Inspector 730; 800; 870; 940; 1010; 1080
III -Qa'immaqam0
-Chief of Department 
-Chief of Section 
-Controller .
-Assistant Inspector 
-Chief of Common Administrative 
Service; or Chief of Divan4* 505; 550; 595; 640; 685; 730
IV 1 -Muha'rer (Senior Clerk)
-Stenographer-Typist 342.50; 375; 407.50; 440; 472.50; 505
(Continued)
TABLE VIII-1 (Continued)
Category Rank Position Monthly Salary (Leb. Pounds) No. of Steps
IV 2 -Kateb (Junior Clerk)
-Typist
-Telephone Operator 205; 232.50; 260; 287.50; 315; 342.50 6
V 1 -Hajeb (Office Boy/
Messenger) 176; 205; 232.5; 260; 287.5; 315; 342.5; 375 - 8
2 -Guard 170; 187.5; 205; 232.5; 260; 287.5; 315; 342.5 8
3 -Janitor 117.5; 135; 152.5; 170; 187.5; 205; 232.5; 260 8
a
Law of May 7, 1957, art. 1 and Annex No. 1, as in Official Gazette. No. 21 (May 9, 1957), 
pp. 468 and 474-476; the salary schedule was amended by Decree No. 6167 of February 21, 1961 as 
in Ibid., No. 8 (February 22, 1961), pp. 137-140.
b
Categories I, II and III could be considered as Lebanon's "Higher Civil Service"
c
The Qa'immaqam (s) could be in Category III or II.
d
Both positions could be in category III or II.
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The use of position classification in the preparation of pay plans is 
indispensable for guaranteeing equal pay for equal work, which is a basic 
tenet of any merit system. In Lebanon, there is no assurance that such 
a principle is being applied because positions are not classified accord­
ing to the nature of the work involved. According to Culbertson, the 
classification and pay plan is "too rigid and too general in its classi­
fication to permit sufficient pay differentiation between positions.
The system forces you to pay people doing more responsible work the same 
as those doing less responsible work,"^ Such inequities in pay, which 
result from improper job classification, can be damaging to morale and 
to efficiency of performance. Some government employees in Lebanon have 
repeatedly complained about this particular problem but to no avail.
The lack of an adequate classification plan and, conse­
quently, of any job specifications or data about the requirements of 
various positions has seriously undermined the recruitment and selection 
systems in the country. The preparation of valid and reliable examina­
tions for the testing of candidates cannot be properly completed except 
on the basis of a detailed description of the duties and responsibilities 
of a position and of the knowledge, skills and experience required for 
efficient performance in that position. Such information is not avail­
able in Lebanon and, as a result, candidates for the public service are.
4Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the 
Government of a Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration 
Improvement," Unpublished report, Part I, p. 21, (n.d.).
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often given tests which are basically irrelevant to the particular job 
for which they are being recruited. It is this situation which has 
given rise to the frequently voiced complaint that Lebanese civil servants, 
in general, do not suffer from any lack of educational qualifications 
but rather from personal inefficiency. The improvement of the recruit­
ment and the selection methods of the Lebanese civil service and, conse­
quently, of the quality of public employees cannot be effected without 
the development of a sound classification of positions.
Finally, the classification plan in Lebanon is very mislead­
ing as far as titles are concerned. To begin with, the title of a 
government position, such as Chief of Service, does not give any indi­
cation of the precise nature of the job. There are hundreds, and possibly 
thousands, of chiefs of services in different ministries of the government 
performing work in totally different occupational fields, but all are 
given the same title. The same title is also given to a number of employees 
who are performing quite different jobs in terms of difficulty and res­
ponsibility. The same is true of other general titles used in the plan.
Such ambiguities in titles are very confusing and in contradiction to 
the principles of merit which dictate that employees performing similar 
work should be treated equally in such matters as their official designation.
In stressing the weaknesses of the existing system of classi­
fication one must not overlook some of its advantages. One of the obvious 
advantages is its relative simplicity when compared with the intricate 
and complex pattern involved in a modern position classification plan.
The ease and simplicity with which such a plan can be developed and main-
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tained makes it all the more appealing to a country like Lebanon which 
at present does not possess the necessary staff to initiate an elaborate 
position classification system. Needless to say, another important 
consideration is the factor of cost which is negligible in the case of 
the present system in Lebanon. The number of staff needed to maintain 
the plan is very small, and the skill and abilities required of them are 
by no means hard to find among government employees in Lebanon.
Another obvious advantage of this system is the ease with 
which it can be adjusted in response to certain changes, especially cost 
of living fluctuations. Such modifications can be introduced easily by 
adding a certain percentage increase to the whole structure.
But such advantages do not Justify the continuation of 
such a crude and rudimentary system in Lebanon. There is no doubt that 
its advantages are so gravely offset by its many serious disadvantages 
that the existing ranking system in Lebanon should be relinquished in 
favor of a new one based on the concept of classification. One cannot 
deny that the ranking plan in Lebanon served the needs of the country 
reasonably well over a long period of time. During this time Lebanon 
had a small and uncomplicated civil service whose scope of activities 
were limited. The administration rarely interferred in the economic 
and social sphere; and as a result, the civil service was basically 
administrative with little technical functions. But with the coming of 
independence, the civil service has undergone many changes. Although 
the role of the government in Lebanon is still basically one of laissez 
faire, there has been, nevertheless, a significant expansion in the civil
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service and in the activities which it is carrying out in several 
economic and social spheres. The civil service is a much more compli­
cated enterprise than it used to be under the mandate system. The 
addition of many new specialized and technical jobs to the government 
service poses a serious problem of classification. Such new positions 
cannot be easily fitted into a simple general ranking structure which 
is essentially one for administrative and clerical operations. This 
is why in Lebanon the government was forced to establish a three man 
committee to carry out a government-wide study for the purpose of 
establishing job description for every position. This committee was 
charged with the task of "...directing and coordinating the works of 
setting the civil servants' job descriptions and the application of 
regulations issued to this effect in collaboration with the concerned 
Idaras."3 Since 1962, this committee has been at work trying to devise 
a position classification plan for Lebanon.
Compensation Plan
In a narrow and proper sense the compensation plan is defined 
as an orderly system of salary payment to employees. It consists of a 
schedule of pay scales applicable to classes of positions previously 
arranged in a classification plan.** A compensation plan aims at
4
Ârrete No. 11, March 20, 1962, Art. 1.
^John M. Pfiffner, Public Administration (New York: The 
Ronald Press, 1935), p. 205.
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(1) seeking equitable relationship between salaries and wages of public 
employees and private employees who are carrying out the same responsi­
bilities and duties, (2) establishing a fair relationship between the 
salaries of individuals performing different kinds of work, (3) adjusting 
salaries to changing price levels, and (4) providing reasonable opportu­
nity for receiving claims and grievances.^
Adequate pay is a basic requirement for a public service 
which desires to attract and retain human talent that can render essential 
services to the people. This problem becomes particularly acute in a 
country like Lebanon, where the bureaucracy is in a transitional stage 
accompanied by rapid changes and expansion in its activities. These 
conditions require the recruitment of large numbers of technical and 
professional employees who are desperately needed for the implementation 
of vital government projects. In order to secure these new personnel, 
the government should be in a position to compete with private firms 
which are operating in a market with a limited supply of qualified 
candidates.
The problem of pay is further complicated by public demand
and insistence on combined economy and efficiency. In such a situation
...the administrator finds himself, therefore, confronted 
with conflicting pressures, one from the public servants
^Leonard D. White, op. clt., p. 343.
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desirous of a liberal wage policy, and one from the 
taxpayers eager to have running expenses reduced. Of 
course, the problem is not even that simple. Tax­
payers want economy, but they also want public services. 
Economy of program, the reduction of activities to their 
bare essentials is one thing; an attempt to secure a 
wide variety of public services cheaply is something 
else. Taxpayers should want the kind of pay policy and 
levels that will secure and retain an able staff, public 
employees who can give the brand of service the citizen 
wants. To harmonize the interests of all groups and 
to retain their confidence and support is a challenge to 
the constructive ability of both legislator and adminis­
trator.
The provisions of a rational classification of positions is
considered to be the best means for dealing with the salary problem
equitably. In many underdeveloped countries, as a publication of the
United Nations points out:
Salaries are not commensurate with the degree of 
responsibility and efficiency involved; indeed 
they are in many cases too low to enable officials 
to support themselves and their families...
Supplementary employment or other source of  ̂
income are the rule rather than the exception.
In Lebanon, there has been a complete absence of a compensa­
tion plan based on position classification. Salaries are fixed arbi­
trarily. No consideration has been given to the fact that salaries 
should be paid on the basis of the quality and amount of work.
The first attempt to establish a more or less uniform salary 
policy came in 1953 when the government issued legislative decree No. 13
g
Glenn 0. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York: 
Harper, 1956, 4th ed.) p. 208.
q̂United Nations, Training and Administration of Personnel in 
the Public Service (New York: 1953), p. 67.
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of December 7, 1953, setting forth, among other personnel rules and 
regulations, a classification and salary schedule for all "Administra­
tive" positions. Besides this schedule, each ministry or governmental 
agency has its individual cadre and, hence, a salary schedule for its 
technical and specialized personnel. This schedule established five 
grades, with each of the lower ones broken down into two ranks with a 
small number of very broad classes of positions. Each rank and grade 
has its own salary range providing for a minimum and a maximum level and 
varying number of intermediate steps.^
According to this law, appointment could be made only to the 
minimum step in every rank or grade. Salary increases were granted 
automatically every two years in an employee's grade. Until 1957, this 
was an unchanged process; there was no limit to the number of salary 
increases that could be granted in the manner described. But from then 
onwards, salary increases without promotion were limited to an employee's 
own grade and the one immediately above it.
In 1955, the government issued a new schedule which intro­
duced some minor changes in the pay scale of civil servants. Grade III
of the 1953 schedule, which included two ranks, was split into two sepa­
rate grades (III and IV in the 1955 schedule), and grades IV and V of
1953 were numbered V and VI. Grade II of the 1953 schedule consisted of
The pay scale was tied directly to rank. See Table IX,
pp.
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seven grades and the salary ranged from L.L. 580 to L. L. 800 per month.
This was changed by increasing the nuinber of steps within the grade
from 7 to 10 and the salary range from L.L. 580 to L.L. 920 per month.
The main reason behind this change was that promotion opportunities for 
civil servants of grade II were by definition very limited. Most of 
them were unable to attain one of the few positions in grade I. Hence, 
internal pressure from this highly placed and powerful group was brought 
to bear in order to acquire greater opportunities of financial advantage.
In 1957 and in 1961, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies passed
a new law which introduced some important alterations to the 1955 sche­
dule. ̂  The main objective of these laws were to provide for over-all 
increases throughout the entire salary scale. Whereas in the 1953 
schedules, the salary scale ranged from L.L. 95 at the bottom to a maxi­
mum of L.L. 1360 at the top, under the 1961 amendment, the minimum was
set at L.L. 117.50 and the maximum at L.L. 1,955 per month.
In addition to this general raise in salary levels, the
1957 law reduced the total number of steps in the whole scale to fifty-
nine in place of sixty-five in 1955 and sixty-two in 1953. This actually 
meant that increases in salary would take place at a faster rate owing 
to the fact that the new scale included fewer steps.
^Decree Law No. 14, January 7, 1955 and Decree No. 6167 
of February 21, 1961.
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Another feature of the 1957 law was that it discontinued the 
system of unlimited automatic salary increases on the basis of length 
of service alone and without promotion. Prom then onwards, no increase 
was permitted beyond the top step of the grade immediately above that 
in which the employee was ranked. The change actually produced no 
hardship because of the number of years required to reach even this 
maximum. But it corrected an important deficiency in the system where­
by a junior clerk, or even a driver, through mere seniority could attain 
a salary higher than that of a chief of department who had been newly 
appointed and who occupied a much more responsible position. Such a 
situation marked a clear violation of the basic principles of position 
classification and merit.
It is worth mentioning that the 1957 law was adopted by 
Parliament as a result of a threatened strike by the civil servants. An 
informal group of representatives of government employees (there is no 
formally organized employee organization) met with government officials 
to express their dissatisfaction and implicitly, if not overtly, threatened 
a general strike unless salaries were raised. The law of May 7, 1957, 
was the direct result of this action.
The above general presentation of the salary policies of 
the Lebanese government reveals certain serious discrepancies which 
help to undermine the morale of civil servants and which should be 
corrected as soon as possible.
The first and perhaps the most important weakness stems not 
from salary policy as such but from the poor classification plan which
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is the very basis of the salary scale. It has already been mentioned 
that the salary scale of the government is not based on any detailed 
and systematic analysis of the duties and responsibilities of each 
position, but rather on rudimentary classification which arbitrarily 
groups positions into very broad classes and assigns them to different 
grades. The salaries attached to each grade are based more on educa­
tional qualifications than on the nature of the work and responsibility 
called for in each position. This, of course, is contrary to modern, 
scientific principles of compensation and results in serious inequities 
to civil servants. But any improvements in salary practices must wait 
for improvements in the classification system itself, without which one 
cannot possibly develop and implement a rational and uniform pay scale.
Another important weakness in the salary system is repre­
sented by the generally low level of government salaries as compared 
with pay in private industry. The low pay of government employees and 
its failure to match that given workers by private firms has posed 
several difficulties for the civil service. The depressed morale of 
government employees who continually complain about their inadequate 
pay probably represents the most important problem. Lebanese civil 
servants feel that the government is not treating them fairly in paying 
them less than employees in private business. They are dissatisfied 
and frustrated and such a situation is not conducive to a healthy 
atmosphere in which the civil servant can perform at his best. It is 
difficult to assess the damage caused to the civil service by such a 
situation, but anyone who has had occasion to contact government employees
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and work with them cannot help sensing their low morale.
The Inadequate pay of civil servants has also put the govern­
ment at a disadvantage when trying to recruit badly needed talent of 
which there is necessarily only a limited supply in the country. The 
government has found considerable difficulties in trying to induce 
qualified candidates to join its ranks.
One should also admit that the reluctance to seek or join 
government service is the result not only of low salaries but of the
generally low prestige of the civil service as a whole. But there is no
doubt that the question of pay is one which has contributed greatly to 
the widely-held view about government service.
One surprising fact about the whole situation is that the
government does not seem to lose a large number of its employees to 
outside competitors. Although no accurate figures relating to employee 
turnover in the civil service are available, there are many indications 
that it is very low. It appears that the many benefits which the govern­
ment provides to its employees, and especially security of tenure which
is a major consideration in a country with a high degree of unemployment,
12in addition to the indemnity laws which discourage resignation by 
employees, have helped to reduce the flow of government employees to
1 0Any employee who resigns voluntarily loses his indemnity 
or termination pay of one month's salary for every year of service.
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outside jobs. Or it could be that private firms are dismayed by the 
generally low quality of personnel which generally exists in the govern­
ment and, as a result, attract their candidates from other sources. Thus, 
it can be seen that the government does not have much difficulty in 
hanging on to its employees; its real problem lies in getting new men 
for its growing bureaucracy.
Finally, the problem of inadequate salaries has greatly 
contributed to the sadly low standards of morality and personal integrity 
in the public service. Government employees have been forced into 
shameless graft and profiteering to compensate for the meager remunera­
tion from their jobs. The passive and indifferent attitude of the 
people has provided a free license for the continuation of such practices. 
A former Prime Minister described the situation of the Lebanese civil 
servants thus:
The abundance of civil servants is matched by the 
meagerness of their salaries and is definitely 
related to the situation resultant in their 
lack of competence, confusion of conduct and 
ethical behavior. This makes it plausible to 
consider the civil servant in Lebanon to be one 
of three: either an honorable man relying for his 
modest living on his inheritance, the number of these 
is small; or the honorable man overburdened with debt, 
these are also few in number; or the third man who 
has descended to the lowest levels of anyone made 
responsible for the welfare, money and ambitions of the 
people by sacrificing the public good on the altar 
of his desires, susceptible to and receiving bribes from 
any source and completely disregarding the interests 
of the people.
^Sa'ib Salam, "Hawl Bina ad-Dawlah al-Lubnaniyah" (On 
Building the Lebanese State) Les Conferences du Cenacle, Vol. VIII, 
(1954), p. 160.
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It is true that the government might have been able to check this moral 
deterioration by providing for more stringent penalties and ruthlessly 
enforcing them, but it cannot really eliminate these practices and 
improve the ethical standards of the public service without basic adjust­
ment in its pay policies.
One final observation to be made in this context is that 
the problem of civil service pay has to be viewed and solved in con­
junction with another problem: the overstaffing of the civil service. 
There is general agreement that the number of government employees in 
Lebanon has swollen beyond the needs of the civil service. Some esti­
mate the number of redundant employees at about five thousand employees,
14which is about one fifth of the total number of permanent employees.
This is the result of a tendency to create new posts, usually minor ones, 
in order to accommodate politicians and minimize the grave problem of 
unemployment in the country. Until recently when a noticeable industrial 
expansion took place, there were only limited opportunities for employ­
ment outside the government; hence, this tremendous pressure for the 
creation of unnecessary posts.
An increase in civil service pay in Lebanon could be achieved 
at the expense of releasing this large number of surplus employees. But 
this would create a tremendous economic and social problem, since the
^Interview with Dr. Charles Rizk of the Civil Service 
Board, December 28, 1966.
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economy of Lebanon, with its present degree of unemployment, could not 
possibly absorb such a wave of unskilled workers. Because of this 
situation, the government has shied away from dismissing them: and in 
fact, there are hardly any politicians or legislators who would recommend 
such a drastic step. On the other hand, it would be ridiculous, as well 
as unjustified, for the government to grant a general increase in sala­
ries to all its employees, including this army of idlers who are not 
contributing any genuine service to the public. The government is caught 
on the horns of a serious dilemma for which it is extremely difficult 
to find a solution which is at once rational, fair, and humane.
A final but somewhat less important weakness of the salary 
system in Lebanon is the system of automatic pay increases granted indis­
criminately to all civil servants. These salary increases are not 
granted on the basis of merit but are given to every employee automati­
cally every twenty-four months. Such a practice does not differentiate 
between the mediocre employee and the superior one. It actually has the 
effect of stifling initiative and encouraging mediocrity of performance, 
since inefficient employees know that they will not be punished for their 
inefficiency and superior employees know that they will not be rewarded 
for their efficiency. This policy, which ignores the simple and elemen­
tary principle of reward and punishment can be very damaging to morale.
The government has not been able to develop and apply a system of per­
formance evaluation which can be used as a basis, among other things, for 
granting periodic salary Increases. At present, it seeres that the current 
practice of blind, automatic increases will have to continue until such
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time as the authorities are able to implement a system of performance 
evaluation which can appraise and measure the relative merits of govern­
ment employees and treat them according to their true worth as servants 
of the people.
Allowances
It would be misleading to study the problem of civil service 
salaries in Lebanon apart from that of allowances. The Lebanese govern­
ment grants a number of salary "differentials" and allowances which, in 
many cases, add up to a significant percentage of the basic remuneration. 
Again, these allowances and differentials, which are a feature of the 
Lebanese system, are not related to the duties and responsibilities of 
the position and represent a violation of the basic principles of posi­
tion classification. It is true that such allowances are necessary and 
welcome supplements to low basic salaries; but, unfortunately, they 
help to perpetuate pay inequities in the ranks of the civil service.
Sound pay practices dictate that all types of remunerations to employees 
should be reflected in the basic salary which is determined in the light 
of the difficulty and responsibility of the job to be done.
Family Allowance: This allowance is paid to married personnel 
and varies with the number of dependents. At present it is L.L. 15 per 
month for each dependent with a maximum of L.L. 90 per family. The 
allowance for children continues until the age of eighteen for males 
and until marriage for females. It is worth noting that the family 
allowance in Lebanon applies to employees in private as well as public 
service.
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Allowances to Specialized and Professional Personnel: These
special allowances are granted to certain groups of civil servants
which exercise professional functions. Engineers in the Ministries of
Public Works and Transport, Interior, Public Health, Planning, Post,
Telegraph and Telephone; and Doctors in the Ministry of Public Health
and Veterinarians in the Ministry of Agriculture are entitled to an
allowance of forty percent of their basic salary if they have served up
to eight years, and fifty percent if longer. Chemical and Agricultural
engineers are entitled to an allowance of thirty percent for less than
15eight years of service and forty percent for longer.
This allowance is, par excellence, the best example of the 
general absurdity which characterizes the pay system. It is granted, in 
theory, in recognition of the professional and technical ability of 
these civil servants and is based on their educational attainments. 
Actually, this added remuneration represents a recognition of the specia­
lized duties and responsibilities involved in the jobs of these employees 
and, as such, should be included in their basic pay and should be reflected 
in a higher classification of their positions. Moreover, the various 
engineers who benefit from this law and who work in different departments 
often occupy widely dissimilar posts and carry out work of varying 
responsibility. Nevertheless, they are all paid the same allowance.
^Decree No. 15703, March 6, 1964.
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This stipulation in the law has, quite understandably, 
aroused complaints from other civil servants who regard themselves as 
professional people but who are denied the allowance. The most important 
and influential among them are the state-employed lawyers, who have been 
pressing for a professional allowance similar to that granted to engineers 
and doctors.
Special Allowances: These allowances are paid for special ser­
vices on officially appointed committees studying specific problems.
The Lebanese have a fondness for committee work, and it is not uncommon 
to find top civil servants serving as members of five or six such committees 
in addition to doing their basic jobs. This is not treated as overtime 
work and is not subject to overtime pay, The employee, however, receives 
regular payment for his services on the committees, which, in certain 
instances, may sit permanently.
It is difficult to determine the number of employees who 
benefit from these usually generous allowances for what is often nothing 
more than an imaginary service. But they are, on the whole, higher level 
civil servants -- of the first and second category -- and the report of 
the Lebanese Court of Accounts in 1957 gives a clue as to the gross 
amount of such allowances granted. It revealed that in 1957 a total of 
L.L. 4,000,000 was spent on special allowances to a small number of civil 
servants. Of this sum, one top civil servant received L.L. 132,000 and 
another was given L.L. 87,000.^ This information was published in
^ L e b a n o n ,  Court of Accounts, "Yearly Report of the Court of 
Accounts, 1957." (Unpublished)
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many newspapers, and the practice of granting special allowances was 
severely criticized. The government was prompted to revise its policy 
and place a limit on this highly controversial practice. The law of 
May 7, 1957, specified that no civil servant should under any circum­
stances receive allowances exceeding 50 percent of his basic salary.
Disability and Death Allowances: The law in Lebanon allows 
a disability pension to any civil servant who is permanently disabled 
in the course of duty. The pension is equal to half his salary if he 
has completed less than twenty years of service, and two-thirds if he 
has served longer.^ Employees who become disabled outside the course 
of their duty are entitled to pensions equal to one-third of their salaries
]Q
if they have completed more than five years of service.
In the case of the death of the civil servant in the course 
of duty his family is given a financial grant equal to his annual salary 
provided it is not less than L.L. 5,000 or more than L.L. 10,000, Even 
if the death of a civil servant does not occur in the course of duty, his 
family is still entitled to a financial grant equivalent to his salary 
for five months provided it is not less than L.L. 2,000 or more than 
L.L. 4,000.19
^Decree Law No. 113, June 12, 1959, Art. 17.
18Ibid.
l9Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, Art. 30.
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In the event that a civil servant becomes ill in the course
of duty all expenses incurred for his mediaal and hospital treatment
are borne by the state. Even if the illness is not the result of the
course of duty, the employee may receive a financial grant, the amount
20of which is determined by the Minister concerned. The same regulation
applies if any other member of the employer's immediate family is sick,
21hospitalized, or dies.
In addition to all these allowances, a civil servant may,
in certain cases, be granted a cash bonus as a reward for some special
service rendered. These bonuses are granted at the discretion of the
responsible Minister who is required by law to explain in writing the
22justification for awarding them. Although there is a limit placed 
on the amount of such cash payments, there have been many complaints to 
the effect that this prerogative has been abused by various Ministers.
One can easily see that the government is decidedly generous 
in granting allowances and bonuses, and that their bestowal compensates, 
at least in part, for the meager salaries given the civil servants.
But it is also evident that these practices are wanting in fairness and 
uniformity and help to inject even more injustices into the salary and 





policies which will help to eliminate much of the existing confusion and 
many of the current inequities. The main problem of allowances can 
neither be tackled nor solved separately from other classification and 
pay complexities. Without such a general and comprehensive approach, 
any solution or adjustment is bound to be lacking in substance and may 
create more problems than it can solve.
Fringe Benefits: In addition to allowances, the government 
service in Lebanon provides many fringe benefits such as retirement, 
leaves and holidays. It is difficult to figure out the monetary value 
of these benefits accurately; but compared with most practices prevail­
ing in private industry, they are extremely generous and help at least 
partially to bridge the gap in salaries between employees in the private 
and public sectors.
Retirement and Termination Indemnities; All government
employees are subject to a retirement system and they will be retired
23under the following conditions:
a. Reaching the compulsory age of retirement. This age 
varies from 60 to 64 or for those who have completed forty-two to forty- 
six years of service.
b. In some cases, civil servants can be retired at the age 




Upon retiring, a civil servant has the option of going on
pension or receiving an indemnity based on one month’s salary for each
year of service up to ten years, and two months' salary for every year 
24thereafter. Any employee who voluntarily resigns is not entitled to 
such an indemnity. However, he must receive the amount deducted for 
the Retirement System.
The retirement pension is figured on the basis of one- 
sixtieth of the average of the last two years salary multiplied by the 
years of service. No retirement salary could exceed seventy-five percent 
of the salary which the employee was receiving. All retired civil servants 
on pension are entitled to the family allowance granted to regular govern­
ment employees.^
There have been some complaints recently that pensions paid
by the government are becoming too low because they have not been adjusted 
to meet the rising cost of living.
Hours of Work and Leaves: The Lebanese government has one 
of the most generous policies in the world in connection with the general 
problem of hours of work and holidays. The number of hours of work varies 
according to the seasons of the year. j?\ir thermo re, it changes for Moslems
^^Legislative Decree No. 113, June 12, 1959, Art. 11 
2^Ibid., Art. 10.
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during the month of Ramadan. The official working hours for civil 
servants are thirty-five hours a week during winter and spring and 
thirty hours a week during summer and autumn. The official work hour 
starts at 8:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. in winter and from 8:00 a.m. until 
1:00 p.m. during the summer with no break for lunch.
Besides this short working week, government employees are 
allowed a total of twenty-two public holidays and twenty calendar days 
of annual leave and one month of sick leave per year.
It is not easy to tell how much these generous fringe 
benefits cost the government in terms of money or how much they mean 
to the employees in terms of loyalty to their profession. Some people 
tend to think that they represent a justifiable compensation for the 
low salaries paid to civil servants. But a better arrangement would be 
to increase the basic salaries of the employees and revise working hours 
and leaves in order to bring them in line with standard practices in 
more advanced countries.
Finally, the civil servants suffer from low salary levels; 
but they suffer more from favoritism, injustice, and inequity. The 
personnel administration of Lebanon, faced with these difficulties, must 
establish its salary system on the basis of:
1. Maintaining and attracting competent, well-trained and 
experienced people.
2. Providing a program for retraining and the disposition 
of surplus employees.
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3. The establishment of a compensation plan based on 
position classification which will provide information on duties, res­
ponsibilities, and qualification requirements, which make for effective 
recruitment and promotion. It will provide uniform titles for positions 
by class and standards of terminology, the maintenance of personnel 
records, the handling of personnel transactions, and the preparation
of personnel budget.
4. The consideration of a full-time government job as the 
principal professional job of civil servants, requiring the devotion of 
their full abilities and energies.
5. Implementing the principle of equal pay for equal work.
6. Accepting the principle of competence and other principles 
of merit in promotion, and leaving some room for salary increase in case 
of long tenure within the same grade.
Summary Statement
In a position classification system, positions are classified 
on the basis of their duties and responsibilities and in a rank classifi­
cation, the jobs are grouped together into broad categories in accordance 
with the qualifications of those holding them. The first concept centers 
on the job while the latter centers on the individual.
The prevailing system in Lebanon is a rank system adopted 
in 1957 and built on a fivefold classification which envisioned each 
category recruiting its members from a specific educational level. The 
over-all system consisted of five categories, each of which was divided 
into ranks and the ranks into grades.
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The present broad groupings of positions into categories 
is an arbitrary one and has not been applied on the basis of any systematic 
study of the duties and responsibilities of each position.
The rank of an individual civil servant was a fundamental
factor throughout his career and his status depended on his rank, not
the positLon which he happened to occupy. Each position in the cadre 
of the various ministries was specified as requiring an incumbent of
one or another rank.
The deficiencies of such a system are: a poor and inadequate 
basis for determining salaries; and the undermining of the selection and 
recruitment processes in the country. Its advantages include its rela­
tive simplicity which is important to Lebanon due to the lack of the 
necessary staff to devise a position classification plan.
The problem of pay is one of the most important factors in 
a public personnel program because of its direct relationship to morale 
and to the government's ability to recruit and retain qualified employees.
The salary scale was tied directly to rank. It was inade­
quate and provided no basis for'equal pay for equal work*. It does not 
provide adequate compensation which has resulted in low morale and 
dishonesty.
Allowances constituted one of the most important means by 
which civil servants compensated for their inadequate salaries and the 
Lebanese government is decidedly generous in granting various allowances 
such as family, specialized and special types which amount to significant 
sums.
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Government service in Lebanon provides many intangible 
benefits which constitute important inducements to civil servants whose 
salaries are low. The most important of these benefits are retirement 
pensions, termination indemnities, moderate hours of work, public holi­
days and annual and sick leave.
The staffing procedures of a bureaucracy determine, to a 
large extent, its basic characteristics. Thus, recruitment and appoint­
ment are the initial factors of paramount importance in the personnel 
system and these features are the subject of the follbwing chapter.
CHAPTER IX 
EMPLOYMENT PROCESS
During the mandate and early independence period, the 
Lebanese administration operated without the benefit of a civil service 
law. There was instead a score of scattered decrees and arretes which 
regulated the various aspects of personnel administration in the public 
service. The first attempt to enact a modern civil service law came in 
1952 when the government was in the process of reorganizing the whole 
administrative system. The civil service law which was finally adopted 
in 1953 was basically a codification of existing rules and regulations 
in the field of personnel administration. This law was far from satis­
factory and had to be changed later. It was not until 1955 that a 
comprehensive personnel law was finally adopted; and this served the 
country with certain slight modifications until 1959, the year in which 
the government undertook an overall reorganization of the whole adminis­
trative machinery of the state.
Some of the achievements of this 1959 reform lay in the 
changes effected in the field of personnel administration. A law^ was 
adopted which provided for a central Civil Service Board which would 
act a a guardian of the personnel law and play a dominant role in this
____  t
^Decree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader, 
Collection of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964).
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respect. This same law established in Lebanon a National Institute of 
Administration and Development which assumed the responsibility for the 
preparation of candidates for the public service and the training of
2existing government personnel. A separate law dealt with personnel.
It was felt that these two main laws would go a long way in filling an 
important gap in the Lebanese system of personnel administration.
In attempting to deal with the problem of personnel adminis­
tration in this and subsequent chapters, concentration will be on the 
1959 laws.
The employment process is naturally one of the most important 
aspects of personnel administration and plays a significant role in 
determining the quality of personnel and, consequently, their performance 
and the service which they can render to the public. It is true that 
Lebanon, even as early as the mandate days, had some arretes which regu­
lated public employment, but these did not really constitute a purposeful 
and systematic mechanism which could ensure the selection of competent 
and qualified staff for the civil service. As a result, the Lebanese 
administration has been saddled with a large number of poorly qualified 
personnel who cannot possibly serve the needs of a continuously growing 
bureaucracy. It is to be hoped that the new personnel policies embodied 
in the 1959 law will help overcome this basic defect in the Lebanese i
civil service.
^Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Ibid.
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Recruitment
Recruitment is the first important step in the employment 
process and is the procedure by which the best talent can be attracted 
to compete for jobs in the government.^ Recruitment to the Lebanese 
civil service is subject to some serious limitations which greatly 
hinder efforts to get well-trained and capable people into the public 
serv Lee.
The first important consideration affecting recruitment in 
Lebanon is the shortage of well-qualified candidates in certain fields. 
This problem becomes more acute in view of the expanding activities of 
the government and the growing need for the services of technical and 
specialized personnel. It must be admitted that educational and train­
ing facilities in Lebanon have not kept up with the developing needs of 
the country. There has been no attempt on the part of the government to 
establish necessary associations with educational institutions in order 
to have their programs at least partly geared to governmental needs.
This problem is further complicated by the fact that the 
government, especially lately, has been having trouble competing with 
private industry for the very limited supply of such specialized per­
sonnel that is available. The prestige of the civil service job is not 
very high, and most candidates would rather work for a private firm 
than join the public service. One of the influences of the West on
Glenn 0. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York: 
Harper, 1956), pp. 59-60.
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Lebanese society is a growing respect for, and even glorification of 
business activity and individual achievement and success in this field. 
This typically American mental attitude has found fertile ground in 
Lebanon which has one of the freest economic systems in the world.
Besides this, the government has not been able to match the 
salaries paid by private enterprise. There Is a general recognition that 
government salaries are very low^ and need to be adjusted, and this has 
been one of the main concerns of more than one Cabinet. These two factors 
--shortage of qualified candidates in certain fields, and the low salaries 
and, consequently, low prestige of government service -- have seriously 
affected the recruitment process in the Lebanese administration.
According to the new personnel law of 1959, recruitment 
becomes the responsibility of the central Civil Service Board. This is 
a decided improvement on the previous system under which individual 
ministries handled their own recruitment and other personnel problems 
independently of each other, thus producing an appalling lack of coordi­
nation and simultaneous duplication of effort.
The Civil Service Board now undertakes to recruit candidates 
for government jobs upon request from individual ministries. The Civil 
Service Board has no periodic program for recruitment but operates
^INAD, "Rapport sur l'Etude Comparative des Niveaux de 
Salaire dans les Secteurs Publics et Prives de l’Economie Libanaise," 
(mimeographed) (n.d.).
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according to the developing day-to-day needs of the various ministries.
One important point should be made clear; namely, that the number of 
staff allocated to each ministry, their grades and salaries are deter­
mined by law and incorporated to what is referred to as the ministry's
cadre. No ministry can alter this cadre without legislative authority.
All it can do is determine the number of posts in its approved establish­
ment that it still needs to fill and inform the Civil Service Board; 
from then onwards, the matter is left in the Board's hands.
Recruitment can take place either through appointment or 
through the passing of a competitive examination. All candidates for 
the civil service must fulfill four general requirements:^
1. Be a Lebanese citizen for at least ten years;
2. Have completed twenty years of age and have not 
exceeded thirty-five for candidates in the 
Categories IV and V. For candidates for Categories 
I, II and III, the difference between the applicant's 
age and the specified retirement age should not be 
less than the minimum period which a government 
employee must serve before being permitted to retire;
3. Be free from such diseases and defects as prevent 
him from assuming the responsibilities of the post;
4. Be enjoying his civil rights, has not been sentenced
for a crime or attempt at a crime, or for a dis­
honorable misdemeanor. These provisions shall apply 
to such persons as have been rehabilitated or have 
benefited by pardon.
Besides these general requirements, each ministry may specify 
any other requirement which it considers desirable for certain special jobs.
^Decree Law No. 112, op. cit., Art. 4.
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The outstanding characteristic of recruitment in Lebanon 
is the fact that the Lebanese have geared recruitment to the educational 
system. There is an overemphasis on academic degrees, especially the 
Law degree (Licence en Droit). Study in Law is still basic despite 
recent introduction of the Social Sciences. This has been one of 
the weaknesses of the system in Lebanon because it has resulted in a 
civil service well staffed with holders of academic degrees but inferior 
in efficiency and performance. Theoretical training, although essential 
in any civil service, cannot replace practical knowledge and experience; 
and the Lebanese administration should be re-oriented in order to allow 
for a balanced compromise between these two approaches.
Table IX, below, presents the minimum educational require­
ments for direct entry into the Lebanese Civil Service.
Applicants for positions in the fifth category, which is the 
lowest, are not required to possess any academic degrees but have to 
participate in an examination which is administed by the Civil Service 
Board. Positions in this category include those of janitors, drivers, 
messengers, etc..
Applicants to the fourth category in the Lebanese civil
service, which includes clerical and sub-clerical positions, have to
pass an examination and should possess at least a Lebanese Baccalaureate
Degree - Part II or its equivalent. Applicants for positions of postal
clerks, telephone operators, and typists within this group are exempted
£




MINIMUM EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT ENTRY INTO THE 
LEBANESE CIVIL SERVICES
Category Rank Degree Requirements Competitive Examinations
V -janitors, drivers, messengers No degree Yes
IV (2) -elementary teachers






IV (1) -clerical and sub-clerical
D
Baccalaureat -Part II Yes
III -administrative positions Licence in Law or equivalent0 Yes
II -administrative positions cLicense in Law or equivalent Yes
I -High Administrative positions Higher university degrees No
Decree Law No. 112, Ibid.. Arts. 6-12.
b
Baccalaureat - Part 1 + 5  years’ experience in Rank 2 of Category IV or 10 years experience 
in Rank 2 of Category IV regardless of degrees.
c
The Lebanese government recognizes the M.A. degree as the equivalent of the Licence in Law.
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Applicants for positions in the third category, which 
embraces higher clerical and lower administrative positions, should 
possess a License in Law or its equivalent university degree. Any 
employee who has spent ten years of service in the higher ranks of the 
fourth category can apply for a position in the third regardless of 
his academic qualifications. Each ministry can also determine the 
special qualifications required for applicants for technical positions.7
Appointments to the second category are made by selection 
from employees in the top two grades in the third category, provided 
they have successfully completed a training program at the National 
Institute of Administration and Development. In certain cases and with 
the approval of the Civil Service Board, appointment to the second 
category can be made through an examination in which employees of the
0third category and outside persons with a university degree can participate.
Applicants to the first category are made by selection from 
employees in the top three grades of the second category provided their 
names have been included on the promotion list. In certain exceptional 
cases, candidates from outside who have the necessary experience and 
higher university degrees can be appointed to the first category provided 
the number of such appointments does not exceed one third of the vacant





Whenever there is a vacancy to be filled, the ministry
concerned informs the Civil Service Board of the nature of the position
and applications are solicited from all qualified persons. The law 
specifies that such advertisements should be announced over the radio 
and inserted in at least three daily newspapers, with a minimum period 
of fifteen days for the filing of applications. These are usually 
brief statements, which include a reasonably detailed outline of the 
required qualifications but practically no information about the job 
to be filled.
Applications are made by means of ordinary letters which
form a somewhat awkward medium for recording information about prospec­
tive government employees.
At the closing date of submitting applications, the Civil 
Service Board examines all of these applications and the supporting 
documents and weeds out candidates who do not possess the required 
qualifications. On the basis of this preliminary check, the Civil 
Service Board prepares a list of candidates who are eligible to parti­
cipate in the examination. The decision of the Board on the eligibility 
of applicants is a final one and cannot be appealed to a higher authority.
With the preparation of the list of eligible candidates, the 
recruitment process comes to an end and the second stage of employment--
^ I b i d . , Art. 8.
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namely, examinations--starts. But before proceeding to a discussion 
of examinations, another important characteristic of recruitment practices 
in the Lebanese administration should be pointed out.
Recruitment procedures as provided for in law seems to be 
reasonable and adequate in scope. But in applying these provisions, 
the government has displayed a basic lack of awareness and understanding 
of the real purposes and objectives of modern recruitment programs.
The attitude of the government is fundamentally a negative one and aims 
mainly at the elimination of unqualified applicants through the simple 
routine of going through submitted applications. There is no positive 
attempt to make a serious search for fully qualified candidates, much 
less to encourage them to apply for civil service jobs. The only 
incentives employed are the simple, dull, and unattractive advertise­
ments in the papers and over the radio. There is no vigorous and 
aggressive program of public relations keyed to attract candidates to 
the service. There is hardly any attempt by the government to contact 
potential sources of applicants at regular intervals and to establish 
friendly relationships with them. All of these factors have greatly 
undermined the usefulness of existing recruitment policies. What the 
government really needs is a change in its attitude and in its very 
concept of recruitment rather than a mere change in the law which can 
with the proper attitude and approach be put to effective use.^




The present law in Lebanon provides that with very few 
exceptions no appointments can be made to any positions in the civil 
service except on the basis of examinations. Until recently, examina­
tions were prepared and administered by the individual ministries. In 
1959, the newly established Civil Service Board was entrusted with the 
responsibility of preparing and conducting examinations for all vacancies 
throughout the Lebanese administration.
Thus, following the preparation of the list of eligible 
candidates, the Civil Service Board appoints an examining committee to 
prepare examination questions, administer them to the applicants, and 
correct them. Such committees are normally composed of government 
employees and some outside members usually drawn from educational insti­
tutions. After correcting the examination papers, the committee prepares 
a list of eligible candidates ranked in the order in which they have 
passed, from which appointments are made. This list remains valid for 
a period of one year. The Civil Service Board reserves to itself the 
right to treat any examination as null and void, provided such a decision 
is made before the public announcement of the results.
A careful study of the examination process in Lebanon reveals 
a serious gap between the provisions of the laws and their actual appli- 
cations. It Is true that the Lebanese government recognizes examination 
as the best tool for the selection of government employees, but the way 
they are used in Lebanon makes them ineffective in the evaluation of 
the relative merit of candidates. The proper and effective use of
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examinations for personnel selection presupposes certain conditions 
which are still non-existent in the country.
The first observation to be made about this process in 
Lebanon is the fact that the examining committees which prepare, adminis­
ter, and mark examinations usually lack well-qualified and trained 
experts. It is true that they include experts in the various fields 
of study concerned, but they rarely include any skilled members in the 
preparation of examinations. As a result, the examinations are apt 
to be poorly constructed and to provide an unreliable basis for measuring 
the relative knowledge and abilities of the candidates.
Another important consideration is the fact that examinations 
in Lebanon are not properly related to the requirements of the positions 
being filled. No use is made of descriptions as a scientific basis for 
the preparation of examinations. Whenever a vacancy occurs, the committee 
prepares an examination on the basis of its own understanding of the 
requirements of the job rather than on the basis of a detailed and care­
fully prepared description of the post in question. Such an attitude 
is fundamentally the result of a lack of awareness of the significance 
of job descriptions, and it will have to be changed if the government 
wants to prepare realistic and reliable examinations.
Examinations in Lebanon are very "theoretical" in nature and 
tend to concentrate on assessing the general academic knowledge of the 
applicants. Such a type of examination cannot detect and measure the 
specialized knowledge and experience which may be essential for efficient 
performance in certain jobs. What is more important is that there are
indications that the examination system for civil service jobs in 
Lebanon is closely geared to the curriculum of one particular university 
of the country. This means that graduates of the other universities, 
although allowed to compete for civil service jobs, are really at a 
great disadvantage because of the way in which examinations are prepared. 
This policy has seriously affected the composition of the public service 
in which graduates of the St. Joseph University far outnumber those of 
the American or Lebanese Universities.
Finally, one cannot fail to observe that the government is 
unaware of many of the changes and improvements which have been affected 
in this field. It is known that research in the sphere of testing and 
psychology has resulted in some significant developments which have 
definitely enhanced the capacity to discover and measure human abilities. 
The Lebanese government has not yet made use of such new developments. 
There is hardly any use made of objective examinations which are very 
useful devices for measuring certain specific abilities. The interview, 
which is a very effective method of selection and one which has been 
greatly refined and perfected, is also rarely used. Nor has the govern­
ment bothered to recruit the necessary specialized staff to conduct 
research and experiments in various fields of selection in order to 
adopt the most suitable and effective means for its own use. The whole 
examination system is still in the handB of amateurs who possess neither 
the knowledge nor the training required for coping with such a specialized
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All these factors combine to indicate that there are some 
serious flaws in the program of civil service examination which makes 
it far from valid and reliable. It seems that examinations in Lebanon 
have served mainly to reduce the influence of political interference 
and nepotism in the choice of applicants rather than help ascertain 
and measure the true abilities of civil service candidates. The wide­
spread criticisms of the public service and the numerous attempts at 
administrative reform in the country are indications of a definite 
dissatisfaction with the level of performance of the administration.
It seems that the selection methods, despite the good intentions of the 
legislators, have somehow failed to bring into government service 
sufficiently qualified and competent employees. The Lebanese govern­
ment, which is now so anxious to improve the quality of its personnel, 
has taken one important step towards this goal by establishing a public 
administration institute which provides specialized training for a 
large number of civil servants.
In its first year of operation - 1960 - the Civil Service 
Board conducted six competitive examinations for which 2060 candidates 
applied. Table IX -2 indicates the dates, number of applicants, number 
and percentages of those who passed. Table IX-3 shows the needed quali­
fications and the subjects of the examinations.
In 1961, the CSB held 17 competitive examinations to which 
2091 candidates participated and only 288 passed as in Table IX-4. The 











No. of those 
Who passed Percentage 
of those passir
1. Typist August 4 324 273 93 34.06
2. Assistant Custom 
Supervisor Augus t 4 182 157 13 8.28
3. Public School Teacher August 16 1,496 1,305 602 46.20
4. Custom Supervisor October 4 50 41 8 19.51
5. Statistician- Head of 
Bureau December 14 3 3 2 66.66
6. Statistician- Head of 
Section December 14 5 3 2 66.66
TOTAL 2.060 1.782 720 40.40
a





POSITIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SUBJECTS OF EXAMINATIONS IN 1960
Positions Qualifications Needed Subjects of the Examination
1. Typist
2. Assistant Custom Supervisor
3. Public School Teacher
4. Custom Supervisor
Baccalaureat-Part II
4th. Secondary or 
Brevet Certificate
Baccalureat-Part II + 
5 years' experience
Arabic dictation; Arabic composition, 
Arabic typing.
General Education, Translation to Arabic, 
Translation from Arabic, Algebra and 
Arithmetic, Economics, Geography.
Arabic Composition, English or French 
composition; Science & Mathematics, 
History & Geography, Reading in Arabic 
plus explanation, Reading in French or 
English plus explanation.
General Education, Customs Regulations, 
Customs Transactions, Administrative and 
Customs Problems.
5. Statistician -Head of Bureau
6. Statistician -Head of Service
University degree in General Education and Statistics.
Statistics + a Licence in 
Law or its equivalent and 
5 years experience
Licence in Statistics + General Education, Statistics. 
Licence in Law or a degree 
in Public Administration 
or Baccalaureat-Part II 
and 10 years service.
a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 30, 1961,pp. 243-244.
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4 TABLE IX-4
DISTRIBUTION OF EXAMINATIONS GIVEN IN 1961a
No. of No. of No. of those Percentage
Position Date Candidates Participants Who passed of passing.
1. Public School Teacher Jan. 13 764 747 19 2.54
2. Asst. Real Estate Feb. 16 19 13 1 7.69
Secretary
3. Foreign Service Emp. Mar. 27 57 41 7 17.07
4. Public School Teacher Apr. 1 663 631 128 20.38
5. Assistant Real Estate Aug. 1 15 9 1 11.11
Secretary
6. Coder for General Jul. 6 30 29 12 41.38
Planning
7. Head of Bureau in Aug. 8 35 21 3 14.28
General Planning
8. Clerk for General Aug. 8 67 63 4 6.35
Planning




5 TABLE IX-4 (Continued)
No. of No. of No. of those Percentage
Positions Date Candidates Participants who passed of passing
10. Public School Teacher Sept. 5 1,230
11. Assistant Bureau Chief Oct. 27 88
for Real Estate
12. Agricultural Engineer Dec. 13 26
13. Assistant Real Estate Dec. 20 14
Secretary
14. Secondary School Teacher Dec. 18 7
15. General Inspector for Dec. 22 2















EXAMINATIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SUBJECTS OF EXAMINATIONS, 1961a
Examination Qualifications Subjects of Examination
1. Public School Teacher
2. Assistsnt Real Estate 
Secretary
3. Foreign Service 
Employee
4. Public School Teacher
5. Assistant Real Estate 
Secretary
Brevet or its equivalent
License en droit, or a 
Diploma of the Financial 
& Economic Center
Arabic composition, History & Geography, 
Composition in a foreign language, Science 
and Mathematics.
General Education, Translation from and 
into Arabic, Civil Law, and Real Estate 
Regulations.
License en droit, or lite- Oral Test; Direct translation from Arabic
rature or Science, or its in a general subject, direct translation
equivalent. into Arabic from French or English.
Political Economy, International Relations, 
Social and Cultural Problems, Financial Law 
and Administrative Law.
Written Test; General Development of Politi­
cal Thoughts (in Arabic and in a foreign 
language); International Law; Political 
Institutions in Modern Government; Transla­
tion into and from Arabic.
The same as No. 1 The Same as No. 1
The same as No. 2 The Same as No. 2
(Continued)
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7 TABLE IX-5 (Continued)
Examination Qualifications Subjects of Examination
6. Chief of Bureau in 
General Planning
License en droit or its 
equivalent or 10 years 
service in Category IV
General Education, Translation from and 
into Arabic, Public Administration.
7. Clerk Baccalaureat -I Part General Education, Translation from and 
into Arabic, Administrative Transactions.
8. Draftsman
9. Public School Teacher
10. Assistant Bureau Chief 
for Real Estate
11. Agricultural Engineer
12. Assistant Real Estate 
Secretary
13. Secondary School Teacher
Diploma in Drafting or 
two years' experience
The same as No. 1
Baccalaureat - II Part
Agricultural Engineering 
Degree plus permission to 
practice in Lebanon
The same as No. 2
Teaching Diploma or its 
equivalnet
General Education, Design.
The Same as No. 1
General Education, Translation from and 
into Arabic, Real Estate Laws, Arithmetic.
Varieties of subjects dealing with the 
Science of Agriculture.
The same as No. 2
General Education, Translation, Conducting 





Examination Qualifications Subjects of Examination
14. General Health and 1. The candidate should be an Inspection Rules and
Social Inspector inspector in the Health and Social Regulations. Organization and
for the Central Inspection Service, who have had administration of Public
Inspectoion Service 10 years of experience or who should 
have a License en droit plus 10 years 
of experience in the Civil Service,
2. He should be at least 35 years old,
3. He should have an M.D. degree,
4. He should have a Public Health Degree




Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 29, 1962, pp. 520-527.
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In 1963, the Civil Service Board conducted an average of 
four competitive examinations per week and a total of 5315 candidates 
presented themselves and 2577 passed.
Following the preparation of a list of eligible candidates 
on the basis of their performance in the examination, the next step 
is the actual appointment of the required number of candidates.
The Personnel Law of 1959 provides that appointments to the
public service should be according to the order of success in passing
the examination; i.e., that the candidate who has scored the highest in
13the examination should be appointed first. This is the normal prac­
tice in most countries which follow the system of competitive examina­
tions and is in accordance with the merit system. But despite the 
legal code, such a practice is not applicable to Lebanon because of 
Article 95 of the Constitution which takes precedence over any statu­
tory provisions. This constitutional provision specifies that in making 
appointments to the Cabinet and the public service, the government must 
ensure an equitable representation of the various religious communities 
in the country. This provision, strangely enough, is in contradiction 
to Article 12 of the Constitution which states that in making appoint­
ments to the public service no discrimination should be made between 
candidates except on the basis of ability and merit. But despite this,
13Ibid., Art. 9.
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clear acceptance of the principle of merit in article 12, the policies 
and practices in this context, have been, and continue to be, strictly 
governed by Article 95. This religious or sectarian factor, as was 
explained earlier, has profoundly influenced the political and adminis­
trative system and is still a determining social force in the country.
What this means in practice is that civil service jobs are 
allocated to the various religious sects according to a certain pres­
cribed ratio which has to be observed in making appointments regardless 
of the results of the examinations. Although such an arrangement is 
an informal one and is not incorporated in law, yet it is strictly 
adhered to by all Lebanese governments and does impose a serious limita­
tion on the application of the merit system. It is often impossible 
for the government to appoint the best candidate, as revealed by the 
examination, to a public office because of religious considerations.
For example, if five positions are to be filled by a Maronite, a Sunni 
Moslem, a Shi'a Moslem, a Greek Orthodox and a Druze and if all those 
who passed belong to one sect, they cannot be appointed to the positions. 
The Civil Service Board has interpreted this article to mean the 
appointment of those who rank highest in the competitive examination 
among their sects. Thus, it is possible to appoint a person who ranked 
fiftieth in the competitive examination and refuse appointment to one 
who ranked second. This problem is further accentuated by the fact that 
the rate of well-educated trained personnel varies considerably among 
the different sects.^
^Interview with a member of the Civil Service Board, 
January 5, 1967.
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Such a discriminatory practice is contrary to the merit 
principles embodied in the civil service laws. But, unfortunately, 
it has been impossible to eliminate it, because religious loylaties and 
considerations are deeply rooted in the Lebanese mentality and social 
values.
Appointment
Appointments to positions in the fifth category are made 
through a decision of the Minister concerned after the approval of 
the Civil Service Board. Appointments to positions in the upper four 
categories need the signature of the President of the Republic. The 
Civil Service Board also has to approve the appointments to categories 
four, three, and two.
One final point to be made about the appointing procedure is 
that it is often an unduly lengthy operation; several months can pass 
before a candidate actually takes up his duties. The decree of appoint­
ment, which has to be signed by the Minister, the President of the 
Republic, the Civil Service Board and, in certain cases, by the Council 
of Ministers has also to be referred to the Ministry of Finance and 
the Court of Accounts for a pre-audit. An appointed candidate has to 
wait until his decree has gone through all these channels before he 
can be officially put on the payroll.
Recruits appointed to the fifth, fourth, and third categories 
are placed on probation for a period of one year. Nev/comers to the
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1 sfirst and second categories are exempted from this requirement.
Each ministry is required by law to provide employees on probation 
with some kind of introductory training which will help them to adjust 
easily to their new work. This training also affords the ministry an 
opportunity to decide which employees should be retained or, alternatively, 
dismissed at the end of their probationary period. Such a probationary 
period, if properly utilized can be of tremendous value to any organi­
zation and can serve worthwhile purposes. The Lebanese government, 
however, has not shown any understanding of the importance of such a 
system. There is hardly any training for new employees, who are left 
completely to their own devices. Besides this, there is no systematic 
observation of the work of such employees during this period in order 
to determine whether they should be retained in office or not. The 
law provides that new employees can be dismissed, with the approval of
the Central Inspection Service, at any time during their probationary 
16period. One would think that in Lebanon, where recruitment and 
selection methods employed are unreliable, a high percentage of new 
civil servants would be dismissed while still on probation. Such is 
not the case, however, because the various ministries do not go into the
15Ibid., Art. 10.
^Interview with a member of the Civil Service Board,
January 5, 1967.
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trouble of carefully observing their new employees while they are on 
probation and reporting their performance. According to the best 
available records and information, there has not been a single case of 
dismissal of a probationary employee.^ This certainly offers no 
proof of the soundness and perfection of the selection methods but 
rather points to laxity on the part of supervisors in taking advantage 
of the probationary period.
Promotion
Promotion policy is, undoubtedly, one of the most important 
aspects of any personnel system, and one which can exert a significant 
effect on any agency's attempts to attract and retain properly qualified 
employees. A sound and positive system of promotion can serve as a 
direct incentive to qualified and competent young people who are encouraged 
by opportunities for advancement to make a career of government service. 
Promotion is also a very effective means of rewarding good performance 
and inducing employees to improve their personal standards. In a civil 
service similar to that of Lebanon where material remuneration and 
benefits fall short of those offered by private industry, sound promotion 
policies assume added significance and can be utilized as an effective 




On the other hand, an Inadequate and unfair system of pro­
motion can seriously undermine the morale of employees and adversely 
affect their performance. Dissatisfaction with such policies can 
result in the swift loss of valuable personnel who will seek advance­
ment somewhere else.
The Lebanese system has three distinct aspects: salary 
increases, advancement and promotion.
Salary increases are automatic increments which are granted 
to every employee solely on the basis of seniority. According to the 
present law, every civil servant is entitled to such an increment every 
twenty-four months unless he has been subjected to some kind of disci­
plinary action. One important aspect of this system is that employees 
who have reached the top grade in their category continue to receive 
these automatic increases until they reach the salary of the top grade 
in the next and higher category. This is a generous policy in comparison 
with most other systems which impose a ceiling on such increases by 
denying employees who have reached the top grade in their own category 
and further automatic salary increments. The previous personnel law 
in Lebanon was even more generous and provided for unlimited automatic 
salary increases, but this practice was abandoned because of the injustices 
which it tended to inflict on government employees. The change to the 
present system has not really involved any serious hardship because of 
the long number of years required to reach the newly imposed ceiling.
This policy of automatic salary increases, as applied in 
Lebanon, suffers from two basic flaws. The first is that automatic
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salary increases which continue beyond the category in which an employee 
is ranked constitute a violation of the principle of equal pay for 
equal work. Under such a system, it is not uncommon to have a third 
category employee, who through length of service and seniority, is paid 
a salary which is equal to or even higher than that received by a 
second category employee who is performing a more difficult and respon­
sible job. This, according to modern concepts of position classifica­
tion and pay, is both unfair and unjust.
The second defect in such a practice is the fact that these 
salary increments in Lebanon are granted automatically to all employees 
regardless of merit or performance. It is obvious that a merit system 
pre-supposes a policy of salary increases which is based on the relative 
performance of employees. Salary increases which are granted indiscri­
minately to all employees represent a violation of the merit principle 
and offer encouragement for mediocre performance; on the other hand, a 
system of performance evaluation which would serve as a sound basis 
for granting salary increases could be devised by the government.
The second aspect of the promotion system in the Lebanese
Civil Service is what is referred to in the law as advancement. This
is a system which enables the government to advance the bestowal of
automatic salary increases to some of its employees six months ahead
of time. Thus, instead of receiving an increment every twenty-four
18months, an employee would get It in eighteen months. In June of
18Ibid., Art. 33.
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every year, each ministry submits to the Civil Service Board a list 
of employees recommended for advancement (provided their number does 
not exceed 10 percent of the total number of employees of that particular 
ministry) who are eligible for a salary increase during the coming 
fiscal year. It is up to the Civil Service Board either to approve or 
reject this recommendation.
This practice, which is somewhat similar to that by which 
awards for merit are granted by some governments to their most efficient 
employees, represents an attempt to recognize and reward good work. If 
it is properly handled, it can be an effective incentive to better 
performance. But if it is handled in an arbitrary manner, it can result 
in serious dissatisfaction and resentment among government employees.
It is impossible to judge the effectiveness and success of such a 
policy in Lebanon since it has been only in existence since June 1959, 
but one cannot help quesf.ionning its feasibility in the absence of a 
performance evaluation system. Under such circumstances, any attempt 
to reward good performance is bound to suffer from a certain degree of 
arbitrariness.
The third and most important aspect of this problem is the
promotion of government employees to higher and more responsible jobs.
Promotion is defined by law as the transfer from a certain position in
one rank to another position in an immediately superior rank or 
19category. The law provides that no employee can be promoted from one 
rank . In October each year, the various ministries prepare a list of
^Ibid. , Art. 34,
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candidates recommended for promotion to a higher rank and submit it to 
the Civil Service Board with a supporting recommendation. The Board 
has either to approve or reject such a recommendation. If it fails to 
reach a decision before the first of December, the recommended promo­
tions go into effect.
Promotions from the fifth to the fourth category and from the 
fourth to the third are made through examinations. Government employees 
in these categories compete with outside candidates taking such tests. 
The only privilege allowed to government employees in these examinations 
is that those of them who have spent ten or more years in the service 
are allowed some marks in excess of outside candidates.
A close examination of this system reveals certain weaknesses 
which greatly undermine its usefulness. One notable characteristic is 
that promotions are made between ranks and between the top three cate­
gories regardless of the existence of vacancies. Each year a certain 
number of promotions are effected despite the fact that no suitable 
vacancies occur in the civil service. What actually happens is that 
these promoted employees are given new titles and new salaries although 
in practice they are still occupying the same positions and performing 
the same duties. This is a peculiar concept of promotion but is hardly 
strange in the light of the fact that the Lebanese administration has 
nothing in the form of modern position classification plan. Such a 
promotion policy has some sense in it if we realize that vacancies in 
the higher levels of the administration are very few. The rate of 
turnover in the Lebanese administration is very small and any vacancies
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which occur at this level are the result of either deaths or retire­
ments. If the government decides to limit promotion only to filling 
these very few vacancies, it will be inflicting a hardship on some 
deserving employees who have been waiting for opportunities of advance­
ment. By means of its present policy, it can provide added opportunity 
and satisfaction for its personnel regardless of existing vacancies or 
the true needs of the service.
Another important point to be made is that appointment to the 
top two categories of the Lebanese Civil Service are almost exclusively 
made through promotions from lower categories. This is provided for 
in the law, although in certain exceptional cases vacancies in the two 
top categories can be filled by appointments from outside the service. 
Such a policy has resulted in a certain degree of stagnation through 
excluding from the service badly needed new blood. This is particularly 
bad in a civil service which has been recurited mostly through favori­
tism and through inefficient selection methods which have brought into 
its ranks personnel of mediocre quality and caliber. A policy of exclu­
sive promotion from within the higher ranks of the service helps to 
bring into these top responsible positions people who are lacking in 
skill and training.
Another important observation to be made in this connection 
with the promotion system is that there is no guarantee that recommenda­
tions for promotions will be made on the basis of merit and comparative 
performance. Again it should be stressed that, without a sound per­
formance evaluation mechanism, the system yields itself to favoritism
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and prejudice. Promotions through examinations to the fourth and third 
categories are not much better because of the way the examinations are 
prepared and the lack of properly trained personnel in this field do 
not enable us to measure reliably differences in the knowledge and 
abilities of candidates.
The final point to be made in this respect is that there are 
no government-wide opportunities of promotion in Lebanon. Promotion 
is limited to employees of a single ministry who are normally discouraged 
from moving to other ministries. Such rigid departmentalization is a 
characteristic feature of the Lebanese administration which was inherited 
from the French and imposes severe limitations on employees and the 
government alike.
Summary Statement
This chapter has dealt with the fundamental aspects of the 
employment process: recruitment, examination, appointments and promotions. 
Major reforms were enacted in 1959 and affected all the above processes. 
Yet, while new personnel laws and procedures were adopted, culture 
and traditional practices still dominated the effective implementation 
of modern practices.
The factor of poorly-qualified civil servants is largely 
the result of Inadequate recruitment procedures. Likewise, low salaries 
and a shortage of qualified personnel have affected the recruitment 
process. Then too, qualifications for governmental employment are 
unsoundly based on academic degrees, preferably law degrees with less 
regard for practical knowledge and experience. Finally, the recruitment
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process is a rather colorless campaign, with no positive attempts to 
make a serious search for qualified candidates, much less to encourage 
them to apply for civil service jobs. A change in attitude and in the 
very concept of recruitment is needed by the government.
Few positions in Lebanon are filled that do not require 
examinations. While it can be said that the government recognizes 
examinations as the best tool for employee selection, this chapter has 
demonstrated that the use of examinations in Lebanon have been utili­
zed in such a way as to render them ineffective in evaluating the merit 
of candidates. Remarks made on the process included criticisms of 
(1) the examining boards; (2) the relation of a particular examination 
to the position applied for and (3) the "theoretical nature" of the 
examination system and (4) the failure on the part of the government 
to adopt any new devices such as objective tests. While the introduction 
of an examination system has reduced the influence of political 
interfernce and nepotism, improvements in the process are critically 
needed to obtain competent and qualified employees.
Appointment follows examination and again it was primarily 
the function of this chapter to make a critical examination of the 
process. Sectarian influences were found to be a major factor of a 
candidate's appointment to office. Article 95, which ensures equitable 
representation of the religious communities, take precedence ever 
any other statutory provision. Thus, it has been the case that it is 
not the most qualified nor succesful persons in an examination who 
will receive an appointment but rather the ones who rankxhighest from
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from the particular sect needed to achieve a balance In composition 
within a ministry. Likewise, the rate of well-educated personnel varies 
considerably among the different sects.
Other defects occuring in the appointment process were noted. 
The lengthy time period before actual appointment is made , by nature, 
is an inefficient routine. Furthermore, while the first year of employ­
ment is considered a probationary period, there is presently no syste­
matic observation of employees. If properly utilized, an inspection 
process of new personnel could act as a safeguard in a system where 
recruitment and selection methods are unreliable. It was pointed out 
that from records available; not a single case of dismissal existed 
for a probationary employee.
Promotion policies were the final feature in the examina­
tion of employment procedures. The three aspects of the Lebanese 
system: salary increases, advancement and promotion were highlighted.
The most important observation to be made regarding the three practices 
is the high degree of arbitrary judgment on any type of advancement and . 
the lack of emphasis on merit and comparative performance.
The real challenge in personnel administration begins after 
the employment process has been completed. To meet this challenge is 




The real challenge in personnel administration begins after 
the selection process has been completed and the appointments of new 
employees have been made. In an administration characterized by corrup­
tion and inefficiency, the role of civil servants is usually commensu­
rate with lack of initiative, responsiveness and identification with 
the broader goals of society. The most important means of improving civil 
service efficiency is proper training.
A close examination of the Lebanese Civil Service reveals 
the existence of a large number of poorly qualified and untrained per­
sonnel. This overstaffing constitutes a major problem affecting many 
aspects of civil service efficiency. These surplus employees whose 
productivity ranges downward to zero impede the effectiveness of the 
remaining staff, interfere seriously with morale, raise civil service 
costs and, most important, inevitably slow down the work of others. These 
employees have been hired as a result of sectarian and political pressures. 
Although there is general agreement that the civil service is over­
staffed, little can be done about it since any mass dismissal of employees
/
would be bound to have serious economic and social repercussions in 
the country.
Another factor which has contributed to the low quality of 
government employees in Lebanon is the unreliable selection methods used 
by the government which has not been able to develop reliable and effective 
testing devices, essential in discovering and measuring the abilities
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of the candidates for the public service. The excessive emphasis on 
academic degrees has resulted in the choice of candidates who are well 
qualified academically, but who often prove to be inefficient public 
servants.
A third factor responsible for the low quality of government 
personnel is the shortage of educational and training facilities avail­
able to government officials -- centers which could provide needed 
professional and technical training in certain fields. This problem 
becomes more acute when viewed in the light of the continuously expanding 
functions and growing specialization of government operations. Lebanon 
is, at present, undergoing a rapid economic and social change, and this 
metamorphosis is thrusting new responsibilities upon the public service 
which caii only be met by people with the required skill and training 
in various specialized spheres of activity.
It is clear that there is a desperate need for the improve­
ment of the quality of Lebanese government personnel. The solution to
such a serious problem lies in an aggressive and comprehensive training
program which would raise the level of efficiency of existing employees 
and prepare a sufficient number of properly qualified candidates. A 
number of foreign experts called upon by the government to study the 
administration pointed out the need for establishing training programs 
in public administration. Professor William A. Robson recommended to 
the government in 1949 the need for establishing training facilities in 
public administration. Mr. Robert Culbertson, after conducting a compre­
hensive study of the Lebanese civil service, wrote in his final report:
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The need for a concerted and aggressive program of techni­
cal training for civil servants has been thoroughly 
documented by each of the Ministers and Directors- 
General who helped prepare this report. These officials 
can describe in great detail their constantly felt need 
for personnel who are more fully trained in the technical 
aspects of their jobs. Employees themselves desire 
training that has not been available up to now in order 
to equip them better to meet the full requirements of 
good technical performance. Government is a complex 
business. It contains many specialized fields, for many 
of which training is not available prior to entering the 
public service. It is the responsibility of government 
to complete the training of employees necessary to give 
them full technical qualifications.
Culbertson goes on to recommend the establishment of a 
Training Service which would be responsible for:
1. Assisting each of the several Ministries to establish 
its own training program.
2. Developing a program of training for jobs in fields 
common to one ministry.
3. Securing the cooperation and use of the resources of 
established educational institutions in Lebanon.
4. Developing, in cooperation with the Ministries, a 
program of sending selected key officials abroad 
for advanced study.^
The growing awareness in Lebanon of the need for training 
culminated in the establishment of the National Institute of Adminis­
tration and Development (Institut National d'Administration et de 
Development) in 1959 which was entrusted with the responsibility of
■̂ Robert Culbertson, "Report and Recommendations to the 
Government of Lebanon for a Program of Public Administration Improve­
ment," unpublished report, Par I, pp. 7-8. (n.d.)
^Ibid., p. 8.
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preparing outside candidates for service with the government, and
3training existing government personnel.
Pre-Entry Training
By pre-entry training is meant the general education and 
preparation which a candidate receives before joining government service. 
Such education is not usually intended to prepare an applicant for a 
specific job in the public service but rather provide him with a general 
background and knowledge and information. Very often this kind of 
training enables a candidate to pass an examination for a government 
job, but in Lebanon there has been no serious attempt to relate such 
learning to the particular needs of the public service.
There are several educational institutions which provide 
pre-entry training in various technical, professional, and other fields 
including some which roughly coincide with the needs of the public 
service. Before we proceed any further in this discussion it might be 
useful to enumerate the various universities and colleges in the country 
and to give an idea of the types of courses and training offered by them.^
1. American University of Beirut
The American University of Beirut was founded in 1866 as the 
Syrian Protestant College and in 1920 its present name was adopted. It-
^Oecree Law No. 114, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Dader, Collection
of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964.)
^In writing this section about educational facilities, the 
author greatly relied on Simon G. Siksek, Bashir J. Daouk and Sami E. 
Baaklini, Preliminary Assessment of Manpower Resources and Requirements 
in Lebanon (Beirut: Economic Research Institute, 1960).
276
is the largest American University overseas and is composed of the 
following faculties:
(a) Faculty of Arts and Sciences
(b) Faculty of Medical Sciences, including
1) School of Medicine
2) School of Pharmacy
3) School of Nursing
4) School of Public Health
(c) Faculty of Engineering
(d) Faculty of Agricultural Sciences
2. University of Saint Joseph
This university is also a private one founded in 1875 by the 
Society of Jesus. It includes the following faculties:
(a) Faculty of Medicine
(b) Institute of Oriental Studies
(c) Faculty of Law
(d) School of Engineering
(e) Faculty of Theology
3. Beirut College for Women
This college was founded in 1924 by the Board of Foreign 
Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States and offers 
courses leading to an Associate of Arts or Science Degree and a Bachelor 
of Arts or Science Degree.
4. Lebanese Academy
This is also a private institution; it offers courses leading 
to the License Degree and includes the following schools:
(a) School of Music
(b) School of Architecture
(c) School of Art
(d) School of Literature and Social Sciences
Its school of Politics and Economics established in 1949 and
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that of Law established in 1953 have been incorporated in the Lebanese 
University.
5. The Lebanese University
This is the national university founded in 1951 and, at 
present, includes the following faculties:
(a) Faculty of Law, Politics and Economics
(b) Faculty of Arts
(c) Faculty of Sciences
(d) Faculty of Social Sciences
(e) Higher Teachers' Institute
This is a rapidly expanding university and is administered 
by the government through the Ministry of National Education.
6. Arab University
The Arab University was founded in 1959 as a branch of the 
University of Alexandria, United Arab Republic. At present, it offers 
courses leading to a License Degree in the Arts and Law.
Besides those studying at these universities and colleges, 
a relatively large number of Lebanese students seek education and train­
ing in educational institutions outside Lebanon. During the 1966-67 
academic year, there were 773 Lebanese students attending colleges and 
universities in the United States.^ There are no figures relating to 
Lebanese students attending other foreign universities although these
^Institute of International Education, Open Doors. 1967 
(New York: I.I.E., 1967), 1967), p. 24
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definitely exceed those in the United States.
One of the first remarks to be made about the existing 
facilities for pre-entry training in Lebanon is that, in spite of the 
seemingly abundant number of colleges and universities, the total 
enrollment is somewhat small. In 1964, the total enrollment in all the 
universities listed above was 12,608, It should be borne in mind 
that the non-Lebanese students account for quite a percentage of this 
figure. With the exception of the Lebanese University, which has been 
expanding rapidly, the above-mentioned institutions have limited faci­
lities and cannot hope to increase their enrollment to any significant 
extent in the near future.
This situation has resulted in a serious gap and shortages 
in certain occupations which are essential for the development of the 
country. Although no comprehensive study of the manpower resources 
and requirements has been undertaken in Lebanon, a preliminary investi­
gation of this problem points to certain shortages in specific occupa­
tional fields; such as, agriculture, public health, education, and 
others.^ One important and serious: shortage is that of technical and 
vocational training, in which existing facilities, in terms of both 
their quantity and quality, definitely fail to meet the needs of the
acountry.
^Charles Rizk, Le Regime Politique Libanais (Paris: Pichon 
et Durand - Auzias,1966), pp. 80-81
^Siksek et al. op. cit., pp. 46-48.
8Ibld., p. 40.
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Another important fact about pre-entry training facilities 
in Lebanon is that training is completely lacking in certain fields of 
specialization which are essential for the public service and for the 
general development of the country. Anybody desiring to receive train­
ing in these fields has to seek it in some foreign institution abroad.
For example, it is only recently that courses in public administration 
were offered for the first time in Lebanon. At present, such pre-entry 
training in the field of public administration, despite its usefulness 
for the public service, is available to a very limited number of students 
at the Lebanese University. A score of other and similar examples can 
easily be cited.
Another significant characteristic of the educational system 
in Lebanon is that university education tends to be very expensive and 
there are a large number of students who cannot afford it. There is no 
free university education in Lebanon even at the national Lebanese 
University.
One final remark to be made is that the system of university 
education in Lebanon is essentially a private one. It is a diverse and 
heterogeneous system which, apart from the Lebanese University, is com­
posed of private local and foreign schools representing different tradi­
tions and cultures which are permitted almost complete freedom of action 
in developing their program and curricula. The government has refrained 
from any interference in this domain and has not. even attempted to 
cooperate with these universities in developing certain programs which 
are deemed essential for the public service. There is no doubt that
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the Lebanese government has failed properly to exploit the existing 
educational institutions in the country which could, in many cases, 
have modified their courses and programs to fit the needs of the govern­
ment.
In conclusion, one might say that educational facilities 
for pre-entry training are reasonably adequate in certain spheres but 
definitely deficient in others. Correction of this problem will not 
be met independently by either institution. It is dependent on a 
proper and close cooperation between the government and the various 
educational institutions in the country. While the government could 
make effective use of existing facilities, it must conduct a careful 
study of its future needs and the available human resources in the
country. It is only on the basis of such a study that proper and pur­
poseful steps can be taken to correct existing deficiencies and provide 
for future requirements.
Post-Entry Training
The emphasis on post-entry training in the field of public
administration is relatively new. Until recently there was a general
belief that proper recruitment and selection methods would insure the 
appointment of qualified and well-equipped candidates who could be 
trusted to perform efficiently in their jobs. Such an assumption 
according to Professor 0. Glenn Stahl, is "naive and short-sighted."^
^Glenn 0. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (4th Edition; 
New York: Harper, 1956), p. 336.
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In the words of Professor Felix A. Nigro
...training represents a continuing necessity in the 
same way that the education of a person never really 
ends. There is always something more to learn. No 
public employee can ever be considered perfectly 
equipped for his job. The role of in-service or, as 
it is sometimes called, post-entry training, is to 
stimulate the worker to put forth his hest effort 
and to help him improve his performance.
There has been a growing awareness and recognition of the
need for such training in the public service. Here, as in many other
fields of administration, private industry was the pioneer in developing
training programs for its employees. Today, we find that private firms 
invest substantial amounts of money in in-service training programs 
which are intended to improve the performance and efficiency of their 
employees. Besides the example of private industry, there is now 
sufficient evidence of the success of in-service training in public 
agencies to justify its adoption and the costs involved in it.^
Thus the lack of educational and training institutions for 
specialized training in certain fields, the sectarian and political 
pressures prevailing in the country, and the poor and unreliable 
selection methods used by the Civil Service, have all combined to produce 
a poorly trained and unskilled civil service which cannot adequately serve 
the growing needs of the country.
l^Felix A. Nigro, Public Personnel Administration (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1959), p. 226.
^Stahl, op. cit., p. 337.
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Until 1959, there was very little serious work in this 
direction. The in-service training activities of the government were 
limited to a handful of programs, often inadequate, provided for by 
individual ministries for certain categories of their employees. There 
was no central agency responsible for the preparation of a comprehensive 
and over-all training program throughout the public service. Each 
ministry acted independently and developed its own training programs.
The first attempt at systematic in-service training by the 
Lebanese government was the establishment in 1952 of an Institute of 
Administration and Finance attached to the Ministry of Finance. It 
was later incorporated in the Lebanese University and then abolished 
in 1959 when all students attending the institute were transferred to 
the newly-established National Institute of Administration and Develop­
ment (INAD).^
This institute was mainly intended as an in-service training 
program for employees of the Ministry of Finance, a key ministry in 
Lebanon, in view of the central role which it plays in controlling 
expenditures of the government. Admission to the Institute was on the 
basis of a certain minimum number of years of government service or a 
rigorous written examination for outside candidates. The course of
^Decree Law 114, June 12, 1959, op. cit.
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study covered a period of three years, after which the student graduated 
with a certificate recognized by the government as the equivalent of a 
Licence en Droit. The institute offered courses in Lebanese History, 
History of Art, Political History, Mathematics, Statistics, Political 
Economy, Economic Geography, Constitutional Law, Civil Law, Commercial 
Law and Administrative Law. During its establishment, more than 150 
graduated from the Institute and are now working in various Lebanese 
ministries.
As may be inferred from this brief description of the academic 
course work, the emphasis throughout the period of study was on theore­
tical training. The institute was not engaged in the type of education 
intended to instruct government employees in the particular skills and 
techniques of their jobs; it offered rather a variety of general train­
ing similar to that provided by existing universities in the country, 
but adapted to suit the particular needs of the government.
In evaluating the work of the institute, one cannot, despite 
its obvious inadequacies, deny the contribution of such a modest under­
taking in employee training. It represented a conscious response to 
a felt need on the part of the government. It was a rational and 
systematic attempt to deal with a basic problem affecting the country's 
civil service. The abolition of the institute was not by any means an 
outcome of dissatisfaction with its work but was necessitated by the crea­
tion of a central agency which had taken over responsibility for train­
ing throughout the Lebanese civil service.
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INAD
The growing awareness in Lebanon of the need for training 
culminated in the establishment of a National Institute for Adminis­
tration and Development in 1959 and attached to the Civil Service Board.
13It was entrusted with the following functions:
(1) To train prospective civil servants in areas of 
administration and development;
(2) To provide in-service training sessions;
(3) To assess the needs for new employees;
(4) To conduct research on administration and development.
The Institute, which opened in November, 1960, was closely 
patterned after the French National School of Administration and planned 
mainly by a French expert specially recruited for this purpose. The 
Institute was made up of two services: The Preparation Service and the 
Training Service.
The Preparation Service: This Service is divided into two 
branches: the Higher and the Middle, al-Dara1a al-Ulia and al-Dara1a 
al-Wusta.
The Higher Grade Branch prepares prospective employees for 
Category m  employment. It is divided into three fields of speciali­
zation: Public Administration and Foreign Affairs; Economic and Financial 
Affairs and Social and Cultural Affairs. This program is open to all 
candidates possessing a License or its equivalent, from within or outside
13Decree No. 4800, July 25, 1960, in Adib Y. Sader, op. cit.,
p. 36.
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the service or those who have completed ten years of service in the
14fourth Category, regardless of the degree they hold.
All candidates must pass an entrance examination and the 
period of study is two years. The first year consists of: (1) General 
Studies for eight months; (2) A three-month in internship in a govern­
ment department; (3) One month of administrative leave. The second 
year consists of: (1) General Studies for six months; (2) A two-month 
internship in a private enterprise and; (3) The final study stage for 
four months.^
Students are given examinations at the end of each stage 
and are ranked in order of achievement. Successful candidates, then, 
fill the existing vacancies throughout the civil service.
The Middle Grade Branch prepares its applicants for place­
ment in administrative positions at the first rank of Category IV.
The program for this Grade is for twelve months and is organized on the 
same pattern as the previous one.
During the period of study of both programs the partici­
pant receives a salary and before joining either, the applicant must 
pledge that he will work for the government for a minimum period of 
ten years if he passes the program of study.
14Ibid., Art. 9. 
^Ibid. , Art. 26.
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Training Service: ^  This department is concerned with the 
training of existing employees in order to develop and improve their 
quality and performance. This service is likewise divided into three 
fields of specialization: Public Administration and Foreign Affairs; 
Economic and Financial; and Social and Cultural Affairs.
The Training Service is divided into four branches: the 
High Administrative Studies, the Higher Training Course, the Middle 
Training and the Elementary Administrative Training. Employees are not
allowed to attend more than one training session during a year.
171. High Administrative Studies: The duration is for three
months and the training is open to Category II employees on a voluntary 
basis. Each session must have at least 15 participants and not more 
than 30 and is held outside of regular working hours.
Training in this Branch includes 6 hours per week of general 
and technical studies and 3 discussion seminars of 2 hours duration 
each.
At the end of the training period the trainees are evaluated 
and ranked. Those ranking in the upper 25 percent can have their pro- 
mations forwarded for a period of six months. Subject to the approval 
of the CSB, trainees in the upper 50 percent may receive an equivalent 




182. Higher Training Course: The duration is for six months 
and the training is open to employees of Category III who are holders 
of a university degree and for employees in the upper two grades of the 
same category regardless of degree. The trainees must pass a qualifying 
examination. Each session is limited to 30 trainees and a maximum of
30 participants is allowed. The time is outside regular working hours.
The training consists of three stages: a three-month of 
general introduction and orientation (12 hours per week); a 15-day 
internship in a private organization and; a two-months stage of practi­
cal methods of work simplification and procedure improvement and the 
last stage of 15 days as field training.
Benefits to those ranking in the upper 25 and 50 percent are 
similar to those in the previous branch.
1 93. The Middle Training Course: The duration is for four 
months and the training is open to employees from the lower steps of 
Category III or from employees of Category IV who are holders of a 
university degree and who have passed a competitive examination.
Graduates of this Branch enjoy similar benefLts as the 
previous two.
18Ibid,. Arts. 88-99. 
^Ibid., Arts. 100-108.
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204. Elementary Administrative Training Course: The duration
is for four months and the training is open to employees in Category IV 
who do not possess university degrees. They are selected on the basis 
of a competitive examination. Renumeration to this group is similar 
to the previous ones.
The Institute did not launch its regular in-service training 
sessions until 1962. During the period 1960-62 the Institute held five 
special "rush" sessions for a group of higher civil servants who were 
given special training in the principles and methods of administrative 
reform. The participants were not subjected to any entrance examina­
tion requirements.
Table X-l presents the results of these training sessions.
Since 1962 the Institute has held twenty-five regular in-
service training sessions which were attended by approximately six hundred
civil servants. The type of training given to these participants was
of a very general nature and did not provide for any specialized training
in their own particular job. The program included courses in general
Public Administration, Lebanese Administration, Economics, Public Finance
21and Budgeting, Organization and Methods and Sociology.
Table X-2, below, presents the results of the training 
sessions of 1962-63.
20Ibid., Arts. 109-119.




RESULTS OF THE TRAINING SESSIONS AT INAD, 1960-1961*
Training Cycle Tour Duration Date
No. of
Participants




For Head of Service
and Secretaries 1st. 2 months 11/21/60
1/21/61
16 10 62.50
Admini s trative 
Cycle for




2nd. 3 months 3/23/61
6/23/61
60 47 78.00


















RESULTS OF THE TRAINING SESSIONS AT INAD., 1962-1963
Training Cycle Tour Duration Date
No. of
Participants




Elementary 1st. 4 months 10/15/62
2/15/62
21 14 66.66
2nd. 4 months 3/4/63
7/4/63
32 15 46.48
Middle 1st. 4 months 10/15/62
2/15/63
23 18 78.26
2nd. 4 months 3/4/63
7/4/63
22 14 63.63
Total 98 61 62.24
a
Annual Report of the President of the Civil Service Board, March 30, 1964, p. 28.
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It is still too early to properly evaluate the in-service 
training program, but nevertheless there are certain weaknesses which 
are apparent and which should be remedied.
The first observation is that these sessions included a 
heterogeneous group of civil servants with different backgrounds, jobs 
and interests. The nature of the group necessitated a very general 
approach which detracted from the effectiveness of the program.
Secondly, the number of civil servants trained thus far is 
very small. If the Institute continues its present policy of limiting 
the number of participants to approximately twenty-five per session it 
will be a very long time before they can attend to the large number of 
civil servants who need training.
Finally, the government has not provided sufficient incen­
tives and rewards for the participants who successfully complete train­
ing sessions. As a result, most of them are indifferent and do not
22display the necessary interest.
The Civil Service Board is aware of these shortcomings and
23is seriously trying to overcome them. However, many of the needed 
changes and improvements in this program require statutory changes and 
as a result cannot be speedily effected.
22 Ibid.




INAD must provide various kinds of instruction to meet the
training needs of different groups of civil servants at different levels.
The degree and method of instruction, together with the subjects of
instruction, must be consistent with the practical, day-to-day tasks
of the employees. Complete coordination between the practical and
theoretical fields is vitally important. A U.N. publication, Training
and Administration of Personnel in the Public Service states: "This
service (a training center) should arrange practical courses to meet
the requirements of actual work in the various aspects and duties of
24the public service."
The study of class specifications, provided by a position 
classification plan, would help a great deal in choosing suitable 
training programs for different groups of employees. Employees must 
also be provided with an incentive to learn. This incentive must be 
strong enough to overcome the apathy of the ordinary civil servant, who 
remains as yet unconvinced of the professional aspects of government 
positions. A definition of the responsibilities and duties of these 
positions, and the necessary requirements entailed in carrying them out 
may work as a personal incentive for the employee to improve his ability. 
The establishment of a clear relationship between training and promotion, 
tying in the competitive examinations with subjects covered in the 
training courses, is useful in creating an incentive for learning in 
employees.
a y
United Nations, Training and Administration of Personnel in 
the Public Service (New York, 1956), p. 13.
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One of the first functions of the INAD should be to elevate 
the level of the general understanding of civil servants. Explanation 
should be given in terms of the overall picture of the political struc­
ture of the country, their position before the people, and the signi­
ficant role of public employees in achieving national goals. These 
topics and some others concerning human relations could be taught by 
lectures and pamphlets. The organizational structures and major goals 
and policies of each department could be covered in the same way. To 
improve professional ability, regular courses, backed up by lectures, 
field work and seminars, must be established.
The problem of training public servants is related to 
reducing the cost of public services by increasing efficiency in 
handling public affairs. This cannot be achieved unless accompanied by 
a more rational organizational structure, a better division of labor, 
the redistribution of employees, and by cleaning out the untrained, 
inefficient surplus employees.
Overstaffing constitutes a major problem affecting many 
aspects of civil service efficiency. Surplus employees who are clearly 
disqualified due to their lack of skill and education must be dismissed. 
All other surplus employees who are not clearly disqualified must be 
evaluated in order to determine their present skills, abilities and 
characteristics and their aptitude for learning. Surplus employees 
qualified for training will have to be placed in training programs 
suited to their respective aptitudes and interests and the employment 
needs of the government.
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The central objective of the Civil Service Board is to 
develop into effect whatever changes are required to enable the adminis­
trative organs of the government to execute public policies in an 
effective and responsible manner. It is not sufficient to pass laws 
designed to meet the essential needs of the people, for those needs 
will not be met unless the system of administration can follow through 
with prompt and efficient execution. Improvements in administration 
help assure that the intentions of the government are actually trans­
lated into action and that the citizen is in fact receiving the services 
to which he is entitled. They also produce maximum benefits for the 
money spent.
Summary Statement
Evaluation of the Lebanese civil service has continuously 
evoked comment on the poor quality and lack of preparedness on the part 
of the government employees. Problems of overstaffing and selection methods 
have been discussed in previous chapters. This chapter illustrated yet 
another aspect causing inefficiency, the shortage of educational and 
training facilities. An aggressive and comprehensive training program 
would be a partial solution to this serious problem; discussion therefore 
centered on the reform attempts of the government in this area.
An Investigation was first made into the general education 
and preparation a civil servant may bring to his initial position. An 
examination of the various educational institutions demonstrated the 
serious shortages in fields of specialization essential to the public 
service. It was further noted that the government failed to cooperate
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with or encourage the various colleges to develop programs correspon­
ding to administration needs.
The emphasis on post-entry training has been fairly recent.
The first attempt at systematic in-service training was the establish­
ment in 1952 of the Institute of Administration and Finance attached to 
the Ministry of Finance. The further evolution of this process was seen 
in the creation of the National Institute for Administration and Develop­
ment, a centralized body serving all ministries.
Modeled after the French National School of Administration, 
the Institute serviced two basic areas: Preparation and Training. A 
resume of the types of training and description of the coursework was out­
lined. A number of shortcomings were also presented. Factors such as the 
heterogeneity of personnel particularly with regard to positions, the 
smallness of training class and the failure of rewarding personnel for 
the succesful completion of agency coursework were mentioned as reasons 
contributing to inadequacies in the post-entry process.
Recommendations made included the encouragement of training 
instructions to be of a practical nature, in harmony with the actual tasks 
and duties of civil servants; the establishment of a clear relationship 
between training and promotion to create an incentive for learning; and 
the presentation of the significant role of the civil servant, in an 
attempt to develop a professionalized corps of employees.
CHAPTER XI 
EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR AND DISCIPLINE
One of the most important problems facing modern bureaucra­
cies is resolving the conflict between the duties of civil servants in 
their official capacity and their rights as private citizens. Civil 
servants in Lebanon as well as in other countries have a dual status.
On the one hand, they are employees of the government and, as such, 
are supposed to operate as impartial agents of the general interest 
and servants of the people; on the other hand, they are private citizens 
and human beings entitled to the rights and privileges accorded to 
other citizens who are not employed by the state.
The essence of the problem is that a clear line of demarca­
tion cannot be drawn between the official actions of a civil servant 
while on duty and his actions as a private citizen outside the govern­
ment office. The conduct of civil servants in their private capacities 
as citizens very often has direct or indirect repercussions on their 
official duties and may impair their status as objective and impartial 
agents of the government and guardians of the public interest. As a 
result, civil servants cannot be allowed to exercise and enjoy all the 
rights which are guaranteed to other private citizens for fear of com­
promising the neutrality and integrity of the civil service. In trying 
to resolve the conflict between the rights and duties of civil servants, 
the latter has to take precedence and restrictions have to be imposed 
on the exercise of private rights for the sake of preserving the public 




In the exercise of his civil and civic rights... 
the civil servant, even outside the office, must 
impose upon himself that degree of moderation 
which derives from his position as an organ of 
the public at large. This consideration...supports 
the conclusion...that the personal freedom of the 
civil servant, especially the freedom of speech, 
of the press, of assembly, and of association, is 
subject not only to such limitations as apply to 
all citizens but also to those special restraints 
which result from the duties of his office and of 
his profession. As was the case under the earlier law, 
the liberties of the civil servant are restricted 
by those duties, not vice versa.̂
Such restrictions on civil servants have been justified by
the theory of the sovereignty of the state. The state as the sovereign
guardian of the public interest enjoys supreme authority and can impose
its will on all its members, "Government insists that in order to
preserve the integrity of public authority, it must possess the right
2of final determination in all employment relations." The state thus 
reserves for itself the right to impose on its civil servants any 
restrictions which it deems necessary for safeguarding and promoting 
the public interest.
^Gerhard Anschutz as quoted by Fritz Morstein Marx, The 
Administrative State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 
p. 147. 2Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York:
RMsen Press, 1948), p. 1.
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In practice, such a philosophy has introduced restrictions 
on the right of civil servants to participate in political activity, 
to join trade unions, and to use the strike as a means of collective 
bargaining. The degree and extent of such restrictions vary from one 
country to another, but they do exist in one form or another in practi­
cally all modern states. At present, the civil servants in such 
countries as the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany, 
are subject to a variety of laws which provide for such restrictions.
It is true that the spread of democratic institutions and practices 
has resulted in greater freedom for civil servants; yet, they still do 
not enjoy all the rights guaranteed to the average citizen and are
subjected to strict penalties whenever they deviate from the provisions
3of the law in this respect.
This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of how the 
Lebanese administration has dealt with this important problem, the 
limitations it has imposed on its civil servants, and the sanctions it 
uses to ensure observance of such limitations.
Political Activity
In Lebanon, the regulations governing the outside activities 
of civil servants are not basically different from those existing in
3Marx, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
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other countries, although they are more severe and strict. The
Lebanese constitution in article 13 provides that "the freedom to
express one's opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press,
the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association shall be
4guaranteed within the limits established by law." But, in spite of 
this provision in the constitution, the Lebanese government has, in 
its personnel law, instituted some significant limitations to the 
freedom of the civil servants. The main prohibitions included in the 
personnel law of 1959 can be divided into three categories:
1. Prohibitions relating to the political activity of 
civil servants, including the joining of political 
parties and participation in political affairs.
2. Prohibitions relating to the joining of trade unions 
or syndicates.
3. Prohibitions relating to the right to strike.
Article 15 of Decree Law No. 112 of June 12, 1959, prohibits
civil servants from taking any action which is contrary to existing
regulations. But, in addition to this general provision, it also
prohibits civil servants from
...taking part in political activities, or joining 
political parties, or carrying the sign of any political 
party or publishing, without the written authorization 
of their superiors, speeches, articles, declarations, 
or publications, relating to all matters.
It is clear from the above mentioned provision that the
^The Lebanese Constitution (Beirut: Khayat's, 1960), p. 7.
300
Lebanese civil servants are subject to a severe regime which even 
denies them the basic right of joining a political party. As was 
mentioned earlier, restraints on the political activity of civil 
servants are common in most Western countries. But, on the whole, 
democratic countries today do not go so far as to deny a large sector 
of their citizens the right to join political parties. One can argue 
that such a regulation in Lebanon is in contradiction and violation 
of the constitution which guarantees the right of association.
The Lebanese government has always argued that the country 
still has not reached that advanced stage of democratic development 
which allows the adoption of regulations applied in older and more 
advanced democracies, such as England and the United States of America. 
Some people feel that the restraints on joining parties in Lebanon is 
not only intended as a guarantee of the neutrality and impartiality 
of the public service, but also as a means of preserving national unity 
and fostering in civil servants a loyalty to the state which transcends 
their loyalties to individual groups. It cannot be denied that many 
of the political parties in Lebanon have their roots in sectarianism. 
Some of these parties do not even believe in the independent existence 
of a Lebanese state and look beyond the Lebanese borders for inspira­
tion and support. The religious and nationalist roots of Lebanese 
political parties have helped to create a sharp and dangerous division 
in Lebanese society. This dichotomy led directly to the crisis of 
1958 which almost resulted in the disintegration of Lebanon.
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As a result, some people in Lebanon argue that it is unwise 
and dangerous to allow such a spirit of division to permeate the public 
service. The way to avoid it, they hold, is to impose a strict pro­
hibition on the political activity of public officials, including the 
right to join parties.
This argument may appear convincing in theory, but there is 
a lot to be said about the actual results of its application. It can 
safely be asserted that a large number of Lebanese civil servants do, 
in fact, belong to political parties and are active members of them.
This is admitted even by the government itself which for years has been 
declaring its intention of purging the political elements from the 
public service, but has never succeeded in doing so; despite the fact 
that, after the attempt of a coup d*etat by the Syrian Nationalist 
Party in December 1961, a number of employees who were allegedly active 
members of this party were dismissed from office. Politics cannot be 
eradicated from the civil service by a simple provision barring civil 
servants from political activity. Even if a civil servant is actually 
barred from joining a party, his actions and decisions cannot be devoid 
of political partisanship and will reflect his political sympathies 
and loyalties. One does not refrain from political activity because 
the law says so. The problem is much more complex and deeper than this. 
It is one of instilling new attitudes and values in the minds of civil 
servants and citizens alike, and of changing some of the cultural 
patterns of Lebanese society itself. Obviously such a change cannot 
be accomplished by the mere provision of laws and regulations.
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The following table illustrates the number of civil servants 
who were investigated by the Central Inspection Service for political 
activities. One cannot help being surprised by these figures, especially 
if one bears in mind that the Lebanese civil servants are not known for 
their apolitical attitudes.
In addition to the ban on political activity, civil servants 
in Lebanon are subject to certain restrictions with regard to running 
for election. Up to 1960, no government employee could become a candi­
date for municipal or parliamentary elections unless he resigned his 
job six months before the date of the poll. This blanket prohibition 
was amended and relaxed in the electoral law of April 26, I960.** The 
new law excluded civil servants in the third category and below from 
this ban and allowed them to run for elections while still in the 
government service.^ If they were elected, however, they were required 
to resign from their posts.
Employees in the first and second categories are still 
prohibited from becoming candidates for elections. These two categories 
constitute the executive and managerial group in the Lebanese civil 
service and, as such, are not allowed to engage in political elections.
5S«1 im Abi-Nader (ed.), Collection of Lebanese Legislation 




NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS INVESTIGATED BY THE C.I.S. 
FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES3






aAnnual Report of the Chairman of the Central Inspection 
Service, 1964, in Official Gazette, No. 24, p. 48/2.
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In order to discourage employees of these two categories from resign­
ing to become candidates for election, the law specifies that unless 
they get at least 20 percent of the votes cast, they will forfeit all 
their rights to indemnity or retirement annuity.7 This can represent 
a serious financial loss to any employee who has spent a long period in 
government service--a fact which must make them hesitate before embark­
ing on any election venture.
The other sphere in which the Lebanese law imposes a serious 
restraint on the rights of civil servants is that of trade unionism 
and strikes. The personnel law specifically prohibits government
employees from joining trade unions and from striking against the
8government or instigating others to strike.
The prohibition against joining trade unions seems a rather 
harsh restriction and one which involves the denial of a significant 
right accorded to civil servants in most Western countries. This may 
be so in theory, but in practice it is not as serious a limitation 
as one might imagine because the trade movement in Lebanon is still 
in its infancy and, hence, of little significance. Today, there are no 
unions of government employees in Lebanon or in any Arab country. If 
the trade union movements in the W.st are taken as a guide, it is
7Ibid.
^Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Adib Y. Sader, 
Collection of Decree Laws (Beirut: Sader Press, 1964), Art. 15.
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doubtful whether any unions of government employees will be formed 
before we have witnessed the further development and growth of indus- 
trail unions.
The situation with regard to the question of strikes is 
somewhat different. The strict ban against strikes in Lebanon has 
not solved this problem. In fact, it is a particularly knotty one, 
which has not yet been resolved by more advanced countries than Lebanon. 
Although some of these countries have recognized the right of their 
employees to join unions, they have been reluctant to accord them the 
right to strike against their own governments. This is a very con­
troversial issue, and there is much to be said both for and against 
strikes by government employees. The crux of the problem is pointed 
out by Spero when he says:
Prohibitions against strikes have never of themselves 
prevented strikes by employees who regarded their 
grievances sufficiently great to lead them to assume 
the risks. Illegal strikes damage the authority 
of the sovereign which the very denial of the right 
to strike seeks to preserve.^
The ban against strikes in Lebanon has not succeeded in 
eliminating them. There have been a score of strikes by government 
employees, the most notable being the 1953 strike of telephone employees
 ------  - - -  - t
9Spero, op. cit., p. 15.
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and the 1957 strike by engineers in the Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport. In 1959, a strike by the garbage collectors of the Munici­
pality of Beirut, which lasted for over a month, created a serious 
health threat to the population and clearly revealed the danger that 
could result from the interruption of such essential services. It is 
claimed that, in 1957, the government agreed to increase the general 
level of pay only after a strike threat by public servants. It is 
worthy of mention that, in all the above-mentioned strikes, the employees 
were able to fulfill their demands, and the government failed to take 
any action against them.
This all helps to illustrate the point that strikes can
best be eliminated not by prohibitions included in law, but by the
elimination of the causes of dissatisfaction on the part of the employees
and by giving consideration to their demands.
In any case, if the freedom of the workers is to
be restricted, justice and sound administration
demand that management accept responsibility for the
establishment of machinery for peaceful solution of
10grievances and of more basic issues.
But just as civil servants have certain obligations towards 
their government, the latter has, in the words of Professor Marx, a 
duty of fidelity and care toward its employees.^ In Lebanon, the
^Wallace Sayre (ed.) The Federal Government Service: Its 
Character, Prestige and Problems, final report of the Sixth American 
Assembly (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 1954), 
p. 145.
^Marx, op. cit., pp. 120-121.
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government has not, to say the least, shown any great awareness of 
such obligations towards its civil servants. Demands and grievances 
advanced by them have often been ignored or shelved, producing feelings 
of frustration and ■issatisfaction. The strike or threat of strike thus 
becomes the most effective means by which they can impress their demands 
on their employer. If the government in Lebanon is determined to 
eliminate strikes or even reduce them, it should start to display a 
more positive attitude and endeavor to devise a personnel system which 
meets the interests of its employees.
Discipline
No organization is so perfect, no executive so ingenious, 
no personnel system so infallible that any of them can 
continuously avoid some measures of punishment for 
wrongful behavior or poor performance of employees.^
Disciplinary action is something indispensable in all organi­
zations. By definition it means certain administrative and judicial 
measures taken to rectify or prevent employees' misbehavior. In other 
words, disciplinary action refers to some penalties imposed upon the 
members of an organization when they act against the established rules 
and regulations. The form and extent of unethical and illegal behavior 
of the public servant are to a great extent a function of the ethical 
standards and values of society. Thus, a need is felt for controlling
1 o0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (New York: 
Harper, 1956), p. 451.
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or checking the misconduct of the members of an organization. The 
rationale behind such a device is that penalties imposed tend to deter
people from wrongdoing. Viewed from this angle, disciplinary action
is considered as a negative approach to prevent wrongdoing.
An important point to be taken into account is the fact 
that self-discipline is the most effective means of control over 
an employee's behavior. This view holds that disciplinary action does 
not remedy the situation fully and that employees should be developed 
in such a way as to show a conscious respect to ethical rules of con­
duct. What is right or what is wrong is not the problem. What is 
desired is the development of a conscious will in the people to act 
rightfully. In the words of Fritz Morstein Marx:
The maturity of the civil service and hence its ultimate 
efficiency depend primarily on the degree to which the
individual civil servant is guided by an appreciation
of the basic rules that must govern his conduct.
Self-discipline appears when an employee willingly behaves 
in accordance with the code of ethics and established rules. What is 
required "is a tradition rather than a law."^ To develop such self- 
control over employees, however, is not an easy task.
Recently, there has been a tendency toward a more positive 
approach to discipline. Based on psychological points of view, this 
approach holds that discipline is a function of morale. The higher
^■%arx, op. cit., p. 133.
^Norman J. Powell, Personnel Administration in Government 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 125.
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the morale the more disciplined the employee within an organization.
Leonard White has defined morale as:
Both as an index of sound employment and a positive 
means of building an efficient organization. It 
reflects a social-psychological situation, a state of 
mind in which men and women voluntarily seek to develop 
and apply their full powers to the task upon which 
they are engaged, by reason of the intellectual or 
moral satisfaction which they derive from their 
own self-realization, their achievements in their 
chosen field, and their pride in the service. ^
Alexander Leighton views morale as being dependent on (1) the 
confidence of individuals in the purpose of the group; (2) the confi­
dence in the leadership; (3) the confidence that the individuals have 
in each other; (4) organizational efficiency and (5) mental, emotional 
and physical health of the individual members of the group.^ High or 
low morale depends on a complex combination of factors which make people 
act or fail to act according to the expectations of the organization.
The factors that are conducive to high or low morale rest upon economic, 
psychological and social incentives. The importance of these incentives 
and the extent to which an employee is motivated to work are closely 
related to such factors as culture, environment, status, and social 
atmosphere. Furthermore, individuals within a culture vary in their 
reaction and responsiveness to the incentive system. Needless to say, -
^Leonard B. White, "Administration, Public," Encyclopedia 
of Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1930), Vol. I, p. 446.
l^Alexander H. Leighton, "Improving Human Relations, Applied 
Science of Human Relations," Personnel Administration, Vol. IX, July, 
1947, pp. 5-6.
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that which will motivate one may not equally motivate another.
The building of high morale is directly related to the 
nature of supervision exercised. It is the responsibility of the 
supervisor not only to seek the satisfaction of employees' economic 
and socio-psychological needs but also to make the employees enthusiastic 
about their work. This means that supervisors should know the art of 
supervision and leadership through training and long experience.
To come to the point, according to the positive approach to 
discipline there is a direct relation between morale and discipline.
If the employees are satisfied and happy in their work, they will generally
be efficient and loyal. On the other hand, if they are not happy in
their working environment, they may fall into bad habits. Punishment 
is not a curative measure. The real cause of misconduct should be 
attacked.
In order to ensure that the conduct of civil servants, both
within and outside the service, is always in accordance with the estab­
lished norms and standards set by law, the Lebanese government has at 
its disposal a number of sanctions and penalties which it can inflict 
on its employees. The Lebanese personnel law outlines in great detail 
the various types of punishments and the procedure through which they 
can be applied to secure the desired obedience from civil servants.
Here again the Lebanese law and practice have been influenced by the 
French continental system which has succeeded in developing an elaborate 
and comprehensive disciplinary code.
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The penalties to which the civil servants in Lebanon are 
liable, and which vary from a simple reprimand to discharge from the 
service, are divided into two braod categories: first degree and second 
degree. The first degree penalties, which are the lighter ones, are 
the following:^
1. Reprimand,
2. Deduction of salary for a maximum period of 15 days.
3. Delayed advancement within the grade for a maximum 
period of six months.
The second degree penalties, which embrace more serious
punishment, are as follows:
1. Delayed advancement within the grade for a maximum 
period of thirty months.
2. Suspension without pay for u maximum period o^six 
months.
3. Demotion within the grade.
4. Demotion of the grade.
5. Dismissal from the Service.
1 P6. Discharge from the service.
Disciplinary penalties of the first degree can be imposed
by ministers, directors-general, directors, chiefs of services, chiefs
of departments, and the Central Insepction Service. The more serious
19penalties can be imposed only by the Disciplinary Councils. Here 
again the law describes in great detail the procedure which should be 
followed by the Disciplinary Council in conducting hearings and
l
^Decree Law No. 112, June 12, 1959, in Sader, op. cit., Art. 55.
l^The difference between dismissal and discharge is that the 
latter involves loss of indemnity and retirement privileges.
^Ibid. , Art. 56.
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Inflicting punishment.
Reprimand is exercised by the immediate supervisor. The 
rationale for this procedure is that it provides the immediate super­
visor with a means to direct the attention of his subordinates to 
their responsibilities and duties. Since the reprimand is recorded 
in the personnel file of an employee it can, therefore, be employed 
as an effective means to control the employee's behavior. A fear 
exists, however, in its misuse by the supervisor. A more positive 
approach could be that of a formal reprimand following an informal 
one. Personal contact occasioned by the informal oral reprimand 
provides an opportunity for constructive influence over an employee's 
behavior.
The Disciplinary Councils, a French innovation adopted 
by Lebanon, are special judicial councils devised to judge the serious 
infractions made by government employees and impose appropriate penalties 
on them. In Lebanon these are basically of three types. One adjudi­
cates in cases involving employees of the first and second categories 
and of inspectors attached to the Central Inspection Service. This 
council is composed of the three members of the Civil Service Board, 
a judge named by the Ministry of Justice, and a civil servant of the 
same rank as the employee being judged, named by the Prime Minister.
The Chairman of the Central Inspection Service, or one of the inspectors, 
acts as the government's representative on the council.
The second Disciplinary Council is one which judges employees 
of the Foreign Service. Its members are named by a special degree.
The third Disciplinary Council is one which judges cases
involving all other employees of the civil service- Its members are
appointed for a period of one year, upon the recommendation of the
President of the Civil Service Board, and include a judge, three employees
from the second category, and an employee of the same rank as the one
being judged. Again, the Chairman of the Central Inspection Service,
or one of his inspectors, acts as the government's representative on 
90the council.
As may be observed from their composition, these disciplinary 
councils are intended to function as independent and objective bodies 
which can guarantee to the civil servants a fair hearing and prosecution. 
The moment a case is referred to them it becomes their complete respon­
sibility to conduct hearings and render judgment without any interference 
or pressures from superiors or outsiders. Decisions of these councils 
can be appealed to the Council of State which can in turn, either annul 
or confirm them. Confirmed decisions become final and come into force
immediately. Decisions of the disciplinary councils are not subject
21to a pardon, unlike sentences imposed by ordinary courts of law.
When a government employee is charged with some violation 
of the regulations which justifies disciplinary punishment of the second
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degree, his immediate superior recommends that the case should be
heard by the Disciplinary Council. However, the actual referral to the
Council can only be made by the appointing authority. In the case of
employees of the higher categories in Lebanon, the Council of Ministers
has to decide in such issues, and secure the approval of the President
of the Republic. The decree which refers an employee to the Discipli-
22nary Council can also suspend him from his job pending a decision.
When a case reaches the Disciplinary Council, the government's
representative is responsible for conducting an inquiry and obtaining
all necessary information and documents relating to it. Within a period
of one month, he is required to submit to the chairman of the council
a detailed report on the case, including his own recommendations. After
receiving this report, the chairman should convene a secret meeting of
23the council within one week.
The accused employee is supposed to attend the hearings in 
person. If he fails to do so, he is tried in absentia. The accused is 
entitled to read the whole dossier relating to his case and to copy 
any documents he may wish to use in his own defense. He is also allowed
n t
to be defended by a lawyer or by a fellow employee of similar rank.
t




The council is required to hold hearings and render a 
decision in the case within a period of two months from the time the 
report of the government's representative is received. The decisions 
of the council are reached by majority vote, but the minority is allowed 
to record its dissenting opinion. Decisions of the council are not 
final because the employee can still appeal to the Council of State.
It should be noted that the Council of State can neither alter the 
council's decision nor impose a different penalty. It can only annul 
the decision on the basis of irregularities in the proceedings and ask 
for a retrial, or else confirm it, thus making it final. The acceptance 
of any case by the Disciplinary Council does not preclude the possibi­
lity of criminal prosecution in the ordinary courts of law and vice 
25versa.
In trying to evaluate the disciplinary system in Lebanon, 
the main point to be made is that, from the standpoint of employees, 
the disciplinary councils have helped to protect them against abuses 
of power and arbitrary actions by the administration and have guaranteed 
them some sort of fair and impartial trial by a neutral judicial body. 
This, in itself, is a definite contribution to the Lebanese administra­
tion. But it should not be forgotten that in its present form the 
system suffers from certain deficiencies which should be remedied
Ibid., Art. 61
316
immediately if it is to operate efficiently.
The first observation which strikes the researcher in this 
respect is the wide gap between the theory behind the system and its 
actual application in the Lebanese administration. To begin with, the 
number of disciplinary cases taken up by the councils each year and 
the number of penalties inflicted are amazingly small. Table XI-2 
below throws some light on this point.
About forty percent of the decisions of the Disciplinary 
Councils from 1960-1964 were sanctions of the first degree, although 
the imposition of light sanctions were supposed to be imposed by higher 
administrative officials without trial prodedure. The number of disci­
plinary cases taken up by the councils each year constitutes less than 
1/10 of one percent of the civil servants. If one bears in mind that 
the Lebanese civil servants are not precisely known for their high 
degree of integrity and adherence to moral standards, these figures 
are surprising.
Another characteristic of the system is that it is exceed­
ingly slow and cumbersome and cannot provide prompt and firm punishment 
when it is needed. Suffice it to say that it requires the approval of 
the Council of Ministers and the personal authority of the President of 
the Republic to refer a case to a Disciplinary Council. In the past,
some cases dragged on for months and even years before a final verdict 
2 6was reached. The new law has tried to ameliorate this slow process




CASES DECIDED BY DICIPLINARY 
COUNCILS8







1960 148 50 57 29
1961 65 16 33 16
1962 118 46 37 34
1963 128 46 53 21
1964 52 13 20 6
aAnnual Report of the Chairman of the Central Inspection 
Service, 1964 in Official Gazette, No. 26, March 25, 1965, p. 48/2.
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by setting deadlines for reaching decisions, but even these allow appro­
ximately four months for the settlement of cases. Since most cases
are ultimately referred to the Council of State, this period is
27stretched to a minimum of six months.
This defect, of course, is typical of all committee systems 
and cannot be easily avoided unless a change is made and disciplinary 
authority vested in the hands of one person. There are many advocates 
of such a change in Lebanon, and this point of view has its merits. 
Before such a drastic alteration is made, however, a careful weighing 
of the merits and disadvantages of each approach should be made in the 
light of the special conditions and needs of the Lebanese civil service.
Another comment, frequently made about the system, is that 
the present arrangements for disciplining employee violate the principle 
that authority should be commensurate with responsibility. Top manage­
ment cannot exercise its responsibility of internal control if discipli­
nary authority is delegated to special disciplinary councils. Employees 
on the whole do not favor it because they are afraid of the possible 
abuse of disciplinary powers by individual administrators and prefer to 
be tried by a neutral board.
There is one variety of disciplinary action, introduced into
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the personnel law of June 12, 1959, which is outside the responsibility 
of Disciplinary Councils; namely, dismissal on the grounds of ineffi­
cient performance. Until the year 1959, the personnel laws in Lebanon 
did not provide for the dismissal of inefficient employees. Employees 
could be dismissed on disciplinary grounds, but there was no way of 
eliminating those whose performance was consistently and clearly below 
the minimum acceptable standards of efficiency. This drawback was over­
come in the law of 1959 which provided that the newly established Civil
Service Board should be responsible for ascertaining the efficiency of
28government personnel and dismissing inefficient ones.
On September 8, 1964, the Chamber of Deputies granted special 
powers to an er^ra-parliamentary cabinet to purge the Lebanese civil 
service. A combined board composed of the three members of the Central 
Inspection Service and of the Civil Service Board went through the 
mountains of civil service dossiers and compiled lists of those whose 
guilt seemed established. After cabinet agreement, 13 judges, 8 ambassa­
dors, 3 director-generals, and 141 other civil servants were retired 
29or dismissed. ?
In spite of the apparent arbitrariness of the procedures, 
since no hearings were conducted, all of the dismissed civil servants 
retired on large fortunes and did not even face social disapproval nor
O O
Ibid., Art. 71.
^ Al-Ahrar (Beirut), February 18, 1966.
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were they tried by the courts. The London Financial Times stated: ^
The purge of the Lebanese civil service now being 
so smoothly executed by President Helou has amazed 
everyone, most of all the Lebanese themselves.
Corruption here has for long seemed less a disease than 
a way of life. It has been almost a form of social 
security, rooted in the Lebanese morality of family
before State, protected by habit, by lack of public
indignation and by the political set-up. Like Gibbon, 
many Lebanese were inclined to regard corruption as an 
"infallible symptom of constitutional liberty" the 
price for the freedom which has attracted such a 
large slice of Middle East business to Beirut.
The final comment to be made about the disciplinary system 
in Lebanon is that it has a negative and a punitive rather than an 
educative function. As a result of borrowing from the French adminis­
trative system, which was to a great extent shaped by lawyers laying 
emphasis on the notion of sovereignty and the duties and obedience of 
civil servants, Lebanon has developed an authoritarian concept of admini­
stration and discipline. The concept of discipline in Lebanon is based
on what employees should not do and on strict adherence to existing 
laws and norms of behavior.
A more positive approach to discipline would treat it as the 
development of skills, values, agreement and acceptance involved in 
effective participation in institutional processes. Discipline should 
concentrate on education, participation, and consultation rather than
30Financial Times (London), March 22, 1966.
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on authority and control.
The conduct of a civil servant while on duty should 
be according to a generally accepted and clearly defined 
code of ethics and behavior. Adherence to high standards, 
however, is the result of all the forces which create 
morale, self-discipline, and efficiency rather than 
the formal techniques of compulsion. In the well- 
developed public service, men and women are led-- 
not driven.
The Lebanese government has yet to catch up with these new 
ideas and attitudes. A system of disciplinary penalties, no matter 
how elaborate and comprehensive, cannot by itself ensure proper conduct 
by civil servants. This is not to say that the principle of punish­
ment and discipline should be discarded. In addition to maintaining 
such a system, however, the government should concentrate its efforts 
on instilling and developing in its employees an appreciation of pro­
fessional ethics which will dictate to them, in the last analysis, 
standards of conduct that will be observed without any need to resort 
to compulsion.
Summary Statement
This chapter has dealt with the relationship between the 
public servant and his government in the areas of political rights and 
duties and the limitations imposed on the bureaucrat with regard to 
fundamental privileges guaranteed to citizens of a democratic state. 
Discussion has centered on political activity, trade unionism and strikes.
31stahl, op. cit., p. 460.
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In theory, the restrictions on all three kinds of activity have been 
strict and called for severe penalties when and if infractions are made.
In practice, however, it has been shown that civil servants not only join 
political parties but are also active members of these associations. Few 
people have been investigated by the Central Inspection Service. Strict 
bans on strikes have been formulated yet disruptive strikes were held by 
various public employees in 1953, 1957 and 1959. In these demonstrations, 
it was noted that the employees were able to fulfill their demands, and 
that the government failed to take any action against them. The ban 
against joining trade unions has been of little significance since the 
movement itself is still in its infancy.
Disciplinary action was also discussed in this chapter. It 
was discovered that new ideas and approach toward personnel administra­
tion namely that of the infusion of self-discipline or emphasis on morale 
through effective supervision or leadership, have not yet been incorpora­
ted within the bureaucracy. The Lebanese system, a result of the French 
administrative tradition, serves instead as a negative and punitive rather 
than an educative approach. It is characterized by an elaborate and com­
prehensive disciplinary code which outlines the various types of punish­
ment and the procedures through which they can be applied to secure the 
desired obedience from civil servants.
The penalties for infractions were discussed as well as the 
personnel and bodies, the Disciplinary Councils, authorized to judge 
such conduct and impose penalties. The evaluation of such procedures led
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to three basic conclusions: 1) For all the impressive organization of 
Councils - few cases were tried and the penalties inflicted were snail; 
2) The system was slow, cumbersome and denied prompt and firm punish­
ment when it was needed; and 3) The system violated the principle that 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A close examination of the development of the civil service 
in Lebanon reveals a certain familiar pattern which is typical, to a 
varying degree, of many developing countries which have recently emerged 
from foreign rule and domination to a status of independence. Having 
been subjected to Ottoman and French rule for a long period of time, 
Lebanon naturally has not been able to develop its own institutions of 
government and administration but accepted whatever patterns were 
introduced or imposed by these powers.
The transition from dependence to independence is a basic 
and fundamental change, in fact a qualitative change, which entails a 
change in the needs and objectives of the nation and which inevitably 
requires a re-examination of the existing institutions of government 
and administration in order to re-orient them to the new goals and 
objectives of a young and developing nation. For some time Lebanon 
seemed to be somewhat unaware of the significance of this basic and 
fundamental change and of the need to reform its administration and 
prepare it for the new tasks and responsibilities thrown upon it. This, 
to be sure, is not an uncommon failure in newly independent countries.
For it is well known that in Lebanon, as well as in other countries which 
have been through a similar stage of development, the struggle for 
independence unavoidably developed into an all pervasive end in itself, 
to which all efforts were devoted and, compared to which all other 
considerations seemed to be matters of trivia. This neglect of the
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administrative aspect of government carried over through the early years 
of independence when the country was still beset by a multitude of 
foreign and domestic issues which took precedence over administrative 
problems and diverted attention from them. Once this stage was over,
Lebanon began to turn its attention to the all-important objective of 
economic and social development. It is precisely at this stage that the 
deficiencies of the Lebanese administration were highlighted and the 
need for its improvement became an urgent problem. It was clearly realized 
that the inherited administrative machinery, which might have been doing 
a satisfactory job during the mandate period, was not properly equipped 
to deal effectively with the new problems of this vigorous nation. It was 
becoming clear that all attempts at social and economic development 
would be futile without the essential prerequisiste of a modernized, 
technical, and efficient administrative machinery capable of shouldering 
these new and growing responsibilities.
In 1952, as a result of growing popular resentment and 
dissatisfaction with the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the 
government service, a general strike led to the resignation of President 
Bisharat al-Khouri, His successor, President Camille Chamoun, showed more 
concern with administrative problems and sponsored few abortive attempts 
to reform the public service. But these were superficial and unsuccesful 
attempts which did not result in over-all significant changes in the 
administrative machinery. The Lebanese government, although aware of the 
need for administrative reform was not, however, aware of the proper 
approaches and methods to be used in bringing about the desired changes.
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These unsuccesful attempts, however, served a very important purpose by 
intensifying the existing awareness of the need for reform and throwing 
some light on the kind of problems faced and the ineffectiveness of 
methods and techniques used in coping with them.
This growing awareness for reform finally culminated in the 
1958 reform movement which is probably the most ambitious and serious 
attempt at administrative improvement in the history of Lebanon, The 
crisis of 1958, which among other things was the result of the poor 
and ineffective administrative system, revealed a pressing need for 
basic and fundamental change in this system.
The reform movement of 1958, although more ambitious in 
its scope and objectives and more sophisticated in its approaches and 
techniques, did not, by any means, bring about drastic changes in the 
administrative system but resulted in certain important changes which 
were expected to improve the functioning of the system in certain areas. 
But this reform undertaking, together with earlier ones, contributed 
to a much better understanding of the various administrative problems 
faced by the country and of the tremendous difficulties which stand in 
the way of possible remedies. It helped to emphasize the fact, which 
hitherto had not been clear in the minds of those concerned with adminis­
trative reform, that there were many administrative problems which are 
closely and directly linked to the cultural and social environment of 
the country, and for which no easy solution could be offered unless 
there was a prior change in some of the social and cultural patterns 
of Lebanese society. It was realized then that administrative reform
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cannot be viewed separately from improvements in other spheres of
society. In Lebanon, where society is still in a transitional stage of
development from the traditional to the modern pattern with accompanying
changes in social values and customs, many improvements in the public
cannot be accomplished until such a transition has been completed and
new attitudes and values imparted to the people and civil servants. This
is, however, a slow and difficult process and, as the late Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, has remarked:
The Asian admires the material achievements of the 
West but he is not willing to pay for the improvement 
by changing his life in a manner which may seem to 
him as an unavoidable concomitant of technical progress 
but as incompatible with the spirit and traditions of 
his own people.1
Before any basic changes can be effected in the administrative system, 
Lebanese society will have to display the necessary moral, intellectual 
and cultural prerequisites for such changes and transformation.
The author would like to isolate, further, what may be 
considered as being the basic features of the Lebanese administration. 
They are the following:
1. The existence of excessive centralization and authority 
resulting in undue concentration of work and decision-making at the 
senior levels of the administrative hierarchy, and an undue concentra­
tion of authority At the center of government in Beirut. There is a 
limited deconcentration and devolution of administrative work and 
authority within the ministries and between these ministries and
1
As quoted by William F. Larsen, "Government Administration 
in the Republic of Korea," International Review of Administrative 
Sciences. Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 1961, p. 312.
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their regional offices in the Muhafazah, The field's chief administrator, 
the Muhafez, continuously refers to Beirut for Instructions and guidance 
in the discharge of his functions. The ministries tend to be overstaffed 
at the lower levels and understaffed at the top. This situation generates 
congestion of work in the offices of the Director-General and the Minister. 
This, plus.the fact that decisions on routine work and, sometimes, trivial 
operations have to be made at the highest levels, creates the dysfunction 
of overburdening top civil servants with unecessary details, and leaving 
them with little time to deal with major policy.
High concentration is due, perhaps, to the smallness of the 
country and the advantages of focusing authority in one place. This is 
coupled by the thought that it is neither very efficient nor administra­
tively reassuring to delegate authority. As such, government wheels move 
slowly, heavily and, in many Instances, inefficiently.
Inregard, Riggs' following remarks may be very true of the
situation in Lebanon:
Because of overconcentration and lack of delegation, 
those close to the goals of action cannot easily 
cooperate with their colleagues in other agencies 
whose work directly affects the success of their own 
efforts. Characteristically, we find lack of 
coordination and cooperation. Moreover, to overcome 
this stagnation, new agencies are often set up in 
the hope that, outside the bog of established 
structures, action may be possible. But the new 
agencies simply add to the intrabureaucratic conflict 
and competition, increasing the burden on the top 
of the hierarchy to Impose coordination.2
2
Frederick W. Riggs, "Public Administration: A Neglected 
Factor in Economic Development," The Annals. Vol. CCCV (May, 1956), p. 77.
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2. The existence of a high degree of "legalistic" orientation,
mainly the application of the law in its narrowest sense with relatively
little attention to the long term objectives of the law and'the social
objectives of the ministry or agency.
Regarding administrative procedures, per se. little 
recognition has been given to the role that might, 
be played by positive mangament and personnel 
practices. As an example, the Personnel Law itself 
gives greatest emphasis to the legal responsibilities 
of the civil servant and the sanctions and penalties 
to which he is subject should he fail to 'observe 
its regulations.13
3. The existence of excessive departmentalization whereby every 
ministry is to a great extent a self-contained unit acting independently 
of other ministries and with minimum coordination and lateral communica­
tion— except through the Director-General. Although the Law^ provides 
that the Directors or Chiefs of Services can communicate directly across 
ministerial lines provided that they are not dealing with matters invol­
ving a general policy, these officials seldom use this authorization or, 
if they do, they use it with reserve.
4. The influence of and emphasis on academic and theoretical 
background in the recruitment and selection of civil servants. Candidates
3
Ralph Crow and Adnan Iskandar, "Administrative Reform in 
Lebanon, 1958-1959," International Review of Administrative Sciences. 
Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 1961, p. 294.
4
Legislative Decree No. Ill, June 12, 1959, Art. 9.
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for the four higher categories of the general administrative cadre are 
required by law^ to have certain specified academic diplomas or degrees 
as an essential condition, besides others, for entrance into the service.
Most notable is the minimum of a Baccalaureat - Part II (or its equivalent: 
the Sophomore diploma) for category IV, the minimum of a Licence en Droit 
(or its equivalent: the Master's Degree) for Categories III and II and 
higher specialized degrees for Category I. In general, degree-holding 
civil servants have them in Law and the Liberal Arts.
5. The premises of decision-making tend to be extended less 
by public pressure and more by high officials and administrators; these 
latter are pressured by ministers or politicians, helped by local or 
imported experts and specialists and coaxed, if and whenever it wishes, 
by higher authorities. The civil servants have developed considerable 
lack of responsiveness and sensitivity towards the public. This was, 
perhaps, the deep influence of the Ottoman rulers and later the French 
who were more anxious that the Lebanese administration and civil servants 
be more sensitive to them as masters rather than to the people, their 
needs and expectations. Also, the government appears at present to some 
Lebanese (i.e., the former population of the southernmost and northeastern- 
most regions) as something distant, an abstraction, with no relations with 
them in what concerns their problems and their means and conditions of liveli­
hood. In these remote areas the government's ability to deal and serve its 
public tends to be limited. Reciprocally, the people's expectations, in 
spite of their needs, toward the government tend to be likewise limited.
5
Legislative Decree No. 112, June 12, 1959, Arts.4, 6-7, 11-12.
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6. The presence and use of personal relationships and contacts 
rather than the official channels in the administrative process. This 
grew
...out of the fact that primary loyalties tend 
to be given to the family, clan, village or 
religious community, which has broad ramifications 
for the entire administration. It is axiomatic 
that when any Lebanese citizen finds it necessary I
to approach the government, he first seeks out 
"some one he knows" or "some one who knows some
one he knows," that is, some one with whom he ..
shares at least one of the above relationships.
Civil servants respond to this type of relation­
ship willingly and quickly and occasionally 
just as quickly when induced by some material 
reward even when no such relationship exists.**
7. Lack of qualified and specialized civil servants, generally 
speaking. Qualified human resources, the most essential factor in any 
organization, are still badly needed to play a vital complimentary role 
to the efficient functioning of modem organization and modern laws.
An abundance of unqualified personnel, due to many causes which were
mentioned in earlier chapters, forming a veritable Old Guard majority,
has yet to be drained out out of the administration and replaced by the 
qualified and the specialized. This is the main responsibility of the 
Civil Service Board and its National Institute of Administration and 
Development which must provide a more positive and sound personnel 
policy and an active pre-entry training program which is more pragmatic 
and less imbued with a rigid legal orientation. Unless this is done no 
significant change may be expected in the productivity and efficiency 
of the Lebanese administration.
6
Crow and Iskandar, op. cit.. pp. 294-295.
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8. Lastly, Is the presence of religious sectarianism, which 
is recognized by law and in practice, and its manifestation in the 
public administration and composition of the State's political posts, 
in the electoral laws and in the personal status law. As regards the 
administration, a scrupulous distribution of administrative posts 
among civil servants from the various sects, in an equitable manner, 
is followed; also, this 'sectarian equation' is strictly observed in 
appointments to the various categories of the service. This policy 
constitutes a barrier to the ingress of the "best qualified" to the 
public service. The absence of a more positive recruitment and appoint­
ment policy, on account of sectarianism, may be —  and in fact is —  
very disadvantageous as far as better efficiency and morale in the 
service are concerned.
The obstacles posed by such social and cultural barriers do 
not and should not dispel any hopes of administrative progress in 
Lebanon. Overemphasis and exaggeration of these barriers might lead 
to a fatalistic attitude which in Itself can be a most serious obstacle 
to progress. In Lebanon, the government can and should play a more posi­
tive role in speeding up the process of transition in the different 
spheres of society and in developing some of the preconditions of 
administrative change.
But, aside from these social and cultural considerations and 
in spite of them, there are many technical problems in the Lebanese 
administration which can be treated separately and where improvements 
can be brought about by the application of new devices and techniques.
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It is these problems which should receive immediate concern and whose 
treatment can result in tangible and important improvements in various
spheres of the public service. These probems were discussed in the
course of this study but reference will be made only to the most
important ones which deserve priority attention.
One of the most important problems in this connection is the 
quality of civil servants In general, which is below the desirable 
standards. This is the result of recruitment through political and secta­
rian pressures, the lack of educational and training Institutions in 
public administration, and the poor tests which are used in making 
appointments to the civil service. The establishment of an independent 
Civil Service Board to take charge of recruitment and selection through­
out the civil service has contributed significantly to reducing political 
interference. The Civil Service Board has not yet been able, however, to 
improve the techniques of testing in order to ensure the selection of • 
competent personnel. Civil service tests are still highly theoretical and, 
to a great extent, unrelated to job requirements. The Civil Service 
Board does not realize that this is one of the more specialized fields 
in personnel administration and that significant benefits can be reaped 
by securing the help of experts in this field. The introduction of 
objective tests, which are still a complete novelty in the civil service, 
will greatly help in this respect provided they are handled by properly 
trained staff.
On the other hand, the in-service training activities of the
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newly established National Institute of Administration and Development, 
will, in the long run, help to raise the standard of existing civil 
servants. Aside from improving the skills and knowledges of these civil 
servants, this institute will play a significant role in changing the 
attitudes and approaches of these civil servants and in instilling in 
them a better awareness and understanding of the problem of administra­
tion.
Another equally important problem of the Lebanese administra­
tion is the complex and cumbersome work methods and procedures which 
result in excessive and frustrating delays in the transaction of offi­
cial business. Citizens often have to wait for weeks and even months 
before completing a simple and routine transaction. The author was 
personally told by one Director-General that he knew of few transactions 
which required over one hundred signatures before completion. Although 
these are definitely an exception, they are nevertheless indicative of 
the type of procedures with which the administration is afflicted.
It is often claimed that such excessive formalism is intended 
as a safeguard against arbitrary actions and abuses by civil servants. 
Although this might be the case in several instances, there are many 
more instances when it is the result of useless and outmoded procedures. 
Simplification of procedures in Lebanon will be in the public interest 
even if it is done with the risk of violations and abuses. One of the 
most important features of any modern administration is a proper
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balance between safeguards and administrative action. In Lebanon, the 
balance is decidedly titled in favor of control and safeguards.
One of the important deficiencies of the Lebanese civil 
service lies in the fields of position classification and salary 
administration. The lack of an adequate position classification 
plan is a serious hindrance to the application to the application 
of a modem personnel policy. In Lebanon, however, the government 
is still unaware of the significance of such a tool in providing 
a sound basis for personnel administration, and equally Important, 
a sound pay policy. Those concerned with the problems of administration 
in Lebanon can contribute by impressing upon the government the serious­
ness of this gap and the need to devise a proper classification plan as 
soon as possible.
A closely realted problem is that of the renumeration of 
civil servants in Lebanon. This problem has two aspects: the low 
rates paid to civil servants compared to rates outside the service, 
and the internal differences which exist within the service itself.
Some students of public administration in Lebanon claim that, 
although salaries of the civil service are low when comapred to 
salaries which outside firms pay for comparable jobs, they are not 
by any means low when compared tc the productivity of the civil 
servants. There is much truth in this argument, but it cannot be 
accepted as a basis for treating all civil servants because it 
constitutes a very unfair treatment to the qualified and competent
336
civil servants who are devoted to their jobs. Also, the low pay of 
civil servants which does not, in many cases, enable them to meet their 
financial needs has driven them to bribery and corruption. The fact that 
the Lebanese government is presently subsidizing a larger number of civil 
servants than it needs should not deter it from considering immediate 
steps to ameloriate the general level of pay. Any improvement in the level 
of pay should, however, be accompanied by a system of incentives to reward 
the good employees who need every possible encouragement and who should 
not be treated in the same manner as the mediocre ones.
The internal inequities and discrepancies in the salaries of 
civil servants have been perpetuated by the lack of a modern position 
classification plan and by a complex system of allowances which is 
arousing much complaint among civil servants. If no adequate classifica­
tion plan can be installed in the immediate future, the government 
should at least carefully revise its allowance policy in order to bring 
to it some uniformity and rationality.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the ills which afflict 
the Lebanese civil service, but merely an enumeration of the more pres­
sing technical problems for which a total or partial solution is possible 
within the existing social and cultural setting. A number of equally, or 
possibly more important problems can be singled out; such as, sectarianism 
which should be solved but which cannot be dealt with without effecting 
certain basic changes in the social and cultural patterns of the country. 
It should always be kept in mind that a basic and a fundamental transfor­
mation of the administrative system can only come as a part of a more
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general and comprehensive transformation In the economic, social and 
political spheres.
Finally, due stress should be made of one very Important consi­
deration in connection with administrative change and Improvement in 
Lebanon. During the past decade or so, the concept of and belief in 
freedom suffered several serious setbacks throughout the Middle East. 
The drift to military and authoritarian regimes throughout this part 
of the world was, in several instances, justified by the corruption 
and ineffectiveness of existing governmental and administrative insti­
tutions which could not serve the growing needs of the new nations. 
Unfortunately there was much truth in these justifications, and this 
has given support to the growing myth among the people of the Middle 
East that demdcracy and efficiency are incompatible. Lebanon, which 
is one of the few outposts of democracy in this part of the world, can 
render a significant service by helping to dispel this myth. If Lebanon 
can succeed in malntaing its democratic institutions and developing an 
efficient administrative machinery, it would fulfill a most important 
mission, not only for itself but for the rest of the Middle East.
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